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SOCIETY, ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD
Introduction
Niklas Luhmann belongs to a generation of the most fertile social theo-
rists of the Twentieth Century, inclusive of the members of the Frankfurt 
School. His views were a major aspect of profound debates concerning social 
theory and its foundations, and included fundamental issues of transcenden-
tal phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, and methods of comparative 
studies of societies. While considered to be a major contributor to systems 
theory, Luhmann was too much of a social philosopher to be classified within 
specific parameters. After all, he was engaged in the philosophical arguments 
concerning transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, ontological is-
sues of world horizons, and meaning interconnections of social systems and 
their sub-systems.
The complex issues discussed by Luhmann will not be offered in this es-
say; the focus, rather, will be on his conception of social system, environment 
and world, and their relationships, above all their relevance for “theoretical” 
and practical understanding of the ways that societies function regardless 
of their differences. It is important to note that Luhmann is in an European 
intellectual tradition that is no longer content of explicating all phenomena 
as if from a privileged position, from “outside” but requires an understanding 
of theorizing that is also an aspect of a social and political system. All, includ-
ing the theorist and the theories, are affected by and affect the very phenom-
ena under investigation. The theorizing subject and theoretical thought are 
inner-social, historical, imbued with current modes of perception, valuation 
and interests. Moreover, this intellectual tradition has argued that it is no 
longer possible to have a theoretical thinking which is not, as a matter of 
course, practical. The reason for this claim is Kant’s demonstration that since 
the thing in itself is unknowable, then any theoretical claim about anything 
apart from phenomena is empty and hence redundant. The phenomena are 
intertwined with our activities and hence cannot be understood without 
them.
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The conception of theory as praxis is, in this context, not Marxian, but 
stems from the cognizance that (1) theories (including Marxism) do not ex-
plain events, but, as critical functions in a society, change them; (2) theories 
do not signify events directly but are conjoined with them from some point 
of interest, whether it is ontological, economic, political, or psychological; 
(3) being an aspect of a social context, theories cannot claim to have encom-
passed “all there is in society.” In these senses, theories are socially effective 
and in turn socially constituted. No doubt, these aspects will become most 
relevant in Luhmann’s efforts to deal with complex social phenomena and 
specifically his explication of reflexive mechanisms that are designed to avoid 
the positing of a “pure” subject capable of reflecting upon everything as given 
without any participation in worldly affairs.
Still another common view of social science must be excluded in order 
to understand what Luhmann has accomplished in his social understanding: 
“empirical facts” as a basis of validation of propositions. Rather, Luhmann is 
engaged in establishing the conditions for the possibility of social theoretical 
praxis that are involved in any empirical fact and theoretical proposition. In 
this sense, Luhmann’s way of thinking is more encompassing and more con-
crete. Moreover, such thinking is not explanatory but expository of the invar-
iant requirements (even temporality and change) without which neither facts 
nor theoretical statements would make sense. That is why Luhmann does not 
offer a theory, but a way of doing, a praxis of theory and social action. 
Complexity and Social Practice
The central point of departure for the exposition of Luhmann’s social 
systems is the issue of complexity and its methodical reduction. It is note-
worthy that “complexity” is not a theoretical concept but a systematic issue 
to be resolved by any society. Yet complexity appears only in view of the total 
social system and, as it will be seen later, in view of the world horizon. Sociol-
ogy, thus, is the understanding of total orientation of community in the con-
text of world horizons. The latter notion is taken up from phenomenology, 
wherein world horizons are open temporal indices of what is to come, given a 
specific social system. In turn, a social system is not a set of “facts” but an in-
terconnection of sensible (meaningful) activities that point to each other and 
are delimited against the environment and activities that do not play a role in 
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such interconnections. This means, furthermore, that what counts as a fact is 
already selected as significant for a social system. In this sense, a social sys-
tem plays a role of selectivity of what aspects of environment will be relevant 
and hence be regarded as “facts” and what will remain in a background as 
“outside” the limits of society. No doubt, the environment “outside” a social 
system may also be regarded as a system, such as an astronomical system. Yet 
in most cases such an “outside” system need not play a significant practical 
role in the social system – unless certain significant questions are raised for 
interconnections within a social system.
Here, the notion of complexity may be given a more precise exposition: 
first, complexity is a relationship between a system and world horizon and 
thus it is not a state of affairs but a process; second, complexity is the basic 
problem addressed by social theory as praxis, and thus it is a sum of possible 
events and activities. What enters here is the concept of possibility which is 
equally central in Luhmann’s work as it relates to system, environment, and 
world, and in addition, contributes to the issue of complexity. A distinction 
must be made between an environment and world. Environment is a cur-
rent variant of a combination of all events, while world is a horizon of all the 
horizons of such events as open possibilities. The concept of possibility or, as 
some would call it “modality” must be explicated in various ways. First, there 
is the ontological – “the way the world really is” understanding that relates 
to Luhmann’s notion of “totality” as open to all possible variations and all 
their horizons, and thus comprises an endless manifold of events. This end-
less totality can be, then, made more precise by selectivity and combination. 
Thus, the totality, as endless complexity, is managed at first by constitution of 
structures that are in a position to simplify or reduce such a complexity. That 
is to say, the first issue that social systems are confronted with is ordering 
the totality of possible events and their complexity by a manageable system. 
The second issue that social systems must address consists of the com-
plexity inherent in a society. The latter is a current state of actualized world 
possibilities manifest in a current environment and its selected relationship 
with human activity. The remaining world consists of unactualized possibili-
ties. A more complex society increases possible combinations and thus com-
plexity and in turn increases possible selectivity from the environment and 
world horizons which, in turn, increase the complexity of intersecting social 
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activities, requiring procedures for complexity reduction. One available so-
lution is an objectivation of the possible in a current order of a concrete en-
vironment that both enables and limits practical activities. Such a reduction 
of complexity would leave the more complex possibilities as an “irrational 
residuum.” This means that the current environment and its selectivity pro-
vide a limit to what is possible, although the limit is equally defined by the 
horizon of each event and by the horizon of all horizons – world. It is to be 
noted that for Luhmann the horizons of events and their combinations and 
world horizon are not subjective projections of a future, but are read on the 
selected environmental factors and the limits that they signify. The reason 
why horizons are not subjective projections is because the human psycho-
logical, physiological, and biological factors are equally aspects of environ-
ment and are functional only when they enter into social interconnections of 
sense. Thus, consciousness is not psychological but functions at the level of 
social system’s signification.
For Luhmann, signification is “sense” and the latter is a founding social 
concept. Social systems are “sense-systems” such that a social world is an inter-
connected sense system. What allows this system to expand is a world horizon 
and, in turn, the world horizon reveals the limits of a particular interconnected 
social sense system. Thus human social activities that comprise sensible inter-
connections are equally “motivated” by the sensible interconnections of the 
relevant environmental factors that set current limits to what is possible. This, 
then, is the meaning of the possible that must be objectified and appear on 
events, including selected human events, such as “feelings” or “desires.”
At this level, complexity also appears as a major aspect of praxis to the 
extent that its reduction is a way of managing the horizons of possibility. This 
does not mean that such a process of reducing complexity and thus possibili-
ties solves all problems. Indeed, for Luhmann a solution cannot be deduced 
from a given problem without creating other problems and without opening 
up numerous solutions, one among which might be selected momentarily. 
Such a selected solution can only function by changing the selectivity of the 
environment and horizon possibilities. This means that a solution does not 
imply what is already given but a reconstruction of the currently available 
activities in correlation to restructuration of the environment. From what 
has been said, it follows that sense interconnections are contingent. After 
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all, complexity, even when reduced, plays its role in a horizon of possibilities 
and thus there are more possibilities of acting than can be realized. Some 
sense indications toward what is possible may not be realized and with the 
shifting rearticulation of the environment may be annulled and replaced by 
other factors that are equally open to possibilities and disappointments. A 
more radical implication suggests that some possible indicated results may 
be attainable, but may have become redundant even for a social actor who 
sought to realize them. At any rate, sense indications have no necessary and 
conclusive results and hence are contingent. Here, Luhmann has challenged 
the very basis of the cherished theory of cause and effect and hence any social 
theory pretending to offer explanations. This is not to say that explanations 
make no sense, but that the sense they have belongs within a system of sense 
interconnections of human social actions. Sense interconnections comprise 
the conditions for the possibility of regarding events causally, but the very 
notion of making sense is not derivable from any theory of causality. This 
has already been known by the empiricists and Kant who left no doubt that 
causality is metaphysics.
Positivization and Reflexivity
The continuous deliberations concerning complexity and its reduction, 
as delimited above, require a set of practices that correlate social structures 
in mutually intersecting ways. To come to terms with such ways Luhmann 
offers an exposition of such practices as positivisation. This term means an 
explicit acceptance of a specific social phenomenon without a pretense to 
base such phenomenon on something else. For example, if there is a ques-
tion of justice, the latter cannot be reduced to some conception of “human 
nature” or “natural right” but must be accepted positively as it functions in a 
society. This positivity also requires a distance from the posited phenomenon 
in order to comprise a space for decisions. The latter suggests that there is no 
one concept of, say, justice, but a constant variation which requires continu-
ous management and rearticulation. The principle of variation is the most 
fundamental; that something can be changed is the basis of all stability and 
legitimation. This follows from the above discussion of contingency.
An assumed distance to a phenomenon – positivisation – is premised 
on reflexive procedures, one of which is decision. Decision is not only about 
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some social phenomenon, such as justice, but also about decisions. Obviously, 
it is impossible to subsume all considerations of a particular judicial process 
under one, even if complex, decision. The decision process must be subdi-
vided into various processes wherein one process may comprise reflection 
upon another: a court decision may be reflected upon and changed by anoth-
er court decision or by a precedent. Clearly, even when a new law is decreed 
to supervene over other laws to reduce their complexity, it is unnecessary and 
indeed impossible to foresee and pre-establish all situations which the new 
law would positivise and reflect upon. The reduction of internal complexity of 
a social system requires the intensification of the effectivity of social processes 
through positivisation. In one sense, processes of the same kind must be ap-
plied on themselves. Language must be able to speak about language, to apply 
money upon money as exchange possibilities, to teach learning and teaching, 
to do research about research, and so forth. As we shall see subsequently, pro-
cesses of different type must positivise other processes and reflect upon them 
in order to reduce the complexity of such processes. Hence, legal procedures 
may reflect upon economic practices and help reduce social complexity in 
production process. These processes that reflect upon themselves and upon 
other processes are social “reflexive mechanisms” that exemplify a broader 
principle. It is a process of positivisation constituting conditions for an ap-
plication of any process upon itself or other processes.
Luhmann sees in the process of reflexivity a basic advantage over other 
processes. For example, an extreme expansion of judicial protections for in-
dividuals in the modern age was accomplished only through positivisation 
and institutionalization of reflexive mechanisms that enabled a subsumption 
under judicial procedures even extremely fluctuating social situations and 
activities. Yet the significance of reflexive processes and positivation does 
not lie merely in its temporal aspect of transformation of old norms, values 
and practices into new ones, but also in the fact that such processes allow the 
restructuration of the selected content of the environment and values. This 
also holds for values; reflexivity multiplies and can manage value viewpoints 
that then can enter into decisions. This leads to an increased satisfaction of 
citizens with respect to the values they hold. With an increase in complex-
ity of social interactions, environmental selectivity, and open possibilities, 
positivisation and reflexivity are unavoidable. It is the central way in which 
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complexity can be reduced and expanded. Institutionalised reflexivity and 
positivisation offer greater opportunities for a greater number of norms and 
values. Of course, complexity cannot be multiplied to such an extent that it 
would overwhelm the management of information. The latter too requires 
reflexive procedures such as studies of languages, and information systems.   
A stabilising influence is provided by political processes of a society. But 
one of the conditions for stability is that a political process in a society cannot 
be seen as playing an auxiliary role to other processes, such as economy, reli-
gion, family, etc. This process must be institutionalised so that it is capable of 
positivisation of every other social process and hence be a process of reflex-
ivity of society as a whole. Yet as already mentioned, such reflexive process 
must be divided among various functions. This is necessary not only because 
the labor is complex, but because the processes of positivisation and reflexiv-
ity can never be completely institutionalised. The changing possibilization 
of world horizon and retrogressively of environmental selectivity precludes 
such completion. Thus political functions in addition constitute a deliberate 
ordering of transition from one set of norms and their application to novel 
norms. Of course, it follows from Luhmann’s thesis that political functions 
must also be positivised through an institutionalised reflexivity, such as se-
lection or appointment of political functionaries who must be coordinated 
according to specific aims and means. Other checks on political reflexivity 
will be discussed shortly.
While norms are posited and established, they are reflected from what is 
known as “values.” For Luhmann, any preference of one activity over another, 
or one environmental factor over others is valuation. With respect to com-
plexity, valuations become ideologies when preferential activities and func-
tions are reflected upon and are used to evaluate other activities and hence 
values. Values, here, are evaluated from a viewpoint of selection of activities 
and can be seen as exchangeable with other values. As soon as the function 
of valuation becomes visible, it becomes a standard of value evaluation. In 
this process absolute values discredit themselves, since it is no longer pos-
sible to evaluate values in terms of the “highest” values. After all, even such 
higher values become positivised through reflexivity as one set among others 
to be compared, discarded or selected. As noted, established values that re-
flect upon other values become ideologies. The latter become the invariables 
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among variable values and provide a reduction of complexity and thus greater 
stability. To enhance stability, ideology must respect two conditions: First, it 
must build selected programs and steer them through various changes, and 
must also accept corresponding exclusion of other programs. Second, it must 
maintain the consensus of those who must remain waiting with their specific 
values by guaranteeing that their opportunity is in the making. This is its sym-
bolic function: horizons are open for implementation of other values.
In its symbolism, ideology must create a space for alterations of values 
as well as activities. However, this means that an ideology must constitute 
symbols that are reflexively distanced from the values that initially became 
an ideology in order to correlate such values with other values and their ac-
tivities. Such a symbolic structure cannot be evaluated within an ideology 
and it becomes guaranteed by a political party as a continuous institution of 
interpretation of the ideology and its explicit values. Thus, whenever there 
are values, there are ideologies, and resultantly political parties. A political 
party is a required condition for the institutionalization of positivisation of 
ideology and its relevant values. Obviously, this structure may pervert po-
litical process, especially in a multi-party social system, by exchanging the 
values of ends and means. In principle, political activities must attain specific 
ends. Political power is thus granted to political figures in the form of compe-
tence for decision-making as means to such ends. Yet in many cases the aim 
of political parties is perverted to maintenance of power while the proposed 
programs, reflected by ideologies and their values, are evaluated with respect 
to their potential to maintain the political power of a given party. The pro-
grams become subordinate as a means to maintain power. This perversion 
makes all ideologies and hence all values extremely variable and the valu-
ation itself extremely reflexive, thus adding to the incrementation and not 
reduction of complexity – greater arbitrariness. But this too is checked by 
reflexively established mechanisms such as elections, revolutions, and above 
all practical life and its limitations.  
This can be avoided by specific norms, institutions and symbols which 
can be distanced from political processes, i.e. they must be politically neu-
tralised. Separation of powers that tend to balance each other’s efforts to 
dominate; economic praxis that in modernity is a major condition of sta-
bility and general interest. Since such neutralizations remain practical in-
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sofar as they are engaged in valuation of environmental factors and open 
possibilities, then they do not hinder the retention of reflexivity of values and 
ideologies. In addition, political parties can never be certain of ideological 
persuasion of their constituencies, they must interpret the public in terms of 
the lowest common denominator, namely materialistically. In this sense, po-
litical materialism fulfills the role of a reflexive domain that hinders political 
arbitrariness. This suggests a broader view of reflexive mechanisms than an 
application of one process upon itself or upon another process. 
This broader view reveals that reflection is not a matter of subjects re-
flecting upon their own selves, but of one process upon another wherein 
even the subjects have their positions and self interpretation. Hence reflex-
ive processes are social procedures established to manage complex functions 
and activities. As noted, economic activity – materialism – is a domain that 
provides a continuity across variations. Yet its process in modern age has 
become complex and included production procedures, division of labor 
functions and their graded valuations, exchange of commodities in terms 
of social labor time, and its costs. Hence, to manage this complexity reflex-
ive mechanisms are established. Money is introduced to manage exchange 
of commodities, pay for work, loans and profits. Yet money too becomes a 
complex process and requires a reflexive institution, such as banking where 
money is exchanged for money, but in such a way that this exchange also 
reflects the material processes. The latter, of course, is equally a reflexive 
mechanism that intersects the exchange of exchange values. Such exchanges 
are performed by conventional rules that comprise a reflexive mechanism of 
what is permitted and prohibited. Here we enter a judicial system that not 
only reflects upon exchange values but also upon the material processes such 
as labor safety, rights to leave a work place, selectivity of environmental fac-
tors that are useful but not harmful, etc. In turn, the changes in the material 
processes will provide reflexive analysis of the exchange processes and the 
evaluation of rules and the requests for their changes. It is to be noted that 
such interreflexivity is not a matter for an explanatory theory but is con-
stantly engaged in praxis. As already noted, theories are not external to social 
and historical events and thus play a role in shaping them.  
Yet in all cases, the establishment of “higher” level reflexivities is de-
signed to reduce social complexities at the lower levels. As was already noted, 
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ideologies and the manner in which they reduce the complexity of values 
are also involved in the reduction of complexities within juridical, and the 
latter within exchange of exchange values, all the way down to material pro-
cesses and the selectivity of environmental factors. No doubt, the “lower” 
levels will limit the reductive capacity of the higher, since they too enter as 
reflexive mechanisms that impact on those of the other levels and thus limit 
their arbitrariness. Moreover, the reflexive processes, such as valuation of 
values by ideologies that reduce complexities have a greater generality than 
the complexities to be reduced. Such generalities have a greater longevity 
than the shifting aspects of a complexity. For example, human activities and 
interactions bear complex meanings, such as diverse purposes, means to at-
tain them, and places and times relevant for their fulfillment. Hence, social 
time is required to reduce such a complexity by constituting a common time 
for everyone. We all know when and where we have to be to accomplish 
our tasks. Such a time is sequential, fractioned, and yet convenient for all. 
Despite labor variations in the material area, despite the qualitatively dif-
ferent tasks required in the arena of exchange values or the debates of laws, 
there is “one time” for everyone, such that the latter reduces the complexity. 
In one way, such a greater generality is also a means for social continuity 
despite changes in other domains, such as the material. Ideologies have the 
same generality with respect to other reflexive mechanisms. Perhaps one ma-
jor effort to reduce complexity in all spheres of human activities and affairs, 
despite continuous failures, are monotheistic cults. Our divinity gives us a 
simple set of rules that are “eternal” and inevitably must apply to all human 
doings. There is no need to belabor the history of the most obvious.
Conditions for Reflexivity
The brief outline above has suggested how reflexive mechanisms func-
tion “vertically” insofar as one process reflects upon another. This reflexivity 
must now be grounded in its conditions, if it is not to remain metaphysical. 
Here Luhmann points out that reflexivity presupposes, as its condition, a 
distinction between what is regarded as currently real and the temporally 
possible. It must be also recognized that what is currently real is a realization 
of past possibilities. In this sense, the past is not “gone” to the extent that 
its unrealized or unselected options may continue to be also future options 
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for selectivity at the present. Hence, a particular society does not vary only 
in terms of the presently selected and given facts and activities, but also in 
terms of its constitutive conditions of selectivity based on temporal possi-
bilities. The selectivity of relevant facts in any social process is a key to the 
constitution of a relationship between social facts, their structures and the 
temporal horizon of possibilities. The fundamental condition for possibility 
and the selectivity of facts within a social process is temporality and, as we 
already saw, modal generalization constituting temporal horizons – in both 
directions – of such a system. 
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Although some computer theorists have abandoned sender-receiver 
models of communication, the ontological and epistemological presupposi-
tions that have buttressed this approach continue to hold sway. These as-
sumption are latent in discussions that conceptualize communication as an 
exchange of information that occurs over specifiable channels of interaction. 
Such constructions of the communication process tacitly assume the exist-
ence of a structural framework or unquestioned point of reference that guar-
antees orderly interaction. At the very least, interaction is assumed to occur 
“in the world”, so that a singular spatiotemporal matrix can be cited as the 
ultimate locus of communication. Thus, reality guarantees that interactants 
can encounter each other within the world’s singular object-field.
Once this basic ontological background is established, a science of com-
munication becomes possible that focuses on the interface between elements 
in a communicative relationship as its basic problematic. All efforts to test 
experimentally for the effects of messages across differentially configured 
channels of communication are founded on this basic realist stratagem, 
which opens interaction as a domain of technological intervention, even to 
the point of replacing the end poles of a relationship with self-referential 
automata. In this realist mode, the science of communication is intimately 
connected with the technological closure of the life world and the projection 
of present socioeconomic conditions into the future.
Exponents of other schools of thought, by contrast, have seriously ques-
tioned the status of the world in human communicative relationships. Alfred 
Schutz, for instance, cogently described the existence of “multiple realities”, 
while Gilles Deleuze and followers working within cultural studies employ 
the imagery of lines, planes, and forces to describe semiotic configurations in 
a nondualist fashion. Similarly, Niklas Luhmann’s extensions of the systems 
theory have thematized the topics of time/space and history, thereby intro-
ducing cosmology as a central topic of cultural and social theory.
For Luhmann, the concept of world is critical to founding a communi-
cation-based theory of the social domain. The world, in his view, is at once 
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the meaningful unity produced by everything that members of a society rec-
ognize as existing, plus the unspecifiable horizon within which members of 
distinct systems may encounter each other. As Luhmann explains,
The relationship between meaning and world can be described as the 
concept of decentering. As meaning the world is accessible everywhere: in 
every situation, in any detail, at each point of the scale from concrete to ab-
stract. At the same time, the world is more than a mere sum comprehending 
all possibilities, all meanings of references. It is not only the sum, but the 
unity of these possibilities. Above all, this means that the world horizon for 
every difference guarantees its own unity as difference. It sublates the differ-
ence in all perspectives from individual systems, in that for every system the 
world is the unity of its own difference between system and environment.
Thus, the world is not merely the sum of specifiable elements that con-
stitute the empirical cosmos, but a manifold of meaning references, each of 
which articulate a cosmology. Such meaning systems are not closed off to each 
other; they are available to interpretive understanding, and, as Schutz explains, 
in the course of mundane activities a person might inaugurate play and pass 
through multiple worlds. But recognition of such multiple realities results in a 
conception of the world that is understood to be a unity in difference.
A communicative relationship between members of meaning systems 
thus cannot be understood in the traditional sense of a more-or-less effica-
cious interface of elements in the world. Instead, such an encounter requires 
a form of communication that in some sense brackets the world of each part-
ner and allows for the recognition of difference, mutual exchange of views, 
and self-transcendence. In other words, a communications-based theory of 
the society must be grounded on a theory of dialogue. But what is dialogue, 
and what is the nature of the space in which the dialogue relationship is ar-
ticulated? Certainly a dialogue is always concretely situated, but what, then, 
is the relationship between dialogue and world?
A basic understanding of the dialogical domain requires the specifi-
cation of its “pure” structure, in the sense that all dialogical relationships 
presuppose this framework. The following components comprise the pure 
structure of dialogue:
1. A significative orientation of the subject is initiated toward a state 
of affairs, events, or things. That is, an orientation, as an activity, 
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“means” something other than itself in a specific way. In this sense, 
dialogue is a reflexive activity.
2. By signifying, by meaning the states of affairs, things, and events, 
the subject orients himself or herself to another subject. This other 
person is not a mere object in the perceptual field, but someone who 
is being addressed about something.
3. By addressing the other, the subject orients this person to the intended 
states of affairs and to himself or herself as the initiator of the address. 
Thus, dialogue makes world and a speaker available to one another.
4. By orienting himself or herself to the other, the subject is oriented 
in turn to himself or herself, and recognizes his or her own unique-
ness and contribution to the dialogue. As a result, dialogue is an 
“encounter” rather than a mechanical interface of actors defined, for 
instance, by their social roles.
The dialogical relationship is unique because it abolishes the binary re-
lationship of the self and the world, or the self and another as an object in a 
field of perceptions, purposes, aims, and reactions.
Similarly, the partner is a dialogue is also de-centered toward the world 
in terms of the meaning given to objects and events by the dialogical partner. 
Thus, the question of intersubjectivity in a dialogical relationship is quite dif-
ferent from the traditional question concerning a person’s relationship to and 
knowledge of the other. In the dialogical context, the other is experienced 
not as an object given to the subject to be deciphered, but as a dialogical 
partner engaged in signifying things and events. In this interchange subjects 
come to recognize their own positions, similarities, and differences in rela-
tionship to the signified events and objects and in relationship to each other.
The dialogical relationship allows one to recognize multiple perspectives 
or articulations of the world. In this sense, dialogue is literally cosmopoli-
tan, for this encounter decenters and introduces the self to another’s reality. 
Today several schools of thought have articulated frameworks for reflecting 
on social reality. Even a cursory acquaintance with these perspectives shows 
they should not be understood as building upon each other and culminating 
in a view of the world “as a whole,” but instead are complementary frame-
works that articulate their own object fields and proffer competing futures. 
The categories of history, individuation, praxis, and power in concrete phe-
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nomena have been the case in the language of economics, functionalism, 
Darwinian evolution, dialectical historicism, culture, and text, to name only 
a few interpretive paradigms. As suggested, dialogue stands in a metacom-
municative relationship to these interpretive explanations of concrete politi-
cal life. As Nietszche suggests, the cosmopolitan is a player who conjures up 
the world at will by employing a tool kit of sciences. However, the concept of 
world must be explored as that which is assumed even in dialogue. The world 
as the concrete fundament of phenomena persists through the presentation 
and depresentation of concrete possibilities.
The Ontological Status of the World
Only in an unreflective attitude to human-world relationships appear 
as an encounter between two things. The relations recognized routinely by 
people are inner-worldly relationships. In the natural attitude, each person 
knows that the world is full of things that the cosmos has a typical organiza-
tion. Yet even the givenness of the world tends to lead to a recognition of dif-
ference. Each inner-worldly thing has an identity and a relatedness to other 
things – the sense of identity demands difference. Already in Plato’s writings, 
Tauton and Heteron were indissolubly bound. This relationship is one of the 
basic ontological aspects of the Western tradition, which ends in Hegel’s dia-
lectic of identity and difference.
The human, seen as inner-worldly, is defined as a “self ” in reference to 
an “other” – to be an ego, there must be an alter. The interlacing of relation-
ships between self and others gives rise to society as a field of exchanges 
between persons who inhabit specific social roles. As Durkheim showed, this 
field tends toward progressive differentiation and a concomitant specializa-
tion of role structures. Thus, the self is ever more deeply defined within a 
progressively elaborate and rigid field of differences. Paradoxically, the “in-
dividual” appears in conjunction with a civilizing process that lends society 
a beehive consistency and progressively quashes the free play of the self.8 
Thus, like Engel’s barbarians, dialogue redeems civilization by fostering a de-
liberative attitude toward fixed social arrangements. As Robert Grudin sug-
gests, dialogue is a tool of the free mind.
The very possibility of dialogue indicates that the self ’s destiny, its deter-
mination within a social field, is incomprehensible without a much deeper 
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and hardly accessible sway that pervades the human – the sway of the world. 
The world is not the most extreme limit and boundary of inner-worldly 
things; it is not a framework or a container; humans do not take residence 
in the world as worms in an apple or money in the bank. All the trusted mo-
dalities of “being in” of things are not applicable not even metaphorically to 
understanding the world, and specifically to understanding the worldliness 
of humans. The world is not an object, a region of all regions, or a time of 
all times. Evocations of finitude and infinity do not bring one “closer” to the 
world-sway. Neither is the world the sum of all humanly known objects and 
subjects. While in the world, one encounters things and others, yet nowhere 
does one encounter the world as a thing, an object, or the other. Is the world 
simply an openness to things and of things? After all, the various apprehend-
able regions of things, the living, the inert, the tactile, the caressable, the aes-
thetic, and the intellectual, have not been and perhaps cannot be exhausted 
by human reasoning. But were one a God, an infinite mind, an all-knowing 
power taking up residence in a most advantageous region, could one then 
know the world? Indeed, one would know infinitely more, but the world is 
not one of the objects of knowledge.
If the world is not accessible to any thought, then perhaps it is nothing 
at all. Should one not assume a skeptical attitude, if the world resists all ar-
ticulation? But is everything an object of experience? It has been noted that 
not everything is present to experience; to have experience we must already 
have the “conditions of experience.” Neither space and time nor movement 
and stillness appear as objects, but “by way of objects.” Each experienced 
something is in a horizon that takes the experiencer on an endless journey. 
The necessary conditions for experience are present “in” the world, yet these 
integuments of worldly relationships are not the world-sway. If one succeeds 
in thinking cosmologically, space, time, and movement turn out to be equio-
riginal world dimensions.
Similarly, the concept of environment should not be confused with the 
notion of the world. The environment is a daily slice of the world. The unthe-
matic clutch of one’s everyday field is accompanied by a thematic grasp of the 
contours of the universe, both in time and in space, thus indicating a way of 
in-being. But the indeterminate hint of the all-pervasive wideness of the world 
overshadows the thematic and unthematic environs. One sometimes intuits a 
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difference between in-being, the beehive world, and the all-pervasiveness of 
the world. This is a hint of the cosmological difference. Against this indeter-
minateness stands the flattened vision of the world as the largest of all things, 
a box of all boxes. One task of world-thinking is to de-flatten the world by 
showing the difference that allows all differences – the cosmological difference.
World-thinking requires one to pay careful attention to those whose work 
has established the edges of all ontological interpretation of the world. One 
such illumination is offered by transcendental phenomenology. Via the epo-
ché, thinking dislodges world-belief from its traditional ontological anchors. 
The totality of things, the inner-worldly things, and the world of stretches, 
courses, distances, and nearnesses are reflexively arrayed before a form of rea-
soning attuned to its constitutive agencies. At the same time, a region opens 
that does not belong to the in-being of the beehive world. This region cannot 
be located as one of the inner-worldly objects or events. All inner-worldly 
events and things, including the thinking subject, manifest themselves on the 
background and foreground of this opened region. Husserl called this region 
transcendental consciousness, but this phrase is misleading.
In the transcendental turn, noetic-noematic consciousness rules. In the 
existential-ontological and the Heideggerian aletheological turn, the tran-
scendentals of Being are reannounced. In world-thinking, the corresponding 
ground is the inner irruption of world and world-dimensions. Thus, world-
understanding is perhaps the last “purification” of the transcendental turn 
from its terminological enmeshment in subjectivity, consciousness, aware-
ness, act and orientation, and of the aletheological Being-quest – Being’s 
compulsive historicality and ecstatic projection.
World understanding encompasses the notions of Being, context, con-
sciousness, and self-understanding. The transcendental turn foregrounds the 
issue of how the inner-worldly ways transmute into objects for conscious-
ness. But Husserl leaped over this problem and failed to note that the ob-
jectivity of an object is a speculative stance. True, events appear either in 
themselves or for us, but is this all there is? What of timing, spacing, lighting, 
changing, and so on. Intentionality falls short in apprehending inner-worldly 
objectivity-subjectivity.
Is the move toward establishing the world-openness of the human 
a reflective move; that is, a move where subjectivity turns upon itself and 
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reflects on its acts, functions, traditional immersions, and ontological divi-
sions? Such a move propels one toward the Kantian limits of reason, or to 
the transcendental notion of the world’s background in the form of absolute 
subjectivity. Indeed, there may be reflective activity on subjectivity and its 
relationship to objectivity, but world-thinking pierces this limit. The context 
that permits reflection is a world context. Accordingly, reflection is a tem-
poralization of a temporalization, with pregiven distances and nearnesses of 
time and space, of significative dimensions assumed both in pre-reflective 
moves and reflection on such moves. Realization is, therefore, a world-reflex 
that allows a movement of temporalization within time. Note that time as 
such must here be understood atemporally (alpha privation).
World-thinking raises the question of what lends inner-worldly events 
their appearance as modalities. Certainly it is not subjectivity as a being 
thrown or thrusted, nothingness, or self-projection. Rather, the phenome-
nality of phenomena is a formation that inscribes and carries its own implicit 
reflectivity. The world-dimensions lend all phenomena their manifestations 
the emergence, duration, and demise of all things and events. Yet world-time 
is not simply a transition between dimensions of inner-worldly horizons.
World-time is distinct from “real” and phenomenal time. Both forms 
of timing belong to the beehive world. Real time, the form of time accorded 
seignorial status in the modern world, is understood in terms of relations 
between things. Each world horizon can thus be said to have its timing. The 
modern technological world, for instance, exudes the clock, which then, as 
Lewis Mumford notes, begins to manufacture time. This substructure of tem-
porality, however, is nested within phenomenal time. The epoché opens up 
time as durée and allows one to recognize the elasticity and multidimension-
ality of time. Both these forms of time subsist on the ground of world-time.
Is it possible to glimpse world-time, even in a sketchy manner? To do 
so, one must think of the world-expansive dimensions and how they foster 
emergence into presence and demise into absence. The beehive world and 
world-time are distinguishable in terms of cosmological difference. One ha-
bitually believes things and events show themselves only in the now, with the 
past no more and future not yet. But if things and events are not essential but 
temporal, then one cannot think of an event without the tree beehive hori-
zons and the transitions between them. Thus, each thing or event is an ap-
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pearing and a disappearing. Appearance should be understood as a temporal 
formation of something or an event whereby phenomena are lent their con-
figurations along the transition of the world-expansive beehive dimensions 
of not yet, present, and no longer. There is not only the tension of a thing or 
event, but also a formation-deformation. This means one cannot proclaim 
validly that the thing or event had a form that is lost, as the loss is a moment 
along a series of traces.
This is one aspect of depth-time. Phenomena, as formations and defor-
mations, have a transparent depth. This depth is possible if one understands 
phenomena not as ontologically determined things or events, but as a self-
formation of temporal configurations. Temporal depth is the transparent vis-
ibility of things. 
If one things along the three temporal dimensions, one encounters a 
formation-deformation whereby the present is a temporal configuration 
transparent through its temporal depth “toward the past” and its “temporal 
future.” Every phenomenon is not merely an appearance as a property, but a 
transparency of the dimensional depth of time. Hence, the world-expansive 
transition lends a thing or event its face, which, from the beehive perspective, 
has the semblance of a thing or appearance.
The inner-worldly appearance is a cross-section of the time dimensions. 
The problem of world time lies in the way it “lets phenomena be,” that is, 
reveals the phenomenality of the phenomena. What lends phenomena their 
phenominality is the dimensional shift, which is not identical with the now 
characteristics of things. Understood this way, phenomena here are not ap-
pearance unto the subject; at best the subject is identical with the shift of 
the temporal dimensions. Nevertheless, even if still in terms of the beehive 
world-dimensions, one can gain a glimpse of world-time as all-pervasive 
rather than a relation between things.
Thus, the ontological status of the traditional notion of appearance is 
lost. World-thinking presents appearance neither as an appearance of a thing 
nor a phenomenon present to a subject; rather, the phenomenon is ultimate-
ly a dimension that lends things their while and apparition. The worldly ap-
parition is not only temporal, but also spatial; apparitions are space-lent as 
well as time-lent. All the beehive configurations including material configu-
rations and kinships are in a world-space that is not a place of all places. The 
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world-space wells up the spacings of the beehive world and gives coloration, 
resounding, and touch to all temporal phenomena. Space as spacing lends 
things their size, weight, expanse, and location in a way that streams across 
all things and events without being identical with them.
Thus, both world-dimensional time, as lending phenomena their phe-
nomenality, and space, as spacing the beehive things and events in their lo-
cations, affinities, and remoteness, have a “movement” that is not one of the 
inner-worldly movements and cannot be understood in the categories of 
traditional philosophies. World-dimensional time is a cosmological notion. 
Thinking of this motion as a transition from future to present, or present 
to past, mistakenly applies inner-worldly, successive movement to the world. 
To glimpse worldly movement, one must attempt to think of the transition 
between things intransitively. The nonontological presence of past and future 
is not simply an absence of things or even nothing. Rather, this presence has 
a temporal sense that is exceedingly difficult to capture. The presence of past 
and future should not be thought of in terms of absence, as absence is pre-
positional. Yet traditional thinking on this matter raises further issues.
In explicating time, Aristotle and Augustine employ a spatial model. 
Augustine establishes a disjunction between space and time; space is exter-
nal, while time is in the soul. When discussing time, Augustine points out 
that a moment can be long or short. He thus operates with spatial stretches 
as a model for understanding time. Yet is time a stretch? Of course, people 
routinely speak of time in terms of spatial metaphors. One refers to the pre-
sent century or the present year in terms of a length of time, but how is 100 
years presented? Obviously, this period is not given contemporaneously as 
a stretch in space, like a length of road. People refer to a century as “theirs,” 
yet most of its years are already gone or remain to be accomplished. Only the 
current year is present, but, obviously, even this year is mostly in the past or 
future. By extending this thinking, one ends with the Zenonian and Aristo-
telian division of time into an infinite point, but such an indivisible point is 
never encountered. All attempts to consider time as present slips away into 
past and future. Consequently, one should not think of the present as an 
extension.
To think of world-movement, one has to trace back from the world-
expansive dimensions of not yet, present, and no longer to the mundane 
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movement of space-time. To think of the world means to show how the 
world-movement manifests itself in and makes possible the appearance of 
the future, present, and past and the phenomenality of phenomena. One can-
not say that world-expansive dimensions are in the world, nor that world-
expansive time is an infinite period, as the infinite stretch smacks of a line 
from now in both directions.
World-time is not a while or a duration, as all whiles and durations are in 
the world. Hence, world-time does not endure. How does world-time “time” 
across all world-expansive dimensions? How does world-space “space” all 
inner-worldly events and things? How does the world institute the move-
ment of spatiotemporal dimensions? How can one think of the world depth?
For phenomenology, experienced elements, such as chromatic qualities 
or audial durations, are no longer the qualities of things or qualifications 
of the subject. They belong to experience, which can be said to be worldly 
in the sense that such configurations are more akin to the traditionally ne-
glected world than to subjects and objects. The same can be said of space 
and time. Time and space are certainly not “in” the subject. Neither are ob-
jects, described phenomenologically, “in” time and space. Transcendental 
phenomenology, by excluding the objective and subjective prejudice and the 
inherence of things and subjects in time and space, reveals an area of investi-
gation that is not identical with the beehive notion of space-time. Hence, the 
thematization of transcendentally understood space-time places one in an 
entirely different region that that of Augustine and Kant.
The world has at least the same status as this neither objective nor sub-
jective transcendental region. One must also avoid mistaking time for the 
objectivation of the transcendental region, since objectivation assumes an 
inner-worldly subject and a specific locus for an inner-worldly object. Al-
though the transcendental region “includes” the meaning of both objective 
and subjective events, of the beehive notion of space and time, it is neverthe-
less distinct from them. Perhaps various phenomena experienced across the 
transcendental region comprise a world formation-deformation and their 
significations? An exploration of the phenomenon of time in terms of the 
perceptual field may answer this question.
The things present in the surrounding world constitute the region of one’s 
perceptual field. In diverse ways, persons are oriented to their surroundings in 
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terms of use, misuse, valuation, interrogation, wonder, and habit. In all these 
modes, people relate to their surroundings perceptually. Thus, the perceptual 
field and the person are copresent. Yet things in the perceptual field, one’s sur-
roundings, are not closed from moment to moment. This field forms a hori-
zon, a perceptual island or “aura” that is neither objective nor subjective.
Yet according to the transcendental stance, the aura is given differently 
than the perceptual field. The aura is represented, it is absent in the presence. 
Yet this representation must be interpreted in the worldly sense. Representation 
is not an act of consciousness, but a temporal event of time within time. This 
mode of analysis shifts attention from the protensional act, or the retentional 
capacities involved in perception, to a time arc, a time curved “within” itself. 
Although one may represent things of the past, what makes the representation 
possible is the past’s presence and the future’s presence within the perceptual 
field. The perceptual field’s aura spreads not only toward the past and future, 
but comes from the past and the future toward perceptual presence, the “now.”
In the phenomenal field, one is related to objects and events in presenta-
tional and representational modalities. One relates presentationally to things 
in the surroundings and representationally to remembered and expected 
surroundings. Thus, persons, understood nondualistically as configurations 
of the world’s present, have an immediate stance to their surroundings as 
presented and represented.
Several things must be done to make this analysis useful for thinking 
through the cosmological difference. First, the terminology must be shift-
ed from its enmeshment in the distinction between the “immanent” and 
“transcendent” to the primary category of world. Second, one must bracket 
the notion of consciousness, with its ontological residue. Third, one must 
cease looking for a knower as some essential point of reference or departure. 
Fourth, one must interpolate the analysis with an exploration of world-time 
as that which does not possess an attribute of being an all-encompassing 
something toward which one relates from a particular “point.”
Bracketing the protentional-retentional distinction allows one to open 
the field of possible temporal orientations toward the past and future. Com-
mon parlance suggests that if an object or event is distancing, then it must 
be sinking into the past, while if nearing, an object or event must be coming 
from the future. This construction is an analogue of the scientists’ “arrow of 
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time,” and may indeed be its founding insight. But note that something could 
be distancing into the future. For instance, a goal that yesterday was near may 
be much more remote today. Conversely, some unholy deed in the past may 
finally catch up with someone. The vent is approaching from the past. Thus, 
prior to temporal localization there is depth.
The present does not emerge from a primal impression. Rather, all 
impressions emerge, approach, and distance without a seignorial temporal 
orientation. Thus, time-understanding is not derivable from the subject’s 
position in the stream of time. Terminologies such as experienced, lived, 
projected, and so on add nothing to the way we “are” temporal. The present 
is a way that all events are, including humans. By means of inner-worldly 
corporeal arrangements, humans plumb the depth of the present and articu-
late a field of presences.
In this respect, references to the no longer and the not yet do not imply 
the past and future but the present depth. If one says that something is com-
ing from a future, one would be merely saying that it is traveling toward one 
on a line from, say, Paris, traversing space, and has not yet traversed sufficient 
space to arrive. Yet the traveling is present and is not coming from the future. 
Concretely, one waits. The traveling is already occurring, and the traveler 
will simply emerge from the horizon that is neither the future nor the past. 
The present is not an impressionable moment, but a depth that can be best 
articulated, at least for now, in Husserlian terms of determinable indeter-
minacy, rather than in the Heideggerian notions of nearness and distance, 
which smack too much of spatiality.
Yet the discussion of time as depth still suggests spatiality. A further 
analysis can clarify the notion of world-time. Appearing from the depth is 
not coming from the future. If one says that Bruce is coming from Toronto 
but he is not yet here, he does not sit perched on a future horizon; he is pre-
sent in the expansive world-presence, and the “future horizon” is merely a 
modulation of the present. Hence, when something shows up on the future 
horizon, its presence is already in the depth.
This suggests that the horizons are articulations of the present depth, 
perception or consciousness being only one modality among others. For in-
stance, the swaying of a sapling in the wind, a movement which corresponds 
with protentional-retentional consciousness, does not require that each pre-
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vious sway “fall” into the past, but constitutes, instead, the continuously self-
configuring depth. The horizons are also configurations of the depth that 
constitutes the indeterminate determinable limits of the sway, of protention 
and retention, of memory and expectation. Hence, Bruce’s coming from To-
ronto is a movement at the present with horizons, such as farther and nearer. 
Note that the horizons may be parallel with the depth, yet they too have ho-
rizons of determinate indeterminacy, with their own depth.
Perhaps less determinate imagery can help one grasp the manifold qual-
ity of the depth. The irrupting time shaded by a flicker of light inscribes wan-
ing protrusions that are immediately pervaded by others and dominated by 
intersections, thus building a constantly spreading depth that is not com-
plete, but intersected, pervaded, and re-dimensioned by other irruptions. 
It is not light that pervades light, but time dimensions that pervade time 
dimensions that are themselves temporalizations of time. Commonly, one 
thinks that light pervades and dominates space and time in some way, but 
this assumes that darkness is space to be shaped by light. Yet the converse is 
just as valid; darkness protrudes and pervades the light. One is thus faced 
with a play of temporal dimensions that cannot be anchored. The depth wells 
with light and darkness, sound and silence, as colorations and echoes of time. 
The “edge” of this upwelling of a particular time dimension constitutes a ho-
rizon that may be called a consciousness horizon. This horizon is no longer 
future or past, but a dimension of depth that pervades another dimension 
that includes “me.” I am in darkness and light. These metaphors are mere 
colorations of a more fundamental sway.
The present is a dimension with depths, horizons, pervading configura-
tions, and defigurations. But the present is also worldwide. Every “expres-
sion” of a thing is a spatiotemporal configuration in motion. Each phenom-
enon spreads a depth and a horizon. Hence, one can no longer speak of the 
place of a thing as its outer limit or of its space in terms of other spatial 
things, as every aspect of the thing shimmers with incessant configurations 
and defigurations.
Is the sum of the self-configuring depth, with its intertwining auras and 
intrusions, identical with the all-pervasive present? To answer this question 
one must undertake a critique of an experienced temporal event, such as a 
sound. When conceptualizing sound as “flowing,” one must think in terms of 
29
Chapter II. Dialogue and World
horizons of time within which the flow takes place. This is an inner-worldly 
manner of thinking. Even if one assumes that the sound is continuous, as if 
on a line, one would also be present to a silence that is not identical with the 
continuation of the sound, but present before and after and during the sound. 
The silence is present in such a way that it is not only the sound that breaks the 
silence, but the silence also resounds in various ways in the sound. The sound 
thus ceases to be a continuous flow of the future into the present and into 
the past, but already implicates a silent dimension of the present irrupting in 
the very sound. The transcendentally constituted continuation is pervaded 
and irrupted by the cosmological dimension of presence. Hence, if one rec-
ognizes that the transcendental was never anything else than a metaphor for 
the world, nothing is lost by dropping this term except residual vocabulary. 
The transcendental temporalization is nothing other than a name for a self-
temporalizing event with a constant presence of a world-depth. Thus, moving 
from the natural attitude to the phenomenological, one finds a cosmological 
dimension that beckons with its own intentionalities an answer to a question.
The present is therefore not an un-impression, but a movement where 
impressions, be they audial, visual, or tactile, already have a shape and trace 
the memory of the “coming” and the expectation of the “passing.” The pre-
sent is a continuous constitution of a depth, with memories and expecta-
tions. The present is “before” the differentiation of time into transcenden-
tal protention-retention. Reflection is a tracing in the depth, and the act of 
reflection is cocontinuous with the traces, rather than a superimposed act 
toward the past. The conscious flow of audiality is a complex trace of the 
world-depth. Protensional-retentional activity is identical with the continu-
ous layering into depth of the sway of the tree in the wind. Consciousness 
thus begins to vanish in favor of identity with the world-traces. By losing the 
subject, one gains the world, but not in the sense that the subject somehow 
mirrors or reflects the world and thus becomes anonymous.
Thus, world-thinking involves a shift from the transcendental to the 
cosmological mode of thought. Protensional-retentional consciousness in its 
ultimate atemporal sense refers to a constant shift that expands and continu-
ously deepens. This expansion and deepening are not articulations of a pre-
given temporality or field, but are identical with an emergence of the field. 
This is why atemporal protension-retention is nowhere to be found, and the 
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instituted pretending and retending acts are at best secondary. Protension-
retention in this full sense is nowhere and at no time, because it is the very 
presence of emergent and self-articulating temporality manifested or given a 
presentational value by consciousness.
The movement toward cosmological or worldly understanding places 
on in a position to employ world and consciousness as synonyms, and at 
the same time to get away from the Heideggerian notion of “being in the 
world” as a shepherd or Being or Dasein as a gathering of the world. Even if 
Heidegger stressed the priority of Being over Dasien, Dasien was the mouth-
piece for Being, while everything else remained in a dumb posture awaiting 
the announcement of its being by Dasien. In cosmological understanding, 
one and all bespeak the sway of the world, and Dasein, being present to the 
evercoming Being, is only one modality of the temporal upsurgence. Indeed, 
“where word breaks nothing may be” announces the anonymity of linguis-
tic signification, which also introduces Being into the picture, but misses its 
trans-signification as world. One can only suggest here that world-thinking 
is not at all identical with the future transcendence of Heideggerian being, 
nor with any ontological interpretation, precisely as it is the world wherein 
any notion of Being is either permitted or discarded; indeed, interpreted.
In terms of the present, “by the time” sound emerges for consciousness 
comes with the consciousness horizon it has been welling up in its silence, 
and consciousness constitutes its continuous articulation. Consciousness is 
one modality in which sound becomes audible. Here again, the horizons of 
consciousness provide a clue to the world. But these horizons are a way that 
the upwelling sound sifts through, pervades, encompasses, and indeed con-
stitutes consciousness. The articulation of sound in world-time constantly 
transfigures the horizons and thus constitutes the temporalization of con-
sciousness in the form of concrete, beehive audiality.
Transcendental consciousness, as retention-protention, sinking and 
drawing, is identical with the emergence of time echoed by sound or shaded 
by color. For this reason, transcendental phenomenology can refer to the 
empty form of time, the silent upsurge that wells into horizons of sound. 
Strip away the found and one is left with “pure time”, except that its conscious 
horizons are an articulated limit, a trace across the depth and a constant wa-
ver from horizon to horizon. The present, then, has a worldwide depth that 
31
Chapter II. Dialogue and World
does not come toward consciousness but is always through consciousness. 
When consciousness discovers its self-temporalization, it also discovers itself 
in an “incessant streaming.” This streaming is one articulation of the pres-
ence shaded in chromatic endurance of echoed intonicity.
The temporalizing of cosmological difference at once reveals the world-
depth, and allows one to abandon consciousness as the repository of desires, 
myths, and magic. Among such contemporary mythologies is the reduction 
of communication to a transmission that occurs between self-contained ob-
jects in the beehive world. The simultaneous and multiple articulations of the 
world undercut the ontological pretensions of technocratic communication.
Conclusion
Computer researchers tend to ignore the problem of the world. Al-
though computerization constitutes a world – a “micro-World,” as Papert 
says, the existential base of computer use is intentionally obscured. In fact, 
the strength of computers is predicated on the ability of these devices to over-
come the contingencies of everyday existence. If computers were plagued 
by the eccentricities associated with interpretation, for example, their util-
ity would be seriously compromised. Contrary to the world, the computer 
micro-world is supposed to be ahistorical.
As described by the Dreyfuses, computers are disembodied. An episte-
mology is presupposed, in other words, that allows facts to be treated as ob-
jective events. The binary logic that sustains computerization treats all data 
as if they are unequivocal and thus divorced from praxis. This input is given 
exact parameters that cannot be found outside of the computer micro-world. 
The world of the computer is the beehive world in which things have an ob-
jective givenness, not the world-sway. The symbolic rule of identity, A = A, 
rules this lifeless domain. 
Within this region there is no need for protention and retention to so-
lidify a particular rendition of facts. Because every fact has a self-same iden-
tity, clarification is simply reiteration. Within the world, on the other hand, 
clarification requires the reinforcement of a particular interpretive modality 
of reality. One interpretation must be given prominence over others, and 
this process reflects interpretive acts. In other words, piling interpretations 
on top of prior interpretations creates what is real. Consequently, the world 
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is characterized by multivalency and historicity. In this regard, the computer 
micro-world is a sedimentation of the world.
But the computer micro-world has been sedimented in such a way that 
this worldliness disappears. The relation A = A obscures time and emphasiz-
es speed and power. Nothing ever needs to be remade, recalculated, or refor-
mulated. Classification, for example, proceeds undaunted within a pristine 
regime. Therefore, computers increase in size and devour more information 
in lessening periods of time. The end point of this project is a utopia where all 
information is available instantly in all places. Far from liberating humanity, 
this project would require that the totality of things be subjected to the re-
quirements of information, resulting in a lifeless, crystalline cosmos that ob-
scures the world’s historicity. The equivocation associated with worldly time 
has no role in computerization; there are no temporal limitations associated 
with a here and how within a micro-world.
As a result of overlooking the world, computerization represents an ab-
straction. Computerization is severed from its experiential source. No won-
der many critics argue that computers are harbingers of alienation. After all, 
a world based on the denial of experience is used to reconstruct and over-
whelm everyday life. Indeed, the computer micro-world is given latitude to 
expand indefinitely. The world is thus pushed to the periphery of existence, 
instead of serving as the original of computerization.
However, computerization would not make sense in the absence of the 
world. Without the world, the objectification, linearity, and (binary) dualism 
inherent to computerization could not be understood. For example, in the ab-
sence of the world, (binary) dualism could not become an object of reflection, 
meaning that this logic could not be envisioned and used to constitute a field 
of objects. Thus, the world is only momentarily occluded by computerization 
and never entirely vanquished. The world process is present even in domains 
that are allegedly objective and ahistorical. The world is never completely re-
pressed, even in reductionistic schemes, such as computerization.
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NIKLAS LUHMANN’S THEORY  
OF POSITIVISATION AND REFLEXIVITY
Introduction
Although widely known from citations and his close relationship and 
cooperation with Habermas, Luhmann is hardly ever represented as a social 
theorist in his own right. This is perhaps due to the lack of translations of his 
works. This essay is designed as an introduction to some of Luhmann’s ma-
jor concepts exemplified by the institutionalization of justice, ideology and 
concrete modalization of social systems and history. While by no means ex-
haustive, these concepts reveal the style of thought and the problems in which 
Luhmann is engaged. To avoid a major and quite common misunderstanding 
of Luhmann the following must be observed: as noted in the first section, Luh-
mann functions in the context of contemporary European thought whose one 
of the major preoccupations since Husserl is the question of “the conditions for 
the possibility of ...” The conditions that are relevant are not “factual” but struc-
tural. Hence when one uses facts, such facts constitute an exemplification and 
not a substantiation of a theory. In this sense, the theory is not “explanatory” 
but expository of the structural requirements without which something could 
not be experienced. Hence it ranges beyond what is commonly designated by 
the term “theory,” as it investigates the “conditions for the possibility of theories 
themselves.” Again such conditions cannot be empirical-factual but structural 
or, to use Luhmnn’s notion, systemic. While we may know all the empirical 
facts about Newton, such facts will neither yield Newtonian physics nor the 
structural conditions for such a theory of physics. While pointing out various 
factual correlations during specific historical periods, Luhmann uses such cor-
relations to exemplify the conditions that are assumed even if not explicated. 
One difficulty in dealing with such assumed systems is that linguistic habits, 
laden with various ontologies and even metaphysics, shift the interpretation of 
such structures toward one of the ontologies. 
While explicitly Luhmann adheres to the systems theory and to some 
aspects if the critical school, implicitly, and perhaps more fundamentally, 
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he is influenced by Husserl and his pure, eidetic phenomenological analy-
ses of invariants in transformation. Hence while dealing with Luhmann, it 
is essential to keep Husserlian eidetic phenomenology in view. Of specific 
importance for Luhmann’s theory of reflexivity is Husserl’s analysis of time 
constitution and structures, not to mention his notion of the “conditions for 
the possibility of scientific knowledge.” It would be redundant to offer a brief 
exposition of Husserlian thought, as by this tine the literate public is well 
acquainted with its major outlines. 
Positivisation
Although the concept of positivisation is distinct from the concept of 
reflexivity, it requires the use of reflexivity for its explication. At the same 
time, it may be exemplified through the selected concepts of justice and ide-
ology. The concept of reflexivity as such will be explicated in its fullness sub-
sequently. According to Luhmann, it is no accident that at the time when the 
concept of value begins its philosophical career, there appears a disdain for 
ideology. At the same time, the concept of justice also attains full positiv-
ity, i.e. it is left to the political decisions of a social system. This contempo-
ranaiety suggests that there is a hidden relationship between ideology and 
justice. Such a relationship cannot be found in the similarity of content. It 
is sufficient to attempt to decipher any paragraph of law and to compare the 
content with ideological statements in order to be convinced of their differ-
ences. Their commonality must be found on a more abstract level: it does not 
lie in the content but in the form. The form is one of positivisation. It means 
that the commonality between justice and ideology is found in their distance 
from themselves. This form of distance to something constitutes the basic 
aspect of positivisation. 
But what does positivisation mean, for example, for the concept of jus-
tice? First of all, Luhmann discards any notion of juridical foundation in 
“natural right” as a higher form of truth or in a concept of justice which has 
an enduring permanence. For him the principle of variation is more fun-
damental. That something can be changed is the foundation of all stability 
and legitimation. Moreover, we fail to think of the concept of positive justice 
adequately if we see it as one of the lower steps in the hierarchy of rationales 
of justice. The concept of positivity must be derivable from the process of de-
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cision. Positivisation of justice means that any content can attain legitimate 
juridical validity and this through the process of decision. Positive justice is 
legitimated through decision, constituting a reflexive process which takes a 
distance to socio-political affairs. The condition of positivisation is that the 
decisions are being made not only about activities, but reflexively about deci-
sions. Obviously it is impossible to subsume all considerations of a particular 
juridical process under one, even if complex, decision. The decision process 
must be subdivided into various processes wherein one process may consti-
tute the premises for other processes. This of course makes sense only when 
the burden of decision is also divided and not that all deliberations and deci-
sions are repeated. For example, when a new law is decreed, it is unnecessary 
and indeed impossible to foresee and pre-establish all situations to which 
the new law would apply, nor must all the foreseen and pre-established al-
ternatives be actualized. In brief, cooperative decision is advantageous and 
indeed necessary when such decision must be achieved in a highly complex 
environment and society. 
The mastery of high internal complexity is a condition requiring the 
strengthening of the effectivity of social processes through positivisation: 
processes of the same kind must be applied on themselves. Such a system 
must have the possibility to define concepts (to use language to speak about 
words), to apply money (to exchange possibilities), to teach learning and 
teaching, to research about research and so forth. These reflexive processes, 
or as Luhmann calls them, “reflexive mechanisms” are an example of a much 
broader principle. It is a process of positivisation constituting the condition 
for the application of any process upon itself. Social orders, having positive 
justice must possess norms which can be addressed to an organization of de-
cision-making which at the same time regulates the process of establishment 
and relinquishment of norms. These norms must be minimal conditions for 
the decision about a juridical question and whether such a question could be 
oriented toward a new norm in a society. Since norms cannot be based on 
some changeless principle, the existing or the newly instituted norms must 
be treated with consistency, i.e. applied with consistency to various situations 
even if such norms would be subsequently replaced by others. 
According to Luhmann, a stabilizing influence is provided by political 
processes of a society. One of the conditions is that the political process in a 
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society cannot be seen as playing an auxiliary role (to economy, religion, ed-
ucation or family). The political processes must be institutionalized in such 
a way that they would be the processes of positivisation of the various social 
aspects and hence one of the main processes of reflexivity of the society as a 
whole. As already mentioned above, such a reflexive process must be divided 
among various functionaries. This is necessary not only because the labor 
is vast and complex, but because the process of positivisation and hence re-
flexivity can never be completely institutionalized. New situations, novel in-
terrelationships of social processes appear requiring the application of the 
norms in ways previously not yet tested. This means that the institutionalized 
reflexivity is in principle inadequate for positivisation of social processes; 
political decisions must be made and various social spheres reflected upon 
and coordinated. Hence Luhmann claims that political process is one of the 
most fundamental processes in social life. While lending stability, it also con-
stitutes deliberate order of transition from one set of norms and their appli-
cations to various circumstances to novel norms (or justice). Of course it fol-
lows from Luhmann’s thesis that the political processes must be themselves 
positivised through an institution of reflexive mechanism, otherwise such 
processes could not be coordinated to their own directions, performances 
and to the other factors of social life. 
Another factor of stabilization of positivised justice is found by Luh-
mann in the discrepancy between the complexity of the entire juridical 
structure and the capacity of individual processes of decision. In complex 
social orders, it is impossible to change everything with one decision. Even 
the establishment of new rules requires a time of maturation and of course 
such times of maturation constitute socialization of the novel aspects and 
their adaptation to the rest of the social processes and factors. Moreover, sta-
bilization of the positivised justice also depends on subjects who cannot ac-
cept rapid changes and function normally. A rapid fluctuation of rules would 
be unbearable and the very process of reflexivity, required for positivisation 
of justice, would in this case become overburdened with a multiplication of 
political processes leading to chaotic if not anarchic decision process. For 
Luhmann, of course, the subjective factor does not imply that the stability 
is gained from some superior principle such as “human nature” or “natural 
law” based on such an assumed “human nature.” Rather, the subject is one 
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of the factors of stabilization of positivised justice. Further processes of sta-
bilization will be discussed after offering a brief sketch of positivisation of 
ideology and the process of reflexivity.
It is only too well known that ideology has been if not completely 
banned from the halls of social thought then at least regarded with suspicion 
and neglect. For Luhmann ideology has its function if understood within 
the process of positivisation. In fact, if properly understood, the function of 
ideology in society is as valuable as that of justice and its norms. While posi-
tivisation of justice is made possible by the reflexive process of regulation of 
norms, the function of ideology is related to the valuation of values. In most 
general sense it can be maintained, according to Luhmann, that any prefer-
ence of one activity over another can be characterized as valuation. These 
valuations become ideologies when these preferential or selective functions 
are reflected upon and used to evaluate all other activities and hence values. 
Values thus are evaluated from a viewpoint of selection of activities and at 
the same time are seen as exchangeable with other values. As soon as the 
function of valuation becomes visible, it becomes a standard of “value eval-
uation.” Thus absolute values in this process discredit themselves. It is no 
longer possible to evaluate values in terms of “highest” values, as such values 
will also have to be positivised through reflexivity as one set among other 
sets to be compared, selected, discarded or accepted. Valuations are variable 
and ideology is what enables the variation. At the same time, it is ideology 
that allows for a relative stability among values. To achieve this, ideology 
must respect two conditions: ideology, on the one hand, must introduce se-
lected programs and thus accept corresponding sacrifices of other programs 
while steering such programs through various changes. In this respect, it has 
a pragmatic or instrumental function. On the other band, it must retain the 
consensus of those who must remain waiting with their specific values by 
guaranteeing that their opportunity is also in the making. Thus it has a sym-
bolic function.
Ideologies must also contain other symbolic structures, enabling the 
reflexivity of valuation. Such reflexivity increases the manageability of the 
decision process with respect to valuation. Thus an ideology must create in 
its symbolism a space for the alterations of values as well as activities and 
indeed the latter in relation to the former and conversely. At the same time, 
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it must be in a position to master the dangers inherent in the complexity 
of a mutually variable relationship. In brief, an ideology must have symbols 
that are reflexively distanced from the values of an ideology in order to be 
able to correlate such values with activities and conversely. Such a symbolic 
structure cannot be evaluated within an ideology and it is guaranteed by a 
political party as a continuous institution of the interpretation of an ideology 
and its values. Wherever there are values, there are ideologies and wherever 
there are ideologies, there must be political parties. 
A political party is the most convenient condition for the institutionali-
zation of positivisation of ideology and its selected values. Of course, Luh-
mann sees a problem with this approach: it perverts at times the political 
process, specifically in a multi-party social system by exchanging the values 
of ends and means. In general view, political activity must attain specific ends 
where political power is granted to political figures in the form of compe-
tence for decision-making to attain the proposed aims. Yet in many cases the 
aim of political parties is perverted to the maintenance of power while the 
proposed programs, based on ideologies and their values, are evaluated with 
respect to their potential to maintain the political power of a given party. The 
programs become subordinate to the ends of power that should not be ends 
but means. This perversion makes all ideologies and hence all values danger-
ously variable and the valuation itself extremely reflexive where all values 
and valuations are instrumentalised.
According to Luhmann, such dangers can be neutralized by the follow-
ing conditions. Specific norms, symbols and institutions must be distanced 
from political process, i.e. they must be politically neutralized. This can be 
done through a basic organization of state power, the decisive role of the 
judicial praxis and even the economic praxis. That such neutralization re-
mains formal, i.e. does not hinder the change of values in politics, is an im-
portant condition for the retainment of reflexivity of values in ideologies. 
Another guarantee against total arbitrariness of the decision process consists 
of the mechanism of election. As political parties can never be certain of the 
ideological persuasion of their constituents, such parties must interpret their 
constituents in terms of the lowest common denominator, namely material-
istically. Thus political materialism fulfills the role of a basic ideology and at 
the same time constitutes a hindrance to political arbitrariness.
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Positivisation, at least the way it is understood by Luhmann, presents 
various difficulties. It is indeed a fact that there can be institutionalized pro-
cesses of decision-making which have a distance to various social functions, 
such as justice and value. It is possible to judge justice and to evaluate val-
ues, and do so institutionally. The problem is that (i) the judgements and 
the evaluations are not performed by institutions (although institutions may 
provide a formal mechanism) but by persons appointed politically to manage 
such institutions, (ii) it is possible to judge the judicial norms through posi-
tivisation, but such judgements presuppose some standard in terms of which 
the norms can be evaluated. Firstly, Luhmann does not provide any criterion 
or means or even a description of such a standard. Secondly, the criterion or 
standard by which judicial norms could be evaluated cannot be one of the 
judicial norms, as in that case we would have a comparison of various norms 
but not a judgement about such norms. It means that such a criterion could 
not belong to the same domain of discourse that is being judged, specifically 
since Luhmann rejects any notion of “hierarchy of norms.” However, in this 
case it is difficult to understand how Luhmann could maintain the thesis 
that positivisation consists of a process of distanciation made possible by 
reflexivity where a particular process is applied on itself. Obviously, here we 
would have two distinct processes, one of which is the process of justice with 
its norms and another is the judgmental process of the norms, using implicit 
criteria that do not belong to the realm of the judicial norms. This is a clear 
case of mixing two levels of discourse, or two levels of experience.
The same objection can be held with regard to Luhmann’s treatment of 
positivisation of values through reflexive mechanisms. He himself has briefly 
noticed the problem while pointing out that an ideology, which deals with 
values, i.e. selects, accepts, rejects and postpones them, is not one of the val-
ues nor can it be reduced to a value. Its level of discourse, its implicit criteria 
seem to be different from values; yet Luhmann does not tell us what such 
an ideology is, an ideology which constitutes the reflexive mechanism ena-
bling the positivisation of values constituting one of the most fundamental 
social processes, the political process. Here again Luhmann cannot maintain 
that positivisation is a distancing and an application of a particular process 
upon itself, viz., an application of value on value. Even ideology, at its most 
primitive level, is a process of justification of values, a process that includes 
41
Chapter III. Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Positivisation and Reflexivity
in its considerations such factors as economy, ethics, technology, political 
procedures and even evaluates the judicial processes. In brief, ideology is not 
a reflection of value upon value but a more encompassing domain wherein 
value plays one role among various other functions.
One of the most fundamental problems that Luhmann would have to 
resolve is that of the relationship between levels of judgements and valua-
tions. In all positivisation, which assumes reflexivity, there are two levels of 
“discourse”. One is the level, for example, of judicial norms and values, the 
other is the level constituting the process of reflection and hence distancing 
from such norms and values. The latter level, which permits positivisation, is 
never reducible to the prior and its mode of operation is completely different 
from the prior. Even in an institutionalized form, the decision process and 
what is being decided constitute two distinct realms operating with different 
criteria and range of implications. One and the same value or a judicial norm 
may mean one thing in one decision-making process and something else in 
another, depending on the criteria that such processes employ. Once again 
Luhmann seems to leave the decision process end its implicit criteria in the 
hands of political process. Such a thesis is exposed to extreme dangers of 
political arbitrariness and indeed to political totalitarianism. After all, politi-
cal party members are the ones who ultimately make judgements about the 
judicial norms and ideological values and if no criteria are given in terms of 
which the political parties must decide about norms and values, the political 
parties may assume an absolute right to make all decisions. It is to be recalled 
that the Twentieth Century has and still is experiencing such politics.
Reflexivity 
Reflection is defined by Luhmann as a process applied on itself or upon 
processes of the same kind. Such an application increases the function, effi-
ciency, and management of such processes. Social processes, which become 
reflexive in this manner, are subtended by a selective process of informa-
tional management. This selective process is the reflexive dimension capable 
of managing a complexity of contents by reducing it to their proper spheres 
and by using mechanisms of simplification at increasing levels of abstraction. 
Thus, for example, the choice of commodities for the consumer is magnified 
through a monetary mechanism (the possibility to exchange possibilities). 
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The same thing can happen with power, when power is applied to power 
where the power of one or various processes is placed at the disposal of an-
other process.   
Luhmann sees in this process of reflexivity a basic advantage over other 
processes. Dealing with justice and value, he points out that any basis of jus-
tice in “natural law” would necessarily limit the number of possible judi-
cial decisions. The extreme expansion of judicial areas during the Twentieth 
Century was accomplished only through positivisation and institutionaliza-
tion of reflexive mechanisms enabling the subsumption under the judicial 
process even extremely fluctuating situations and behaviors. The significance 
of the reflexive processes and positivisation does not lie merely in its tem-
poral aspect of transformation of old norms and values into new ones, but 
also in the fact that such processes allow the restructuration of the content 
of norms and values. The same is valid for values; the reflexivity multiplies 
value viewpoints that must be taken into account during the process of deci-
sion. This leads to an increment of satisfaction of values through the employ-
ment of other reflexive processes. 
With the increased complexity of social factors, positivisation and its 
subtending process of reflexivity are unavoidable. It is, according to Luh-
mann, the only possible way in which complexity can be managed and also 
expanded. Hence, institutionalised reflexivity and positivisation offer greater 
opportunities for the establishment of greater number of norms and values. 
Of course, complexity should not be multiplied to such an extent that it would 
surpass the capacity to manage information. To guarantee that such an event 
is avoided, the process of information must become reflexive and hence posi-
tivised. That this reflexivity is already institutionalised is obvious from the 
fact of the objective studies of languages, information systems, communica-
tive capacities and even pre-linguistic gestural behavior as informative.
As noted at the outset, Luhmann’s thought is more concerned with 
the conditions for the possibility of ... than with facts or data. The question 
that emerges is the following: “what are the conditions for the possibility 
of the process of reflexivity and positivisation?” It must be pointed out that 
Luhmann has a strong aversion to metaphysics and is not willing to accept 
anything that suggests extra-temporality or eternity. Everything must be un-
derstood temporally, in a process and hence from a perspective of socio-his-
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torical variations and even radical breaks. As will be seen subsequently, such 
a temporalisation of all social factors toward history introduces a concept of 
theory which is no longer merely explanatory but above all critical. In brief, 
the foundations of the critical theory will appear in the discussion of the 
conditions for the possibility of reflexivity and positivisation. 
Any reflexivity presupposes as its condition the distinction between the 
real and the temporally possible or, as Luhmann terms it, the modalized. 
Thus a particular social history does not vary only in terms of the presently 
given and selected facts, but also in terms of constitutive conditions of selec-
tivity based on possibilities that are temporal. The insight into the selectivity 
of facts in any social process is a key to the constitution of the relationship 
between social facts, their structures and the temporal horizons or possibili-
ties. Thus the fundamental condition for possibility and for the selectivity of 
facts within a social process is temporality. This means that the condition for 
the possibility of a social system as a process is a modal generalization consti-
tuting the temporal horizons - in both temporal directions - of such a system. 
The consequence of such a modalized conception is that all selectivity 
and all delimitation of facts is based on a system’s structure conditioning 
in its turn the horizon of possibilities out of which events are selected. This 
selectivity is a process of reflexivity in that it allows a distanciation from the 
present and its evaluation in terms of the various possibilities of the future. 
As a condition for the possibility of reflexivity, the temporal horizon offers a 
distanciation from the immersion into facticities and opens various options 
in terms of which the present state of affairs could be evaluated. Yet it must 
be stressed that the options are not absolutely arbitrary. The social system 
itself may be used to reflect upon the horizon of possibilities and indicate 
the limitation of such a horizon: here emerge the socially possible and the 
socially impossible. 
It could be maintained, according to Luhmann, that more complicated 
social systems require more extensive, abstract and more differentiated tem-
poral horizons for reflexivity than the simpler systems. They reach a higher 
world-complexity, richer with options of norms and valuations, which in 
their stead constitute a basis for a more refined selectivity of living and acting. 
Such a reflexivity from a horizon enables the synchronization of inner-social 
histories of systems that are divergent (e.g. moral systems) with systems of 
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economic production, education and others. Yet it must be said that com-
plexity is a multi-dimensional quality of a system: thus it is impossible to say 
without any further qualifications whether one system is more complex than 
the other. Hence a higher complexity of a system does not mean a higher 
complexity in temporal horizons - or in any relationship to the environment. 
More complex social systems do not necessarily have a more complex histo-
ry, let alone in each respect a more complicated history. Researches concern-
ing cognitive and volitional complexes of psychic systems have indicated that 
more complex (more abstractly structured) systems gain in capacity to have 
simpler or more complex environmental relationships. The structural ab-
stractions open a set of complex and simple, differentiated and undifferenti-
ated relationships to the surroundings and offer the possibility to specify the 
surroundings sectorially in terms of depth and differentiation and, if need 
be, to shift the specifications. Language here is misleading: more complex 
systems do not require higher complexity in everything.  
At the outset, it must be obvious that it is too simplistic to assume a one 
dimensional, linear advancement of relationships between the complexity of 
social system and the temporal horizon. The growth of more complex social 
systems does not have a more complex history; rather on the basis of the 
complexity, they neutralize history, illuminate it by differentiated selectiv-
ity and in many cases, reject its lessons. When history becomes relevant in 
more complex societies, it becomes at the same time contingent, it becomes 
memory and forgetfulness, detailed interest and indifferent neglect of a con-
quered past; all of these coexisting possibilities is the situation that correlates 
to the complexity of the system. 
In their common work, sociologists as well as historians do not ask what 
is time. Although this question may be asked with total directness, it cannot be 
answered with such directness. At the same time, the danger is great if one does 
not critically reflect on this question, leave it open and think in simplistic terms 
such as the metaphor of river or a clock or a calendar. Such notions of time are 
at best abstract, having no capacity to determine which of the temporal points 
are past and which are future. It is simply an indifferent quantity. 
The temporal conditions for reflexivity are quite complex, although 
they can be managed by higher levels of reflexive inclusion. By this Luh-
mann means that modalized aspects can be again modalized under more 
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inclusive possibilities and wider horizons. One can discuss the possibilities 
of reality and reality of possibilities or even possibility of possibilities, neces-
sities contingencies and so on. The complexity of the temporal condition of 
reflexivity can be characterised in the following way. There can be a present 
future that must be distinguished from the future present even if only on 
the grounds that the present future contains more possibilities than is possi-
ble for future presents to become reality. One must also distinguish between 
future presents, present presents and past presents, between the present of 
the past as history and the past present. If one begins with the two temporal 
horizons of the present, namely past and future which in each point can be 
seen as presents with their own pasts and futures with further possibilities 
of reiteration, then one begins to constitute the conditions for the possibil-
ity of all possible processes of reflexivity. This suggests that the indefinite 
modalizations of time horizons can be seen as temporal reflexivities in time. 
The immediate future can be reflected by a more remote future and both in 
turn by a still more remote and perhaps encompassing future yielding the 
structure for the reflexivity of possibilities in possibilities. This process is the 
condition for any distancing from the present facticities and environment. It 
allows the positivisation of the environment, be the environment “material,” 
“ideological,” “juridical” or even “ethical.” The judgement of current events, 
environment, or facts is a judgement from a horizon of time and its possibili-
ties requiring no hierarchical arrangement either of values or of norms. This 
free ranging reflection of time in time and possibilities in possibilities is the 
condition upon which all reflexive processes are based. For our purposes it is 
not necessary to deal with further complexities of Luhmann’s theory of time 
reflexivity as a condition for social reflexivity which may be institutional-
ized to allow the complexity and management of an indefinite multiplicity 
of social events. Suffice it to say that such a reflexivity allows the possibility 
for decision-making without being one of the interest-laden social events, 
ideologies or juridical norms. 
Our most limited discussion of the conditions of reflexivity has opened 
the possibility to consider further the shift of the concept of theory to a con-
cept of critical theory. First of all, it must be noted that in the current Europe-
an thought theory has no longer a privileged status to be an extra-social, ex-
tra-historical or extra-temporal process, surveying events indifferently from 
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a non-participating observer’s stance. Theory too functions in society and 
history and in its stead changes the very “objects” of its explanation. Hence 
a critical theory must (i) show how its very explanations of events will influ-
ence such events, as such an explanation can be subsumed under reflexive 
process and its predictions either enhanced or thwarted; (ii) it must evaluate 
social events from a temporal horizon of possibilities showing what is pos-
sible and what is impossible within a given social system and its sub-systems. 
This means that a critical theory must correlate all factors and show how, in 
this correlation, some possibilities are realizable, others probable, and still 
others made impossible. For example, it must show how an economic capac-
ity may be thwarted by a political incapacity, a moral stance or an economic 
misapplication; or how an economic capacity, yielding certain options, may 
become impossible due to a technological incapacity. At the same time, the 
critical theory must show the limits of the possibilities of a social system 
and delimit the changes that must be instituted within certain social sub-
systems to surpass the limitations. Critical theory thus constitutes the most 
encompassing process of social reflexivity in historical and ultimately in the 
complexity of world time. 
Conditions of Stabilisation
Relying upon Luhmann’s own insights, we have mentioned above that 
his theory may lead to a process of arbitrariness due to the very fact of the 
complex reflexive requirements so that major and final decisions may fall 
into the hands of political parties and ultimately the members of such par-
ties. Luhmann points out that the emergence of reflexive social mechanisms 
led to an increased achievement and progress in every social area, but at the 
same time opened a proportionate increase in risks. How can one have faith 
in justice if its norms are exposed to constant change and finally to decisions 
by political figures? One thing is certain for Luhmann: the reflexive mecha-
nisms are unavoidable if the attained niveau of social complexity is to be 
maintained. Moreover, it is dubious whether the risks could be avoided by a 
retrogression to some prereflective conception of order, such as natural law 
or true values. The expectation that a measure of dynamism and motility, of 
change and time would reside in something changeless becomes a disfunc-
tional ideology. 
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The question addressed to sociology is the following: what presuppo-
sitions and conditions must social systems or societies possess in order to 
institutionalise reflexive mechanisms? It is to be assumed that only social 
systems of high complexity of social processes can be transformed into re-
flexive mechanisms sufficiently trustworthy to orient other social processes. 
High complexity, in its own stead, allows functionally structural differentia-
tions and such differentiations are conducive for reflexive decision-making 
processes. Thus complexity and the resultant differentiations of functions 
constitute a condition for the institutionalisation of reflexive mechanisms. 
Yet this is insufficient, as according to Luhmann the reflexive mechanisms 
must be employed for the orientation of the whole society and hence must be 
oriented by some political mechanism. Such mechanisms must of course be 
reflexive so that political decisions could be reflexively corrected or changed. 
If a political system is to be established on the basis of complex decision 
processes, then it must establish social mechanisms for the nurture and test-
ing of political talent, for the creation of consensus as well as the initiation, 
preparation and control of binding decisions. This introduces far-reaching 
restructuration in politics and considerable changes in bureaucracy dealing 
with juridical norms, governing processes and value adjustments. Political 
support cannot be guaranteed by traditional institutions, as it is related to an 
extremely differentiated process of decision-making. It must be constantly 
readjusted and this readjustment must be institutionalised only temporarily. 
At the same time, the state bureaucracy, all state agencies must be special-
ised for the implementation of diverse programs. These two functions, the 
political and the bureaucratic, leads to a strict distinction between politics 
and bureaucratic agencies. Such a separation must be strictly maintained in 
states with more than one political party. It separates not only roles but also 
purposes and behavioral expectations; at the same time, the criteria and ra-
tionality are distinct for each. Even states with a single political party no 
longer maintain a political hierarchy within state agencies but distinguish 
between party and state bureaucracy. Only in the developing nations such 
a distinction has not yet been fully developed. This at the same time means 
that the reflexive mechanisms, for example of justice and ideology, are also 
underdeveloped. Functional differentiations in a society raise the complex-
ity of decision process and this in turn requires reflexive, political processes. 
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At the same time, such reflexive processes enable a stricter differentiation 
between various social segments, delimiting their autonomies and institut-
ing their changes with respect to other social segments. In brief, the reflex-
ive mechanisms strengthen the functional differentiations of both various 
social segments and of the political system itself. Such differentiations and 
delimitations of functions act as stabilizing force, as each segment assumes 
a relative autonomy and resists any arbitrary intrusions by political figures. 
At the same time, no political figure or even a group could manage the com-
plexity of functions, strengthened through various institutionalised reflexive 
mechanisms. This, according to Luhmann, guarantees stability and prevents 
arbitrariness in political decisions.
Luhmann’s theory comes closest to being adequate to the complexity 
of modern social life, yet using the very premises of critical theory it can be 
evaluated as to its shortcomings and problems. It may be correct to maintain 
that complexity and differentiation of functions through reflexive mecha-
nisms is a guarantee of stability, but at the same time it may also be a guar-
antee of stifling bureaucratization of all social segments, an entrenchment 
of positions which would resist any change. In fact, instead of promoting 
change, it would tend to differentiate itself into more “refined” functions and 
hence use the reflexive mechanisms to expand itself and not to constitute 
a benefit for society. Moreover, the institutionalisation of reflexive mecha-
nisms capable of differentiating the temporal horizons into an indefinite set 
of possibilities may lead to an investigation of empty sets and not of concrete 
problems. To correct such vaster effort, other reflexive mechanisms would 
have to be established to decide on the reflexive mechanisms that are not 
accomplishing anything. It is the same as having congressional committees 
to investigate a particular problem and its possible solutions and then to 
form another committee to see whether the other committees are solving the 
problem and then to hire a consulting firm to check whether the last com-
mittee is adequately equipped to pass judgements on the previous commit-
tee: a song without an end. 
Luhmann fails to respect the tendency of institutionalised functions to 
maintain themselves and in fact to proliferate themselves indefinitely and 
hence instead of becoming aids in social process, they become burdens and 
hindrances. This is perhaps the weak link separating political and bureau-
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cratic spheres. With political changes, some bureaucratic functions may be-
come redundant; in order to maintain themselves, such functions (or the 
functionaries within them) might accept subservience to political whims 
and thus break down the strict distinction between the two spheres. Despite 
the dangers, Luhmann is one of the few scholars squarely confronting the so-
cio-political complexity of our times. The problems inherent in his approach 
do not detract from his contributions. 
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CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MODALIZATION OF 
TIME
World‑Time and Systemic History
For Luhmann, the naive relationship of man to his history can be inter-
rupted in various ways by reflection. One possibility is to regard the past as 
one specific region of objectivity and to raise the question concerning the 
conditions of its knowledge. If in this perspective one wishes to scientize 
knowledge above recollection, one may interrogate the conditions under 
which such knowledge can be validated as scientific attaining at the same 
time an intersubjective validity for the results of historical research. If one 
takes this “epistemological” foundation for granted, then it is valid to main-
tain that past is something that has been and that furthermore the themes 
worthy of research can be selected from the plethora of objective pasts in 
terms of the interests of knowledge. It may be granted that an ideology could 
disrupt such interests of knowledge (always: interests of knowledge) without 
losing greater or lesser optimism that such disruption could be eradicated. 
Social history, as a scientific discipline, would then be concerned with the 
knowledge of past social structures and processes. For the evaluation of in-
terrelationships and as an aid of selectivity, it could apply to currently rec-
ognized sociological theories that have proven themselves in research. In 
this sense, it is possible to employ theories concerning the interrelationships 
between social differentiations, autonomy of partial systems and symbolic 
generalizations.
The right and possibility of this procedure cannot be challenged. Yet it 
must be recognized that in this broad area problems are skirted that still fall 
within the competence of sociological theory. They are concerned with the 
social conditions of the constitution of time and history. The constitution of 
temporal modalities and the selection of what is relevant in them is not only 
a question of knowledge; rather they inhere in the object itself. This must be 
granted if one accepts that the object of sociological as well as socio-histor-
ical research consists of sensible and self-reflective human experience and 
51
Chapter IV. Social Structure and Modalization of Time
activity for which the possibility of reflexivity inheres in their own selectiv-
ity. The extent to which a sociological theory includes the problem of sense, 
temporality becomes a constitutive dimension of its object and can no longer 
be treated merely as a condition of knowledge of an object.
The historical research can possibly liberate itself from the “historical 
consciousness” and its investigated object, society, as well as from following 
the old and at all times simultaneously present omniscientia Dei. Be this as 
it may, the road is long and can only be entered after an analysis of the tem-
porality of the object and the recognition of the manner and the object from 
which abstraction must eventually be initiated. In sociology it is a common-
place that time consciousness varies with distinct social systems depending 
upon their social structure. The thesis is elaborated with a view to the tempo 
of temporal flow, time shortness and length of time horizons that are relevant 
for activity – specifically in view of economic or “civic” aspects of time. Yet 
all these are at best partial aspects of the general problem of time. Beyond 
this, the bourgeoisie society discusses since Hegel and in wake of Marx the 
historicity of the given contemporary social consciousness - states and their 
reflexive means, although in this case without clear distinction of epistemo-
logically theoretical questions. Our further deliberations aim at the unifica-
tion of these individual elements with the aid of more abstract, theoretically 
systemic questions. It ought to be shown that and how social systems con-
stitute time, time horizons and specific explication of temporal relevancies. 
And to constitute should not mean “to produce” or to create ex nihilo but 
rather to render it sensible as a condition for the construction and reduction 
of complexity.
Corresponding to the theme of this volume of collections, we shall limit 
ourselves to the past horizons of time. The constitution of an open future 
would require, from the same theoretically systematic point of departure, ad-
ditional considerations. It is possible to distinguish between experience and 
activity in a different manner than was previously the custom with the aid 
of a theoretically systemic point of departure. By experience we understand 
the consciousness process that is accessible to self-experience insofar as its 
selectivity is not related to the selecting system but to the environment. The 
relationship to selectivity (and thus the constitution of experience and activ-
ity) is only possible on the consciously maintained and stabilized difference 
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requiring simultaneous presence of (at least) two elements, for example of 
the possible and the real, the present and the non-present, of the known and 
the unknown, etc. We wish to characterize this simultaneity of two levels as 
modalization of the process of selectivity. This means that we maintain the 
presence of those two levels that lend to the selection process its character 
of selection.
On the basis of these brief considerations, we could characterize the 
contemporary experience of time pointing to nonactual temporal horizons, 
as the modalization of the contemporary experience. Expressions about 
the past are, for example, present expressions in the mode of past. In other 
words, one can modalize the present experience in such a way that its con-
tents retain the general character of the past. Besides the temporal modaliza-
tions, there are various other forms of modalization, such as epistemological 
dealing with knowledge; knowledge of possible world, theories concerning 
the conditions for knowledge: idealism, materialism, empiricism, language 
games, social conditions, pragmatic needs; conditions, such as religious, ide-
ological, moral ones that select certain aspects as knowledge while rejecting 
others. The classical discussion of modalities and modalizations was at first 
related to an ontologically interpreted logic, then to language and finally to 
the conditions of knowledge without attaining a complete, analytical separa-
tion and equilibrium of these distinct kinds of modalizations. Thus there is a 
lack of a sufficiently abstract and functionally capable concept, i.e., a concept 
that would permit us to grasp temporality as “a case of . . . .” In this regard the 
theoretically systemic deliberations could be of further assistance.
Talcott Parsons has accomplished the way for the first step. His famous 
systemic problem schema (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latent 
pattern maintenance) presupposes two axes in its construction. One ex-
presses the difference between a system and an environment, the other is the 
axis that is dichotomized into the distinction between the present and fu-
ture fulfillment. This contains the recent and clearly formulated fundamental 
thesis that the differentiation between a system and environment produces 
temporality because it introduces a difference between theoretical time as a 
basis of sequence of events and the time of open possibilities as a horizon of 
selection of past and future. No longer can everything occur contemporane-
ously. The retension requires and has time. A critical effect of a part of the 
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systemic processes appears later and even then a sensible relationship to the 
environment must be found; otherwise, the difference between a system and 
environment dissolves again.
Luhmann can now make a connection with another step in thought. 
Systemically and theoretically, all modalizations can be conceived as gener-
alizations of systemic structures. Generalization means that the structure is 
compatible with more than one environmental condition and respectively, 
systemic condition; a concept assumes a difference between a system and 
environment. In this sense, we can for example identify modally generalized 
possibilities either with the real as an otherwise possible or with the possible 
as either real or not real. Temporal modalizations are generalizations of an-
other type. They are based on the maintenance of an identity of a world or a 
system through a succession of conditions.
All further considerations are constituted on the assumption that such 
accomplishments of generalization vary with the systemic structures them-
selves, i.e., they neither occur purely arbitrarily nor are they a mere “decora-
tion” of an epistemic process, a kind of transcendental illusion. This sup-
position leads to a task of a more exact investigation of the interconnection 
between time horizons and the structures of social systems. As a point of 
departure, this requires two added premises; the concept of sense and once 
again the difference between system and environment.
The sensefulness of human experience and activity is constitutive for 
time and history insofar as they have the experienceable selectivity of all de-
terminations. All that occurs sensibly, occurs in a horizon of other possibili-
ties. This is the case even when other possibilities as possibilities are negated 
and the event is introduced as necessary; negations can (!) and this “can” is in 
its own right necessary - in turn be negated. Historical events are not relevant 
in their pure facticity and not in their factual, procedural interconnection 
but rather in their selectivity. World history makes sense as a self-selectivity 
of being and thus can be grasped theoretically as an evolution - in a society 
that enables and establishes not only political or theological but also scien-
tific interests in history. Modern understanding of history includes a differ-
ence between facts as given at a particular present and what is possible. What 
counts as facts are selected on the basis of our knowledge or in terms of their 
significance for society. Yet facts will change on the basis of what is relevant 
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for the possibilities that comprise criteria of selection and definition of facts 
such changes in the status of what counts as a fact cannot be abolished be-
cause modern society constantly includes novel possibilities and interprets 
facts even around the globe in terms of some lacks of possibilities available to 
the west. Let us look at an example: it is almost unavoidable that we observe 
societies without politically organized possibility of a binding decision in ju-
ridical decisions from the viewpoint of the “absence” of such possibilities and 
analyze transitional situations as if both possibilities were “given” where the 
one and then generally the other became realized. Today one must disregard, 
negate the possible in order to reconstruct the horizons of experience and 
activity of the past social systems. This hardly controllable thought opera-
tion which is difficult to delimit conceptually and which is only attainable 
fictively presupposes science as the condition of its very possibility (and thus 
again the present). Thus under the title of reflexivity we are returning to the 
understanding of time.
This insight into the selectivity of historical facts offers us the key for the 
establishment of the relationship between social structures and time hori-
zons. History emerges as a selection from horizons of possibilities while pos-
sibilities presuppose as the condition of the structures of systems. Once again 
it is clear that we must transport one of the concepts used in epistemologi-
cal theory, viz. “condition of possibility” into a systemic theory. The insight 
gained in epistemology that possibilities are dependent on the conditions of 
possibility and distinguish themselves in accordance with what conditions of 
possibility are meant, allow themselves to be transferred to systems through 
the concept of modal generalization. Systemic structures must be assumed 
if the possible is to be distinguished from the impossible and they must be 
further presupposed if one wishes to differentiate various kinds of the possi-
ble such as the politically possible, the economically possible, the technically 
possible, etc. “Presupposing”, “separating”, “differentiating” are here meant as 
operations of daily life although also as processes of knowledge. Ultimately 
this means that not only in knowledge but also in all conscious operations, 
i.e., by inner reconstruction of selectivity, modal generalizations are possible 
in various directions and can be attained through differentiations.
The result for the theory of history is that all selectivity and hence all 
eventualities of facts are based on systemic structures that condition the ho-
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rizon of possibilities from which, regardless by what processes, events are 
selected. In a system there are distinguishable projective possibilities in ac-
cordance with the degree and form of differentiations resulting in a differen-
tiated selectivity of events in their past horizon. For example, the concept of 
nature of the classical Greece (and thus the beginning of the societas civilis of 
the Old European tradition) designates the limits of the possible with respect 
to the political-juridical sphere and thus the historical or positive selection of 
the law and determines the supersession of archaic family relations through 
the political constitution of society. By a similar conception, the Chinese le-
galists designate the contingency of the environmentally dependent satisfac-
tion of needs to be overcome by a politically planned economic order; for 
Greeks, whose economy was outside the civil society, such thought was un-
realizable. In the bourgeoisie society of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies the limits of the economically disposable are finally designated. The 
distinctions are conditioned through the differentiations of the institution-
alization of systemic differentiations and of the relative priority of economy 
and politics. In all cases they are applied to the reproduction of the given 
history of the social system. In archaic societies, with slight differentiations 
and hardly developed consciousness of possibility and selectivity there is a 
corresponding lack not only of a depth of history but also of a discriminating 
concept of nature.
If it is correct that the systemic history as a history of selectivity is con-
stituted in dependence upon the structural conditions of possibility, then 
memory is a most preeminent process, namely not merely a grasp into stored 
and present signs of past facts but rather a reproduction of the selectivity 
of events. This presupposes not only the acquaintance with the history of 
facts but also with the memorableness of other, not actualized possibilities. 
The distinction between a system and environment and resultantly the dif-
ferentiation between systemic and world history becomes more significant 
in a way to be discussed in detail. Reproduction of the selectivity of events 
places such high demands that one cannot start with the notion that they 
succeed with equal sense in all sense transformed psychic and social systems. 
A system reproduces in recollection its own history of selectivity, the history 
of selectivity of its experiential and active relationships to its own environ-
ment. Moreover, there is a reconstructed world history of unaccomplished 
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selectivity necessary to grasp its own adjoining selectivity. The differentiation 
between systemic history and world history need not become thematic for 
the system; at the same time it introduces conscious operations in that the 
functioning conditions of the possibility of the world and of the system dif-
ferentiate themselves.
There is a difference between systemic history and world history. In sys-
temic history, the experiences and expectations are limited and can be rec-
ognized when repeated. Therefore, in communication a social system and its 
history are accepted more readily as obvious with all rules and expectations 
than the system’s pre-history or the history of the environment. One can deny 
before the judge that one has committed a murder; but it is much more dif-
ficult to deny in the same system that one has denied that one has committed 
a murder. In other words, among the participants in a social system the rule 
is valid that one assumes the identity of the commonly experienced systemic 
history, thus expecting the commonality of recollection. Systemic history 
thus serves as a natural (non-technical) guarantee for connected selectiv-
ity of further experiences and activities. In this function it can be replaced 
only through complicated, technical provisions (e.g., through jurisprudence). 
However, when and insofar as this assumption functions, history can serve as 
a systemic structure. Under more or less extensive conditions, certain free-
doms or private reconstruction can be legitimated and made factually pos-
sible against world history, as they would not be harmful to the system.
A commonly experienced and recollected systemic history is an essential 
presupposition for mutual understanding that cannot be replaced by an objec-
tively established world history. With diverging sharpness and depth of recol-
lection experiences and premises of communication can no longer be mediat-
ed. Thus there appear barriers in understanding between generations and also 
in the cooperation of organizational committees with frequently changing par-
ticipants who can only have an extremely short memory of the social system; 
thus the participants can only presuppose a commonly known world-history. 
In any case, the only consequences that can be drawn are from the established 
facts of the past but not from the selectivity of such common facts so that the 
past selectivities are not advanced but only repeated or abolished. 
Luhmann’s main thesis at this juncture can be formulated at the begin-
ning as follows. It states that more complex social systems constitute more 
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distant, abstract and more differentiated time horizons than the simpler so-
cieties. They attain a higher, richer in possibilities world complexity enabling 
them to attain higher selectivity in experience and activity. In this manner, 
they can synchronize better inner-historical systemic histories most varied 
in kind incapable of contentual (for example, moral) integration; this is ap-
plicable also to systemic histories having a long and divergent duration or 
differing pace of their course.
The abstract thesis of a correlation between social complexity and world 
complexity will direct our further deliberations. Nevertheless, and this warn-
ing must at the same time be inserted, it is formulated too simplistically from 
systemic-theoretical grounds and thus cannot be maintained in this rough 
form. Prominent complications will have to be incorporated to the extent 
that social theory makes progress. Experiences from other areas of applica-
tion of systemic theory, above all of organistic theory, the theory of psychic 
systems and organizational theory show that the concept of “systemic com-
plexity” does not yet designate any empirically usable variable; the historian 
would experience the same if he were to attempt to confront the complexity 
of a given social system directly with historically transmitted time and his-
torical systems. Two modifications are required above all else: First of all, 
complexity is not a simple, one-dimensional, measurable quality of a system 
but a multi-dimensional concept so that one cannot state in every case with-
out further specifications whether one system is more complex than another; 
secondly, a more complex system does not imply, without qualifications, a 
more complex world in all of its laws and components, or in all relationships 
of the system to the environment. Thus, more complex societies do not nec-
essarily have correspondingly more complex history, not to speak of a more 
complex history in every respect. Moreover, primarily researches concerning 
the cognitive and motivational complexity of psychic systems have shown 
that more complex (more abstractly structured) systems acquire the ability 
to have simple as well as complex relationships with the environment. Their 
environment does not become increasingly complex in every respect - this 
would demand too much even of the most complex systems - but rather the 
structural abstraction opens a co-existence of more complex and simpler, 
more differentiated and un-differentiated relationships to the environment, 
thus constituting the possibility to specify sectorially and if necessary to shift 
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the depth sharpness and differentiation of the environment. The linguistic 
formulation is misleading; complexity is not a characteristic of a system; 
more complex systems, simply because they are more complex, need not ex-
perience this as more complex.
Social Structure and Modalization of Time
Historical events are not pure facticities nor are they relevant as a con-
nected process of facticities; they are relevant in their selectivity. World his-
tory has sense as a self-selection of being and must be grasped theoretically 
as explication and not as an explanation. Explication is what makes sense, 
what forms significative connections among selected environmental factors, 
and indeed, what comprises open possibilities as temporal. In one way of 
saying, for Luhmann the concept of sensible history is based on the differ-
ence between the real and the possible. The historical picture does not vary 
only in terms of the presently given and selected facts, but also in terms of 
constitutive conditions of selectivity, above all the ineradicability of possibili-
ties of other possibilities given today. For example, it is almost unavoidable 
to judge societies that do not possess a politically organized possibility of a 
judicial process in terms of the lack of such possibility; while analyzing tran-
sitional periods, we do so under the aspect as if both possibilities were given, 
whereby the first one, then the other achieved realization. One must exclude 
what is possible today in order to reconstruct the experience and activity 
horizons of the past and a consequent reconstruction of the social systems; it 
requires fictive process which is difficult to constitute conceptually and pre-
cisely and whose operations are hardly controllable in that they constantly 
assume a condition called science. To proceed, we must return to the notion 
of the reflexivity of time understanding.
The insight into the selectivity of historical facts yields a key to the con-
stitution of the relationship between social structures and temporal horizons. 
History arises as a selection of possibilities and their horizons, while the con-
dition for possibilities assumes the possibility of building a system. Here it 
becomes obvious that we must introduce the epistemologically loaded term 
“condition of possibility” into systematic theorization. The epistemologically 
gained insight that possibilities depend on the conditions of possibilities, and 
differentiate themselves in terms of specific conditions, allows itself to be em-
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ployed as a concept of modal generalization of a system. (Kant’s discussion 
is a generalization of traditional questions of modality in the sense that it is 
insufficient to ask the question concerning possibility, but concerning the 
possibility of the possibility notion as such and hence the conditions of pos-
sibility; what are the conditions that permit critical operation with modali-
ties). Systematic approach must be assumed in order to separate the possible 
from the impossible and it must be further assumed in order to differentiate 
among the various kinds of possibilities, such as politically possible, eco-
nomically possible, technologically possible, etc. and differentiation between 
the possible and the impossible.
The consequence for a theory of history is that all selectivity and all oc-
currences of facts are based on a system structure conditioning the horizon 
of possibilities out of which events are selected. The selectivity of events de-
pends on the degree of differentiation and the form of differentiation yield-
ing various open possibilities concerning the past. For example, the Greek 
notion of nature delimits the possibilities of political and juridical actions 
and thereby the historical and positive selection of the laws which at the 
same time surpasses the archaic social relationships; in Chinese thought, the 
notion of nature implies contingency and environmental dependence for the 
satisfaction of one’s needs which can be enhanced by socio-economic and 
political planning – for Greeks this is an impossible thought; their economic 
system was outside the limits of legal citizenship. The differentiations are 
based on the grounds of institutionalized systemic differentiations and the 
relative primacy of economy and politics; they are employed in all cases for 
the reproduction of the history of the social system. In archaic society, lack-
ing differentiations constitute a lack of possibilities, there is also a lack of 
history and a lack of the notion of nature.
If it is the case that the system history, as a history of selectivity, is con-
stituted in terms of the conditions of possibility, then memory is a preten-
tious process in that it cannot be an apprehension of given signs of the facts 
of the past, but a reproduction of the selectivity of events. (This demands that 
the concept of information and the concept of conscious functions must be 
related to the process of selection). This assumes not only an acquaintance 
with the history of facts but also the presence of non-actualized possibili-
ties. This will make the differentiation between a system and an environment 
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and the difference between the history of a system and a world history more 
significant. Reproduction of selectivity of events presents great demands that 
we cannot simply proceed from the notion that the selectivity is successful 
in the transformed significance of psychic as well as social systems. A system 
reproduces a memory of its own history of selectivity, a history that selects 
its own world-relationships of experience and action. It also reconstructs a 
world history of non-accomplished selectivity. The difference between the 
history of a system and the world need not be thematized by the system.
Our thesis can be formulated quite simply; it says that more complicated 
social systems require more extensive, abstract and more differentiated tem-
poral horizons than the simpler systems. They reach a higher world-com-
plexity, richer with possibilities which in turn constitute a basis for a higher 
and more refined selectivity in living and acting. In this way, it is possible 
to synchronize the inner-social histories of systems and indeed histories of 
systems that are vastly different (e.g. moral systems) and were thought to be 
incapable of integration; also histories of systems that are old, that run their 
course fast or slow. 
This abstract thesis of correlation between social complexity and world 
complexity will guide Luhmann’s subsequent reflections. Yet two modifica-
tions are required. First, complexity is not a uni-dimensional quality of a 
system; it is multidimensional, so that without further specifications it is 
impossible to say whether history of a system, world history, must now be 
given more precise delimitations. By way of events and their selectivity, time 
constitution arises because selectivity is profiled against and in terms of a 
constant structure of possibilities which yields to the selectivity its “event 
characteristic”; it is oriented. Even physical systems constitute time insofar 
as they are distinct from the environment and can assume an independent 
stance from it. The possibility to assume more than one stance is based on 
an incomplete interdependence, i.e. not each change changes everything. 
The gaps in interdependence that are possible through system building are a 
condition for the differentiation between future and past. In a system of sig-
nifications, the selectivity of meaningful events is experienced in a horizon 
of other possibilities which, insofar as they outlast the process of selectiv-
ity, become experienced as time horizon. Time consciousness is a necessary 
condition for selectivity in the relationship between system/environment, 
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constancy and change. This the most abstract notion of time leaves open the 
possibility for the most various consciousness of time in terms of various 
social structures. Greater precision is possible only when time is relativized 
historically in terms of various social systems and not in terms of one kind of 
temporal structure as a general premise.
Time horizon arises with the experience of selectivity and already in 
the experience of the closeness of one’s own history of a system. Such a time 
horizon can be very closely associated with concrete events, their immedi-
ate conditions and consequences – almost become identical with events - 
whereby it is not required to differentiate between time and the events. This 
situation is found in the development of children and archaic social systems. 
It arises when social systems begin to experience the history of their system 
and their need to reproduce history is limited by their contemporary situa-
tion. Their time understanding remains dependent on the events of the his-
tory of the system. Without a more abstract notion of time, past and future 
are not sharply differentiated. On this basis, we find a widely accepted differ-
entiation from a near and a distant past (also future), whereby distant times 
are not strictly times but dim zones that are relevant for beliefs and their 
prescripts. The basis for this is that in the immediate past and future, the 
individual intentions are quite divergent and are homogenized in a distant 
time-horizon. For these societies, there is no consistent universal history. 
The first need for temporal dimensionality must be closely related to 
religious differentiations in myth and then in conceptual thinking. Primarily, 
when prominent social processes arise, be they ceremonial or political, and 
when they are no more experienced as a part of natural process of religious 
events, but are seen as tasks to be performed in terms of correct activity to 
guarantee the harmony of cosmic events, there arises a need for time as a 
specific dimension of experience and activity. Only then will the conscious-
ness of failure arise and the social processes will become contingent and 
dependent on variable factors; only then there arises a need to grasp this 
contingency in terms of a double possibility of success and failure in terms of 
divine powers, ones own actions or the interference by strangers. A dimen-
sion is constituted that orders the events in terms of relative selectivity.
One of the most successful extensions of a history of a system to a world 
history, which clearly reflects the inner contingencies of the system, is the 
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Old Testament. The politically shifting history of Israel can be seen as an un-
fortunate and contingent history. However, under the monotheistic premise, 
it was not presented as a history of a particular people in their particular en-
vironment; hence the “outside-world” had to be interpreted as a work of the 
same god and related to the society as an evil visited by the god. Due to the 
supposed sins of the people, the simple dichotomy between the system and 
environment in the sense of the congruence of near/distant, accustomed/
strange, good/evil was destroyed. The problem of contingency, in the form 
of system and environment, had to be expanded into the world-history and 
demanded the generalization of one’s god to world ruler. The later prophecies 
found a final solution for this social problem in the notion of eschatology, 
whereby eschatos is no more a local notion but a world orientation.
The need for abstraction toward a relatively context-free time horizon is 
closely related to the increasing differentiation in the social system. In socie-
ties with increasing differentiations, which must surpass its systematic lim-
its in communicative interaction, the memory of one’s history of the system 
is inadequate. One requires abstractions as coordinating generalizations, 
which permit him, if not to integrate, then at least to relate the various histo-
ries of the systems. The comparison demands that one’s own system assumes 
an abstract time with datable events. In other words, the increased functional 
differentiations in a system also increase the interdependence of the histories 
of systems, so that more abstract forms of mediation must be established. 
World time must become the coordinating generalization and generalized 
coordination as homogeneity, which means independence from specific 
movements and their speed, be it in one’s own system or that of the strangers; 
reversibility, which means the possibility to calculate backwards in spite of 
the irreversibility of events; determinability by way of dating and causality; 
transitivity as a condition for comparison of different temporal periods.
The formulation of world-time, above all the notion of linear succes-
sion, corresponds to this need. Linear time is a very late product -- in fact 
a product of modern times. It makes possible a differentiation between fu-
ture and past as either continuous or discontinuous heterogeneities. The re-
lationship between past and future is contingent. A generalised time, which 
is posited as independent of any history of any system, is world-time and 
constitutes a dimension of a world-horizon. The synchronically measurable 
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world-time permits all actual and contemporary systems to run and con-
stitute a condition for a world-wide communication. It also is a systematic 
time of world-society, i.e. an all-encompassing system of communication of 
human experiences and actions. The identity of world-time and a systematic 
time does not destroy the difference between a system and world. It is based 
on the thesis that a society is a system which reduces an indeterminable com-
plexity and constitutes the world as a horizon of determinable possibilities.
In relationship to the social reflexivity, it can be asked whether there 
can be “meta perspectives” that would enable, through their institutionaliza-
tion, a higher degree of individual subjectivity and many-sided expectations, 
without at the same time being hound to a concrete expectation of biograph-
ically describable subjects, i.e. without privileges. Some of the main sym-
bols of the bourgeoisie system seem to point in that direction. The right to 
choose one’s profession, religion, to express one’s opinion, as a con possibility 
of subjective freedom, love as passion (and not as a religious duty), money, 
yet these are late winnings (these meta-factors are posited as equivalent for 
everyone even if in practice accessible in most unequal measure). One could 
raise the same question concerning time reflexivity; are there “meta perspec-
tives” that differentiate the time horizons of various systems and correlative-
ly fulfill the demands of consistency and changing growth of selectivities? 
One could guess that these must be future perspectives because future is the 
time-horizon with the highest complexity which must be worked out in a 
theory of planning.
The question we now must raise is: How are social structure’s need for 
history and temporal horizons related? How does the need for time and his-
tory arise out of the increasing selectivity in the system/environment rela-
tionship, i.e. how do social systems choose their notions of time and history 
in order to develop their possibilities of selectivity and at the same time their 
limitations? This we can best show in terms of examples.
1. Early archaic societies have a short time-horizon of a simple system 
of interactions. They live in present orientation which is not in opposition 
to past and future, but carried by a concrete, contemporaneous net of lateral 
social relationships. An interest in history, which was not lived through by the 
individual, arises through the differentiation of political roles in connection 
with their radius of legitimation. The history of a system becomes a genealogy 
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in late archaic times and finally it becomes a history of deeds of the ruling 
house or politically conceived history of the clan. It takes on moral implica-
tions, teaches the ways and un-ways of action and prescribes the required 
memory of the clan. Time consciousness expands. The archaic differentiation 
between mythical and genealogical time is unified in terms of construction of 
history with predominant religious coloring, the continuity of which includes 
the present. From such a history one draws moral, practical and even rational 
directives. The differentiation between the political, religious and economic 
roles is slight and the religious-moral thought plays a role of integration which 
covers up the political motives. Here there is an extension of the present time 
horizon and hence of the possibilities of ethical and political achievements 
that in their turn presuppose a further expansion of the time-horizon. In ju-
ridical area, we get guilt and forgiveness in the sense of temporally limited 
events, such as atonement; promissory oaths and general consensus which 
demands a temporal horizon without the presently given factual basis.
2. Scarcity makes history insofar as it sees possibilities as interdepend-
ent and selectivity as contingent, i.e. as success at the price of … But scarcity 
is not the same for all societies. It can be generalized as a form of contingency 
that is made independent of gains, needs or given quantity of commodities by 
the employment of quantity called money. Here we get factors that neutralize 
history. The process of gains and production can be relegated to the past and 
released from the present and relevant history if they have no significance 
for the present operations; these factors, in short, do not count in principle 
of constant quantity of production. In this sense, the bourgeois society does 
not require history for its operations. History can be eliminated in terms of 
contracts, money and property. It can reach a state that was impossible on 
the basis of politically conceived history - historiless concept of potentialities 
(almost Aristotelian), and yet this, due to scarcity, makes history.
3. Science is becoming a very important aspect in the total system of 
social life whereby the history of science depends very much on the selection 
of open possibilities which in their turn are dependent on the projects by the 
given needs of society - praxis and technology are priority rules. The history 
of science is understood to be a history of problems and their solutions; hence 
the difference between the horizon of possibilities and the constituted realities 
is the difference between problems solved and problems requiring solution 
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(with the assumption that there are more solutions than one). This assumes 
that independently of any specific solution of a problem, it can be pointed to 
where the conditions of solvability lie: concepts of potentiality, disposition, 
truth-value as a possibility of a proposition to be true or false, verification, 
falsification, quantification, etc., although not totally clarified, are neverthe-
less assumed. These notions constitute the horizon of possibilities in terms 
of which science makes history. The history of the scientific problemata indi-
cates the contingency of scientific process and diminishes dogmatism.
4. The history of love is usually overlooked in favor of more serious en-
deavors. Not the private affairs, but the historical need for love. Romantic, 
passionate, detached, etc., love prescribes the cultural norms of behavior and 
at the same time institutes instabilities. Instability, chanciness, suffering, un-
conditionalness, and hence incertitude are presuppositions of a wide horizon 
of possibilities to legitimate the modalities of partner-selection, education, 
family organization, etc. This means that love is not a specification of rights 
and duties, that sexuality is not a quantity of mutual performance, but all 
constitute an indeterminate horizon of possibilities that are mixed with his-
torically sanctioned strategies and reduced to a system of expectations. If you 
marry, you are respectable and pay less taxes, etc. These strategies are related 
to the production and continuation of the historical system.
The varied and brief descriptions were employed to indicate that the 
spaces of selectivity of a history of a system vary with the generation of pos-
sibilities and the selectivity interests of a system. But why history, when our 
society claims to have opened a horizon of possibilities that seem to be end-
less? Is it the case that we have reached a context-free situation that has made 
us free from all that has been done? In order to deal with these questions, 
we must assume a systematic structure. We are not asking concerning the 
natural principle of release from the memory of the past but assume a social 
system that inhibits this “natural process” by presenting the history of the 
system as a context of possibilities which yields meaning to individual expe-
riences and actions. For example, in an over-documented society, there are 
institutions that allow a relatively free context of selectivities that disregard 
history. One uses history not as an immediate process of comprehension and 
meaning, which is the case in simple systems, but rather distances oneself 
from it through the construction and reduction of historical complexities.
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This can be made manifest in terms of expressions that would point to 
subjects and temporal situations and their comprehensibility would depend 
on an interaction in an immediate situation. Expressions such as “I”, “you”, 
“today”, “yesterday”, “while longer”, etc. are replaced by context-free system 
of symbols that perform the complex selectivity to correspond to the most 
complex social system. It sees the past as completed, closed and not given 
immediately in terms of living with one’s predecessors and their ways.
The neutralization, discrediting and objectifying of history through 
technology can be seen in terms of a few examples. Let us take organiza-
tional structures built in terms of identification of positions. Positions are 
abstract points of identification of roles in terms of which persons, tasks and 
organizational manipulations could be altered. The identification as a posi-
tion allows arbitrary breaks in the continuity of technical functions, whereby 
persons, tasks and organizational functions can be easily exchanged. The 
limit of meaningful exchange of, for example, a person, does not reside in 
the predecessor which would be inclusive of a past time dimension, but in 
the requisite functional capacity in terms of the factual requirements of the 
system and its determined positions. An observation oriented toward the 
historical past is not adequate; it is a temporal horizon that always implies 
the other, the future. No historical investigation can leave the future out of 
consideration. The inadequacy of the notion of history as past has been ex-
plicated in the section of time reflex. 
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MEANING AND ACTION IN  
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING:  
AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
Building a review of the traditions that led to the cultural perspective and 
treating organizations as framework, this article uses Luhmann’s neofunctional 
model as the conceptual device to illuminate cultural theory. Organizational 
cultures are seen as systems of signification and as communication media by 
which the premises of action are developed, maintained, and transmitted.
Employing the concept of culture in the study of organizations raises a 
number of important questions. For instance, in what ways do organizations 
resemble cultural systems communication meaning across time? Is there a 
unit of analysis in the organizational setting that corresponds, even if only 
roughly, to the usages of culture by social and symbolic anthropology? How 
do the cultural texts, reputed to underpin organization discourse, get cre-
ated? Are research practices constructed around the concept of organiza-
tional culture necessarily forced to take either underlying communication 
processes? Can interpretive methods focused upon the cultural aspect of 
organizational life be employed to examine the practical factors with which 
organizational members must continually cope?
Organizational culture has provided an opportunity for advocates of in-
terpretive approaches to gain a foothold in the organizational arena. Theory 
development with respect to the concept of organization culture is certainly a 
desideratum. In too many cases, however, interpretive methodologies appear 
more intent upon exorcising the ghosts of positivism and functionalism than 
upon articulating principal methodologically and theoretically accountable 
tools of their own. Therefore, even while accepting the legitimacy of the “cul-
tural perspective”, it is also acknowledged that adequate theoretical expli-
cation of this perspective remains unavailable. Given its underdevelopment 
as a theoretical framework, reasoned assessment of the research outcomes 
emanating from the cultural perspective must await clarification of some of 
the core concepts attached to this perspective.
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For present purposes, the explanations offered here presume the three 
following points. First, we distinguish between the socio-psychosocial per-
spective and the communication perspective to delineate a “cultural” do-
main within organization theory and research. Where this differentiation 
of fundamental viewpoints is wither absent entirely of incompletely worked 
through, “organization cultural” will yield products like atheoretical ethnog-
raphies, reformulations of traditional “climate” variables, and storytelling. 
Second, we believe that organizations are by nature practical domains or 
“action frameworks.” Consequently, the cultures of organization are first of 
all functional configurations and performances, and only secondarily theo-
retical or even mythopoetic phenomena. Third, organizational culture serves 
the maintenance and development of organizations by providing important 
ordering mechanism that further the organization’s domination in complex 
information environments.
The point of view elaborated in this chapter draws liberally upon contem-
porary European phenomenology with the Husserlian tradition. It employs 
especially Niklas Luhmann’s neofunctional system’s model, which contains a 
particularly elegant extension of phenomenological principles in application 
to the analysis of social action systems. The chapter highlights generalized 
communication processes at work in organizational life that furnish the raw 
material molded by particular organization in creating their particular cul-
tural forms. Because this cultural process is a communication process before 
it is a socio-psychological process, the discussion begins by distinguishing 
between questions more appropriate to social psychology than to communi-
cation, and by briefly characterizing organizational research traditions in the 
light of this distinction. Next, the discussion offers a specific interpretation of 
the “cultural perspective” that treats it as a functional construct bound by the 
practical requirements of achieving tasks, producing products, and effecting 
organization aims in its environment. Finally, the chapter surveys some par-
ticular ways that cultural meanings “work.”
The Problematicof Organizational Communication
For conceptual as well as practical reasons, the field of human commu-
nication needs to develop a more clearly communication-based perspective 
of formal organization behavior. To this end, it is necessary to begin by dis-
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tinguishing such a perspective from a standpoint of organizational research 
based upon social psychology. Organizational communication research has 
looked at issues related to, but apart from, that of communication among 
individual members of organizations, and sought to measure that interaction 
through employee self-reports and an assortment of observational protocols, 
or in terms of productivity and efficiency. Only rarely has the literature sug-
gested that organizational communication might involve a level of commu-
nication that differs significantly from interpersonal or group interaction. 
The absence of a clear distinction between social and psychological and com-
munication perspectives has resulted in this heavy dependence upon inter-
personal and small group designs by communication research and theory 
treating organizations and organizational behavior.
For a social psychological researcher, the primary object of analysis 
consists of intra-individual psychological processes; these processes are by 
definition hidden to the researcher. Consequently, the social psychological 
researcher turns to communication behaviors and employs them as indica-
tors for the purpose of accessing psychological events. However, regardless of 
how much effort is devoted to interpreting communication behaviors, it is ul-
timately the underlying psychological processes that the social psychologist 
is interested in. Psychological observations and theories about them establish 
the baseline for any explanation about actual behaviors and fix the guidelines 
for any possible interventions. In other words, from the standpoint of social 
psychology, communication behaviors and events are secondary operation-
ally and derivative causally. Human psychological behavior forms the major 
object of concern for social psychological investigation.
Even among current writers and organizational researchers, there is a 
persistent and sometimes overwhelming tendency to fall back upon specula-
tion and description of these inner and hidden psychological properties and 
occurrences when examining communication in the organization. Often, 
where these are not descriptions of communication traits or context stimuli, 
the resulting analyses are remarkably similar to literary analysis. For present 
purposes, it is important to acknowledge that although the socio-psycho-
logical aspects of human communication are fascinating and undeniably 
contribute to our self-understanding as communicators, such accounts of 
communication behavior do not augment our knowledge about how mean-
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ing is shared and structured among individuals; instead they describe how 
individuals experience the transference of that meaning. Little or nothing is 
disclosed about the transference process itself or about its social construc-
tion. Examination of the communication process needs to emphasize the 
extra-psychological, the extra-individual aspects of meaning transmission. 
An emphasis upon process characteristics views communication behaviors 
and events as operationally primary and causally effective. In other words, 
communication processes take precedence over individuals, whether singly, 
in dyads, or in groups.
In the first chapter of Organizations and Communication: An Interpre-
tive Approach, Karl Weick (1979) assumes the considerable task of presenting 
possibilities for the development of a new research agenda for researchers 
examining organizational phenomena. He begins by reminding the readers 
about Berstein’s description of the field of organizational communication as 
“a discipline in search of a domain” (Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983 p. 2). For 
any communication researcher seeing to address some aspect of organiza-
tional research, this reminder is still the place to be (Etzioni, 1971; Goodall, 
1984; Perrow, 1979; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Warren, 19984).
What is the province of organizational communication? It is the ques-
tion that arises from the lines of research reports, journal articles, and con-
ference papers, amidst which once quickly becomes lost in a sea of variables, 
of aspects of behavior frequently encountered in the organizational setting. 
Such studies offer examinations of cohesiveness, conflict, competition, task 
orientation, leadership emergence, fantasy themes, and the relationship be-
tween groups within the larger organizational structure. These all represent 
applications and elaborations of socio-psychological models.
The examination of group behavior focuses inevitably upon the behav-
ior of the individuals composing that group, more specifically upon how in-
dividual behaviors are affected by group dynamics. It presupposes a circular 
model, the outgrowth and extension of the interpersonal model, that is, of 
the dyad. To the degree that that model is based upon a mechanistic model, 
including feedback loops, channel noise, and an (assumed) separation be-
tween the message and the medium/channel, it thereby focuses the research 
questions upon isolated communicators in highly contextualized circum-
stances. The communication variables in this setting are characteristics of 
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idiosyncratic communication performances. In short, the focus is upon the 
trees and not the forest.
From the positivistic tradition, in an attempt to import and impart sci-
entific objectivity and rigor in the examination of human social phenomena, 
quantitative methods and assumptions were applied to studies of individu-
als, groups, and organizations/institutions. One immediately thinks of the 
famous Hawthorne studies, which ironically produced the conclusions – the 
“Hawthorne Effect” – demonstrating that effects are not so simply anticipat-
ed when the research object is human behavior (in that case, productivity). 
Structural and mathematical models continue in the literature surrounding 
research about organizations, and often form an important part of the cur-
riculum of MBA programs.
An interest in structure as the defining characteristic of organizations 
has yielded an emphasis upon hierarchy, authority, power, and control, with 
the complementary view of employees as unmotivated, uncommitted, un-
trustworthy, and unreliable. Organizational goals have been seen as dictates 
handed down from above via commands; thus goals are achieved through 
punishment and reward. It is characteristic of this research that all organi-
zations are looked upon as essentially alike along all important dimensions 
(i.e., no differentiation is made as to product or to goals) and as essentially 
self-contained.
The human relations school of thought developed as if in reaction to this 
report, exercising worker attitudes, self-actualization, loyalty, and an assort-
ment of collateral structures like purchase fishing and decision-making prac-
tices. The focus of attention was on leadership, communication, purchased 
patient, and conflict. Individual self-expression and self-actualization and, in 
turn, group interaction (often in terms of leadership from versions) became 
the central concerns. It was assumed that occurs organizations are composed 
of individuals, understanding individuals and individuals as members of 
small groups will inform us about organizational behavior, and provide the 
basis for useful explanatory models.
Despite the differences among these viewpoints, they all nonetheless 
share the assumption that individuals and collections of individuals con-
stitute the ultimate building blocks of complex organizations. However, as 
Charles Perrow (1979) notes in his critical essay Complex Organizations: 
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“One cannot explain organizations by explaining the attitudes and behav-
iors of individuals or even small groups within them. We learn a great deal 
about psychology and social psychology but little about organizations per 
se in this fashion” (p. 149). Taking Perrow’s admonition to heart, this dis-
cussion relinquishes “individuals” as the basic unit of analysis for the study 
of organizations, and consequently takes issue with the use of “interaction 
between individuals” as a basis for analysis of organizational communication. 
The complexities of organizing imply a form of communication much more 
efficient and compressed than can be understood by employing models ulti-
mately derived from face-to-face interaction.
The work of March and Simon (1958) seems at least to be hinting at 
a domain beyond the social psychological approaches when they observe, 
for example, that instead of the organization controlling the decision-mak-
ing process, it controls the premises of decision-making. March and Simon 
distinguish the premises of decision-making from an individual’s decision-
making capacity/ability. In this way, such premises can be said to supersede 
individuals in given positions by establishing specific role expectations, ir-
respective of the individuals involved.
Extending the ideas of March and Simon, Perrow (1979, pp. 146-153) 
directs are attention to the notion of control within the organization. Per-
row dismisses the command model and its rules-based extensions as both 
too simplistic as well as unreflective of accounts of actual organizational life. 
Carol points out that perhaps as little as 20% of all activity in an organization 
can be accounted for by such obtrusive control means. He continues by ap-
plauding the insights offered by March and Simon with respect to their de-
scription of unobtrusive control mechanisms. The slate are mechanisms are 
to be distinguished from the more common control mechanisms to the plea 
employed by social scientists to explain daily organizational life: mechanisms 
like training, socialization, standards, and peer pressure. Instead, March and 
Simon suggest that there is a more subtle means of critical defective by deci-
sional promises through such forms as the standardization of raw materials, 
the development of an organizational vocabulary, and the absorption of en-
vironmental uncertainty. It is not that socialization and professional training 
are examples of these premises, it is rather that these premises ground and 
predetermine the character of socialization and professional training. In dis-
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cussing this aspect of March and Simon’s work, Perrow alludes to an entire 
level of organizational analysis as yet incompletely examined by researchers 
and scholars in the field of communication.
There is significant dissatisfaction with the current state of organiza-
tional research among some theoreticians, which has been reflected directly 
and indirectly in the work of Karl Weick (1979). Weick takes explicit note 
as will of the common managerial complaint about the inapplicability of re-
search results and conclusions to actual organizational settings dreaded the 
organizational research is out of touch with important parameters determin-
ing organizational reality. Like March and Simon, Weick attempts to change 
current in longstanding views of organizations by applying new metaphors 
and by suggesting radical views of organizing as human behavior. He ques-
tions the applicability of the rational model to human individual or collec-
tive behavior. Weick also challenges traditional views about the relationship 
between goals or plans and action. Both rationalization and explanation, ac-
cording to Weick, are accomplished after the fact of any action. Nevertheless, 
orders of discourse are built into these rationalizations that convincingly re-
flect pre-established organizational aims. In other words, first we act; second, 
we construct an explanation; and third, we ignore or forget that the action 
preceded the explanation. The mesh between the action and the supervening 
rationalization is achieved at the organizational level, as distinguished from 
the inter-individual level, in such a way that rationalization functions as a 
simple extension of the action already undertaken.
Drawing upon March and Simon, we can suggest that this is possible, 
as well as not counterproductive for the organization by virtue of the shared 
base of premises that unobtrusively, yet efficiently and consistently, guide 
action selection. If this is assumed to be true, then at least two questions are 
raised for the organizational researcher. How are the premises created? How 
do these premises come to be shared? For present purposes, a third question 
is also relevant: Is this directly related to Communication in organizations?
This chapter argues that such premises are to be found in a symbolically 
generalized form; that is, they are embedded in communication codes, which 
operate at the level of organizational functioning (Luhmann, 1979, 1982). 
As such, the analysis of these codes and of their operation offers appropriate 
objects for researchers interested in communication in organizations.
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Recently the topic of communication in organizations has begun to be 
addressed from a cultural perspective. Responding to a sense of frustration 
on the part of the organizations themselves and perceiving stagnation of re-
search propositions, a growing number of researchers have called attention 
to the metaphor of “culture” as a tool for understanding certain factors of 
organizations (Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983). Utilizing interpretive meth-
ods, this effort to apply the metaphor of culture to organizations by and large 
suggests an attempt to encompass theoretically some evident complexities 
that are as yet unaccounted for by organizational communications research. 
These analyses, however, remain for the most part at the level of interper-
sonal or group interaction; they provide richer descriptive detail, but they do 
not furnish equivalently robust theory.
Organizational culture in many respects represents a reformulation of 
variables previously approved under the heading of the political climate” by 
traditional organizational literature, for organizational culture has achieved 
a growing prominence in the literature and vocabulary of communication 
partly in response to several very popular and successful books addressing 
the issue of success and failure among corporations in America. Perhaps the 
most well-known of these volumes is Peters and Waterman (1982), In Search 
of Excellence, which presents eight governing principles for corporate suc-
cess (see also Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Each of these principles is related to 
four and bodies some aspect of organizational culture; that is, the principles 
identify in described on real, live rules of daily activity characterizing “suc-
cessful” corporations (as defined by the authors). But, in fact, the book’s net 
effect amounts to anecdotal description of the paradoxes resident in organi-
zations. Although enjoyable, the book’s practical implications are unclear, 
and its heuristic value not established. Nonetheless, but pointing to these 
resident paradoxes, the book holds the crew for scholars concerned with a 
defined communication process operating at the level of your organization; 
when the effective use of these paradoxes in creating successful organizations 
points to an ambiguity that can be resolved only at some other level of com-
munication analysis.
At the organizational level, communicating a selected, preferred mean-
ing involves a task of managing such tremendous contingencies that even the 
language is overburdened. Yet this task is essential to the process of routiniz-
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ing face-to-face interaction, making possible the stabilization and develop-
ment of organizations. Communication within an organization must occur 
not only at the interpersonal level.
Perhaps, as some have suggested, communication of this sort in organi-
zations occurs at the level of culture. While this is an intriguing proposition, 
actual applications of the cultural metaphor to organizations by commu-
nications researchers have often neglected the very object of their research 
interest—namely, communication. In these cases, communication comes to 
mean only the collection of activities (labeled as rites and ceremonies) that 
the researcher identified as symbolic in nature. Left at this level, it is easy to 
understand the conclusion posited by some of this research: organizations 
can be comprehended only individually. While such account may inform us 
about our own culture or subcultures thereof, they do little to further our 
understanding of the processes taking place in organizations, which make 
the generation and continuity of cultural forms either necessary or possible.
Niklas Luhmann (1970, 1975, 1979, 1982) provides one possible answer 
to what that underlying process is and how it operates. For Luhmann, it is 
communication of a particular sort that makes possible all forms of social 
complexity. He postulates communication media codes, which are special-
ized, symbolically generalized codes that reduce complexity by simultane-
ously transmitting both a selected alternative from among multiple action 
possibilities and the motivation for the acceptance of that selection. Luh-
mann suggest, then, that communication lays at the heart of the possibility 
of all social complexity, including organizations.
The Concept of Culture and Organizational Processes
The first task faced by the researcher who wishes to employ a cultural 
standpoint for the analysis of formal organizations involves deciding upon 
a unit of analysis for the organizational setting that corresponds, at least 
roughly, to an already established concept of culture. Of course, it is unlikely 
that “organizational culture” correlates to anything more real, though prob-
ably no less so, than does any other research dimension upon organizational 
life. Nonetheless, metaphors like text, fabric, system and the like ought not 
yield unneeded by hypostatizations that tempt the analyst to attribute effi-
cient causality to them. The organizational interpretive matrix comprising 
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such elements as symbols, legends, customs, rites of passage, and so forth, 
does not imply the existence within any given organization or organizational 
subunit or a cultural unit of analysis. In the realistic sense of a fixed, de-
terministic constellation, there is no set of inherited practices and attitudes 
that “defines those” who “belong to it” by constitution a “mighty system of 
circular causality” (Bidney, 1954). In other words, the empirically disclosed 
redundancy of perceptual patterns (mind-sets) and symbol-laden practices 
(customer) can mislead the researcher into supposing the existence of a self-
contained communication circuitry that artificially generates social cohesion 
by regulating and, to some important degree regimenting the behaviors and 
beliefs of organizational actors.
Keeping these caveats in mind, organization culture can be defined as 
follows: Organization culture consists primarily of open-ended context framed 
by significant symbols and modes of legitimated social action that enables selec-
tive responses to changes in the communication environment.
This definition of organizational culture does not presuppose a particu-
lar a priori distinction between intraorganizational and extraorganizational 
communication relationships or one between formal and informal inter-
personal relationships within organizations. Such distinctions are instead 
regarded as changeable empirical delimitations forming important compo-
nents of the frameworks that are constructed differently from organization 
to organization and from environment to environment.
The principle conceptual and research orientation as suggested by this 
definition of organizational culture can be summarized as follows:
(1) Attention must be paid to the rich diversity among organizations 
instead of swallowing them up as a whole into an image of formal 
organization that deprives actual organizations of their intrinsic con-
tent. From cultural perspective, which is interesting is not so much a 
structural or composition form of organization as the largely ad hoc 
generation of meaning-of works that binds each of them idiosyncrati-
cally. Conversely, what is held in common by different organizations 
are communication process characteristics that furnish the mecha-
nisms for the stabilization of viable core cultural forms.
(2) Bureaucratization should be regarded as a set of social relationships 
composed of meaningful behaviors and not only as the formaliza-
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tion of an isolated communication system. This requires a historical 
and structurational perspective upon organizational bureaucratiza-
tion that treats it as a purposive of human enterprise. This perspec-
tive views organizational goals/ends as internal parameters within 
the interpretive context delineated by the organization and suggests 
the variability and indetermination of environmental ends by defin-
ing them as historically situated dependent variables construed by 
the interpretive process.
(3) The relational communication functions performed by an organiza-
tion with respect to external (so-called peripheral) social forms as 
well as with respect to the various intraorganizational subgroupings 
(subsystems) indicates the importance of the services performed by 
both symbolic differentiation and of the legitimation of interest for 
the comprehension of organizational behavior from any particular 
vantage point, either inside or outside the organization. Stated in sim-
pler terminology, organizational cultures are not seamless fabrics; any 
standpoint upon them or within them is inherently local and partial.
(4)  Given the symbolic and functional character of organizational so-
ciology, no reliable prediction of the organization’s future can be 
filtered based solely upon knowledge about the organization’s his-
torical conditions, which are extensions of established communica-
tion structures and events. The temporal structure of organizational 
culture is not linear, instead it is spiral-like. The viability and effec-
tiveness of the particular interpretive context endures only by virtue 
of its continuous reinterpretation and use by the organizational ac-
tors. Organizational tradition guides without governing, otherwise 
the least circumstantial novelty in the communication environment 
could in principle render the tradition ineffectual, and so vulnerable 
to irrelevance.
Effective employment of the concept of culture in the setting of organi-
zations requires that one pays attention to the communicative interlocking 
of sense in situation and the manner that stresses cultural process as well 
as cultural products, and accordingly looks upon organizational culture as 
a field encompassing complex variations within present communication 
events, and not simply as an amalgam of routine traditions made up of typi-
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fied communication outcomes. To this end, we propose that organizations be 
viewed as action systems integrators through the symbolic of reproduction 
of generalized communication media. In so doing, the focus is a palm func-
tion, communication, and relationship, rather than the fine structure, the 
position, or person.
A cultural scheme provides the setting for self, other, and world inter-
pretation and coordination incorporated into an elaborate system of practic-
es and codes. Inborn predisposition and social invention, purposive ideality 
and mindless reality, the natural and the fabricated—each of these facets of 
the human landscape are linked, arrayed, selected, and integrated by a “third 
common term,” by meaning.
Cultures can be viewed as space/time sense-making systems. Regarded 
in this manner, a culture consists principally of a system of codes interlocked 
in a semiotic ecology of interdependent communication structures and pro-
cesses. When they are looked upon as simple classes of objects, human be-
ings, natural phenomena, and technological implements coexist by fact of 
mere juxtaposition in space and time. But when they are regarded as ele-
ments articulated within elaborate communication systems, they take on in 
the form of lived patterns of meaning, of distinctively cultural unities.
Signification systems express complicated combinations of sense and 
nonsense discriminations, of “what counts” selections, with respect to an 
information environment. These signification systems have gradually been 
fashioned over time into taken-for-granted (often seemingly autonomic) 
conventional grammars of contingently searchable lived meanings. As a con-
sequence, the “what” and “how” something is or becomes meaningful within 
a cultural setting depends largely upon a temporally evolved semiotic ecosys-
tem, whose many dimensions and points of intersection include unexplored 
vectors of meaning orientation upon cultural self-selection.
The complicated interdependence of the many apparently distinct el-
ements framed by the communication structures describing the semiotic 
ecosystem has regularly been confirmed by the complex impacts exercised 
by sudden internal disruptions of exogenous influences. The seemingly ad-
ventitious collateral impacts brought upon by some alteration in the cultural 
milieu can generate entire series of unanticipated interactions and problems. 
The introduction of literacy or of iron weapons are well-known examples 
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from cultural anthropology. But more to the point, much the same can be 
said about the advent of state capitalism at the beginning of the last century 
or, more recently, the introduction of the new technologies into the work-
place or manufacturing facility, and the importing of Japanese management 
techniques by American firms. Novelties like these can tremendously strain 
the local social capacity for ordering meanings and managing decision prac-
tices – hence, discussions about the trade-offs between adaptation versus 
evolutionary (change) potential. 
A cultural world is never given as a totality that can become in principle 
as “object” of experience or investigation; but it always contains a “more” 
that is enacted long before it can be represented by thought. It is precisely the 
apparently inexhaustible human capacity to create, modify, and transform 
meaning relationships that underlies the complex differential sign-system ar-
ticulations of their information environments and that consequently makes 
possible distinct cultural systems. This marvelous experiential plasticity per-
mits the human organism to adapt situationally without thereby becoming 
“adapted.” Cultural “continuity” is constructed upon this basic, experientially 
rooted sign-system flexibility. By their very nature, cultural configurations 
describe open-ended context for structure variations and innovation.
The integration or, perhaps better, the cross-fertilization of concepts of 
communication and concepts of culture by way of these semiotic metaphors 
centers upon the topics of the generation, reproduction and transforma-
tion of bounded domains of signification complexes (actually, “intersigni-
fications”). While keeping in mind that cultures are not languages, and that 
linguistic analogies can lead to serious misunderstandings, still a compari-
son of language and culture is useful to this point. Cultures, like languages, 
display the capacity for complex intercombinations that construe—that is 
to say, retain, select and invent—relationships between individuals, between 
human and natural domains and between individuals and them-selves. They 
integrate complex idiolects of human experience including, to use traditional 
faculty psychology, cognitive, emotive, and conatative features. In saying this 
much, however, we are already speaking from the semiological, rather than 
the linguistic level. At the linguistic level, strictly speaking we encounter 
complicated signaling systems composed of units, combination rules and ap-
plications; it is at the semiological level that signaling systems, and language 
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is only one such system, serve as vehicles of signification (Lyons, 1979). In 
other words, using Pierce, there is no sign without signification and inter-
pretation; signs in the semiotic sense occur only as part of the intersection of 
exchange interpretation, and effect (Bailey, Steiner, & Matejka, 1980).
Thus at the level of semiotic ecosystem there exists no such thing as a 
simple” culture. The forces, tensions, and competitions between avenues for 
meaning become concretely experienced by individual human subjects in 
terms of sense-making discriminations available with the cultural milieu. It 
is, finally, the essential contingency of the cultural communication system’s 
reactiveness to its envenoming that establishes selective orientations, vectors 
of signification, guiding the culture’s flexible management of novel physical, 
social, political, creedal, and technological factors. Cultures change only in 
becoming changed; human beings are simultaneously the creatures and the 
creators of cultures.
Some attempts to apply the cultural perspective in the organizational 
setting have not successfully avoided the natural tendency to reify their unit 
of analysis. For example, it might be heuristically beneficial to treat organiza-
tions as if they were texts that require patient and skillful interrogation on 
the part of the analyst in order to reveal the indices of institutionalized signi-
fication embedded with them—a kind of organizational hermeneutic (Deetz, 
1982). But at the same time it is equally important that we examine the com-
munication contingencies animating the collective authorship of these texts. 
How do individuals allow themselves to be convinced? How far do these 
texts genuinely reflect organizational life? Moreover, culture does not consist 
only of the transmission of complex behaviors through symbolic acquisi-
tions as it did for anthropologists like E.B. Tylor (1889) or Lowie (1937); it 
also represents a medium for concerted historical invention and individual 
virtuosity (Landmann, 1974). Acknowledging that the “natives” conceptual-
ized their sociality, however naively, should also product insight into how 
and to what ends they did so. The analysis of the elements composing the 
organizational text must be complemented by the analysis of their function.
 Cultural inventions generally, and most particularly those produced by 
organizations, are inseparably bound up with the domain of practical neces-
sity. Organizational culture contributes instrumental and adaptive responses 
to naturally occurring features of the work environment. As a result, the ar-
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tifacts contained in an organization’s culture, whether material or symbolic, 
are practical devices long before they become objects for the researchers’ spe-
cialized cognitive endeavors. Context and message, structure and function, 
provide useful analytic distinctions; but the synchrony of codified symbol 
and action routine has greater significance than the diachronic of the living 
cultural processing of organizational interaction only from the standpoint 
of the nonparticipating observer. From the standpoint of the organization 
and its members, the relationship is exactly the reverse: the communication 
apparatus provided by significant symbols and structured interactions forms 
of virtual organizational memory that not only contains the organization’s 
past but, more importantly, also sustains a constantly renewed and adapt-
able living present. Seen in this light, organizational culture furnishes or-
ganizational actors with the communication context that enables informed 
case-by-case specification of the instrumental “how” of work-ability and the 
epistemic “why” of institutional rationality.
No less important than the definitional and methodological problems 
of how best to go about conceptualizing the cultural unit of analysis are the 
empirical as well as phenomenological problems of acquiring insight into (1) 
how the organizational texts themselves establish reliable interpretations for 
ongoing organizational actions and their agents, and (2) how through their 
daily application such texts are subjected to an ongoing process of reinterpre-
tation that guides and is guided by the everyday intercourse of organizational 
members within their work environments. 
But much as the unwarranted reunification of social systems can be 
avoided by underscoring their indetermination and equifinality in respond-
ing to and manipulating their environments, a similar reification of or-
ganizational communication patterns might also be avoided if we stress the 
selective variability and multivocality of symbol use with respect to any or-
ganization’s communication transactions (Luhmann, 1982; Weick, 1975). In 
other words, principals of selection and generalization, which can be said to 
hold with respect to the external boundaries of organizational activity, also 
apply to its internal differentiations and contours (Luhmann, 1982).
Many concepts of formal organization involve notions of social hierar-
chy, laterality, collectivity, membership, and share meanings. However, while 
justifiably acknowledging these factors, researchers often neglect the most 
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salient characteristic of any formal organization: that it is assembled for the 
purpose of some particular activity, to accomplish some end through some 
process, to get something done. It is for this reason that organizations have 
goals, charters, objectives, and bottom lines. Organizations engage in task 
activities yielding more or less tangible products; such products may include 
decisions and technical services. Organizations, then, are “doing” or action 
environments.
According to Niklas Luhmann (1970, 1982), we can view formal organi-
zations as articulated action systems formed within a larger and more highly 
complex environment. For any number of reasons, including the limitations 
of human beings for coping with ever present and increasing complexity in 
a direct (sensory) way, as well as the temporal and contextual limitations of 
face-to-face interactions, it is convenient and possible to regard the forma-
tion of systems as a response to the “problem” of environmental complexity 
(Luhmann, 1979). Social action systems, then, take shape in order to achieve 
the reduction of complexity; that is, they simplify life, make it controllable, 
manageable, comprehensible (Luhmann, 1982). In other words, social systems 
represent “islands of lower complexity . . . within fields of higher complexity.” 
They encode “what counts” selections. Social systems become constituted and 
operate through the communication of meanings (1982).
This abbreviated description of Luhmann’s functional systems viewpoint 
allows us to fill in between the broad brushstrokes of the image conjured 
by Weick’s (1979) evocative statement that “Organizations enact, adapt to, 
and survive amidst an environment of puns” (p.171). What Weick poetically 
terms as “puns,” Luhmann conceives as complexities that surround and arise 
within modern organizations. In turn echoing Luhmann’s analogy about or-
ganizations as “islands of lower complexity”, Weick describes the function of 
organizing in the following way:
Organizing serves to narrow the range of possibilities, to reduce the number of 
“might” occurs. The activities of organizing are directed toward the establish-
ment of a workable level of certainty. An organization attempts to transform 
equivocal information into a degree of unequivocally with which it can work 
and to which It is accustomed. (p. 6)
“Possibilities” and “might occurs” are the contingencies that concern 
Luhmann. It is the role and function of communication media to further the 
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system/organization’s efforts at “narrowing the range” and “reduc[ing] the 
number” of alternative actions. It is in this way and by exactly this means that 
an organization is able to “transform equivocal information into a degree of 
unequivocality.”
Pattern-engendering differentiation vis-à-vis the environment occurs 
through the reduction of the environment’s inherent complexity. Action sys-
tems do not reproduce their environments. Athough rooted firmly in their 
surroundings, they correspond to their environments neither structurally 
nor causally, any more than cultures are reducible to geography, climate, or 
race. Instead, action systems selectively process and reconstitute their envi-
ronments though selective generalization (Luhmann, 1975).
Selective generalization has immediate theoretical application for the cul-
tural standpoint on the study of modern organizational behavior. Experimen-
tal exercises with small groups and organizations that have introduced changes 
into the work environment, whether physical, social, or organizational, for the 
purpose of influencing productivity have been sufficiently ambiguous in their 
outcomes so as to suggest that social interactions are not so rigidly determin-
istic that specific manipulations lead predictably to dependent variations (Per-
row, 1979; Luhmann, 1982). Luhmann (198), for one, offers an alternative con-
ceptualization of these interaction processes. “Typically a system has several 
alternatives at hand with which it can intercept and neutralize changes in its 
environment. It is precisely upon this elasticity that its stability rests, as well as 
its ability to find favorable conditions of existence” (p. 38).
In application to organizational culture, it is important that the concepts 
of selectivity and generalization not be uncritically transposed from the or-
ganic and zoological niveau to the human and social level. These concepts 
perform their function in fundamentally different senses in the two mate-
rial regions. Selective generalization serves in the former to close the system 
upon its environment, while in the latter selective generalization opens the 
system to the environment. It is for this reason that it makes little if any sense 
to talk about a natural habitat with reference to human beings.
Selective generalization serves biological maintenance by establishing 
restrictive “filters” constraining the organism to a limited sector of the envi-
ronment by making it insensitive to those features of its domain that do not 
act as “signals” triggering adaptive response mechanisms (compare Kohler’s 
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[1925] invariant valences embedded in rigid gestalts, Washburn’s [1968] hu-
man utilization of space, Luria’s [1981] analysis of animal “communication,” 
and von Uexkull and Kriszat’s [1934] discussion of “habitat”). For human be-
ings, by contrast, selective generalization serves not to establish a mesh with 
the environment but rather to constitute it.
Selective generalization takes two general forms in cultural life: with 
regard to the environment “experience” and with regard to the social system 
“action” (Luhmann, 1982. P. 291). Selective generalization releases human 
beings from their surroundings by making these surroundings “available and 
manipulable in a meaningful way.” For human beings, there exists a hiatus 
between inner drive and external world, which allows the human individual, 
in the phraseology of Plessner, to live “excentrically” by “orienting him/her-
self by the world” as well as in the broad sense: It releases human beings from 
the dogmatism of their milieu.
The need to effect systemic manipulations of constantly shirting envi-
ronments suggests that the identity of an organization consists in purposive 
adaptations achieved through processes of selection. Selections are stored, 
coordinated, retrieved, and recombined through repeated enactments. The 
vital function performed by selection in establishing the criteria for organiza-
tional integrity implies that organizations can be conceived as self-interpret-
ing configurations of meanings. As has already been proposed, the processes 
steering organizational self-interpretation must involve more than simply 
deciding between available alternatives; for such decisions already presup-
pose interpretation, and therefore indicate the ready application of gener-
ally accepted premises that are not themselves potential objects of choice. 
To attend to something past, to study it, to relate it to the present, to antici-
pate a future that selects a relevant past, to modify, embrace, or endeavor to 
eliminate what is, was, or will be; in short, the entire temporal organization 
of information-processing activities invariably interpretively particularizes 
some generalized premise.
Some of the limitations of the Weberian means/end schemes for un-
derstanding organizational decisions are implicit in these remarks. First, 
structure itself creates as well as manages contingency. Second, ends con-
stitute functional variables that instruct the system in the selection of dif-
ferentiation maintaining inputs and outputs. Organizations (like cultures) 
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that fail to adapt means/end prudently tend toward collapse; one needs to 
think only about the current pressures on the American automobile industry 
or tray to imagine academic institutions stripped of the political technol-
ogy of research subsidies and endowments. Third, action systems can suc-
cessfully maintain more than one systems state, and therefore means/ends 
orientation, in relation to the same environment; this capacity is perhaps 
the only remaining functional difference between state and corporate capi-
talism. Fourth, ends are not always adequately instructive. There are always 
gaps in the interpretive system. Selective generalization does not provide the 
details of the institutional and extrainstitutional arrangements. Were it to do 
so, the organization would risk becoming overly adapted to a particular ma-
terial or symbolic situation and be therefore deprived of the very plasticity 
it requires for its structural integrity. Accordingly, effective management not 
only requires “knowing the ropes” but also their resourceful manipulation. 
Meaning constellations emerge and become elaborated within an organiza-
tion on an ad hoc basis; they are rooted in the accumulation of generalized 
selections (Including rationalizations) shaping the communication environ-
ment (Luhmann, 1975). 
The role of meaning in linking organizational membership indepen-
dently of individual personalities and attitudinal preferences should not be 
ignored in any analysis that wishes to understand organizational behavior 
from the standpoint of an interpretive system. Organizations, understood 
as systemic units of possible significations, “belong to” no identifiable party 
or parties affected by implicit or explicit participation in the organization, 
whether these be stockholders, managers, laborers, product divisions, com-
petency- and task-differentiated departments, social and political interest 
mediators or regulators, the public, or whatever. Each of these represents le-
gitimate interest roles sharing a “common” symbolic referent. The “meaning” 
of the organization, and consequently its ontological “what” as well as the 
legitimated scope of its responsibilities and its power, consists chiefly of the 
historically evolved communication network connecting the various inter-
acting influence attempts undertaken by all parties sharing the organization 
as a common point of experiential or action reference.
Conversely, for “its” part, the organization selects and utilizes all rel-
evant communication media within its environment, regardless of whether 
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these are socially legitimated psychological value-codes like self-esteem, in-
dustriousness, honesty or “material” codes like scarcity of employment op-
portunities or the dependence of local economies upon regular organiza-
tional inputs. Such available meaning codes are absorbed and manipulated 
in order to influence the premises of action for organizational members and 
non-members alike. Such environmental codes contribute significantly to 
the organization’s ability to discover favorable conditions for existence, to 
neutralized irritants, and to shape its environment. In exchange, the system 
responds selectively to external influences exercised by factors like politically 
mediated limitations upon market and resource exploitation, expectations 
about minimal working conditions, unions, community standards, competi-
tors, philanthropic pressures, and the like.
The plasticity of the organizational system hinges upon the selective 
permeability of its communication horizons. This permeability in turn trig-
gers system responses as a whole, producing differentiation along available 
discretionary dimensions that enable organizationally purposive adjustment 
to the end of maintaining maximal manipulatory latitude with respect to 
its environment. In this light, we might understand, for example, how the 
Marxist critique of corporate capitalism actually promotes the survival of the 
corporate system toward accommodating potentially dysfunctional contin-
gencies in its communication environment. Through responding selectively, 
the capitalist system has been able to detach the issues pertaining to work-
ing-class interests from the substantive contradiction of class consciousness. 
By so reconstituting the corporate posture, Marxism assists the capitalists as 
a class in rendering Marxist polemics ineffectual among the working class. 
In short, to borrow upon classical imagery, Procrustes and Proteus describe 
limited cases of organizational communication system states.
Symbol and Action:  
The Function of Communication Media Codes
In Illusions, Richard Bach (1977) writes, “Argue your limitations, and 
sure enough they’re yours” (p. 100). In a similar vein, Weick (1979) has 
observed that “people in organizations repeatedly impose that which they 
later claim imposes on them” (p. 153). These observations point out the mu-
tual articulation linking organizational members and the organization, and 
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highlight two aspects of that relationship. First, we are reminded that it is 
people – organizational members—who first do the imposing. Second, the 
original act of selection is forgotten thereby in effect setting the reality of 
the organization apart from its immediate (and not just original) context of 
creation. Thus the “rules” of organization life, the meaningful fabric steering 
individual actions and orienting collective choices is constantly recreated by 
everyone and, therefore, by no one. Moreover, these ground rules inform-
ing the selection and the interpretation of organizational activity function 
the most efficiently when they are both invisible and condensed, therefore 
obviating the need for deliberate reenactment of some original circumstance. 
Such rules include, but are not limited to, standard operating procedures that 
enable the matter-of-fact handling of day-to-day work activities.
The importance of this anonymous influence, of a “communal presence,” 
to the organization’s efficiency becomes nowhere more clear than when this 
“text” becomes an object of conscious attention on the part of the organiza-
tion’s members. When it is raised to public scrutiny, it becomes problem-
atic, so that its effectiveness is impaired and can even become lost altogether. 
To be sure, whatever flexibility is inherent to that which remain unspoken, 
hence incompletely articulated, is also forsaken because constant examina-
tion and the demand for clarification institutes a far more rigid rhetorical 
structure than is ordinarily encountered in completing daily functions. In 
such a circumstance, the possibility for individual variation upon a generic 
interpretive template can become almost nonexistent. Rational perspective 
is lost because what had served as background becomes foreground, so that 
only foreground remains. Heretofore self-evident procedures for making 
sense of action and information become muddled. The organizational envi-
ronment, previously apparently ordered and balanced, now seems confusing 
and inordinately complex.
As part of the requirements for functioning effectively, the organization 
needs to possess mechanisms that communicate meanings that order the op-
tions available to the various individuals within the system. As a vehicle for 
sending clear messages that create the expectation for preferred organiza-
tional meanings, namely, guiding choice, the language code is insufficient. By 
its very nature, language contains both the possibility for affirmation (com-
pliance) and for negation (rejection). The more complex the action system, 
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the greater the need for a functional differentiation between the language 
code in general and special, symbolically generalized communication media 
like power, trust, truth, or money. Such media condition and regulate the 
motivation for accepting offered selections across entire ranges of different 
contexts. These devices consequently greatly increase the efficiency of the 
system by instituting collectively taken-for-granted reality constructs.
In part, generalized constructs of this sort account for what research-
ers have described as the “climate” of a given organization – for example, 
the intangible quality of AT&T that distinguishes it from IBM, especially in 
the mind of the organizational member. It accounts for things like company 
philosophy, for “the way things are done,” for both typical behaviors and the 
deviations that are permitted to coexist. It accounts for the 1001 day-to-day 
actions that ensure that business is conducted in an unassuming, depend-
able, and self-perpetuating manner. It is the stuff that “is” the organization; 
the living matter that, like the cells of the body, renews itself through passing 
along the patterns containing blueprints for the entity’s structure and pur-
poses. It frames a composite of individual units that is nonetheless more than 
their simple collection, and so enables growth and adaptation. Such con-
structs serve as the coding scheme for the organization, and as gatekeepers 
monitoring ever present and changeable external and internal contingencies. 
A task this immense would soon exhaust the utility of language, thus special-
ized communication media carry out these functions for the organization. 
A communication medium is defined as a mechanism for transferring 
meanings in addition to or as a supplement to language; it is a code of gen-
eralized symbols that guides the transmission of sections. “The theme of fac-
tual experience always relates to other possible, but unrealized, experiences. 
The world gains its unity solely from the boundaries of this ‘et cetera’” (Luh-
mann, 1979, p.52). Luhmann (1979) also states:
Through the generalizing capacity of such media, structures of expectation and 
patterns of motivation are formed which make it possible for selections made 
by one individual to be relevant to another, in the sense that he/she is aware of 
them and does not treat them as an open question, but performs his/her own 
selections as consequences of them. (p. 48) 
As such, the code guides the purposive selection from among the in-
numerable cues empirically present in any particular context: It filters sim-
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ple context information to permit serviceable “what counts” determinations. 
Most important, the communication medium can perform this function so 
efficiently and unobtrusively that the fact that selections are actively being 
performed never receives a second thought. Seen in this light, communica-
tion media clearly have a motivational function; in other words, they “urge 
the acceptance of (the other’s) selections and make that acceptance the ob-
ject of expectation” (Luhmann, 1979, p. 111). When one member’s selection 
serves simultaneously as a vehicle motivating some other member’s choices, 
a communication medium can be said to have been formulated. Media code 
is self-reinforcing; it makes the following two assumptions:
(1) Media-guided communication processes bind partners who complete 
their own selections and know about this from each other.
(2) The transference of selections entails the reproduction of selections in 
simplified conditions abstracted from their initial contexts (Luhmann, 
1979, p. 112)
The command/consensus dichotomy offers a convenient illustration of 
the kinds of processes involved. First off, commands are exceptions to the rule 
of procedure. Indeed, command/acceptance can actually become dysfunc-
tional when it restricts the subordinate so severely as to negate the natural 
plasticity of individual initiative and competence. Second, the most effective 
command is doubtlessly the unspoken one. Generalized authority – or, if you 
prefer, the power to command—selects the other’s premises of action in such 
a way that the subordinate anticipates on his or her own accord the appropri-
ate activity (Luhmann, 1975). When they must be employed, spoken com-
mands can tend to personalize superior-subordinate relations to such a de-
gree that the persons become the theme of interaction instead of the means/
end particularity of the task situation. Personalization of this sort can in turn 
introduce a vast array of communication contingencies that the established 
channels of communication may or may not be equipped to handle. 
Cooperative action among different actors and elements within organi-
zations is not as much a matter of consensus as it is a matter of the coordina-
tion of particular interests. This coordination is accomplished through the 
elicitation of commitments from the affected parties. Networks of mutual 
obligation form important, if often covert, communication systems in their 
own right. Commitment transforms private concerns into public themes, 
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while permitting continued relatively free play to personal rationalization 
and interpretive mechanisms.
From the process standpoint, what is happening is that commitments, 
regardless of how obtained, generate communication structures that are in-
different albeit hardly irrelevant to individual premises (ideas, values, mo-
tives, etc.). Formally or informally achieved commitments, whatever their 
grounds, frame communication relationships that can readily be evaluated 
by the affected parties in the simplest, more immediate terms – namely, as 
the irretrievable allocation of scarce communication resources. Trust, good-
will, influence, information, command, respect, integrity, self-esteem, and 
the like are examples of such resources. More than that, an individual’s per-
sonal evaluation of the relationship readily becomes translated into palpable 
behavior for organizational actors on the basis of the relative cost/benefit to 
each party of reneging/honoring/extending the commitment. Thus commit-
ment secures both a basis for cooperation and a framework for evaluation 
against which various interests can assess their allocations.
The processes of simplification and abstraction highlighted by the na-
ture of relational commitments presuppose symbolically generalized codes. 
To take the analysis one step further, the illustrations provided by Luhmann’s 
(1979) discussion of power furnishes a clear example of the motivational role 
of media codes. Power serves as a communication medium by ordering situ-
ations containing binary selectivity (yes/no). Power assumes the following:
(1) Uncertainty exists in relation to the power holder’s selections. In other 
words, for whatever reason, the power holder has more than one available 
option. Moreover, executing this choice produces or removes uncertainty 
with respect to the power receiver.
(2) Alternatives are available to the power receiver.
Power can be said to be greater if it can exert influences in the face of 
attractive alternatives, and it increases proportionality as there is an increase 
in freedom for the power receiver.
Because the function of a communication medium is to transmit reduced 
complexity, rather than to emphasize actual applications of power, Luhmann’s 
(1979) perspective underscores the structuring of the other‘s possible selec-
tions. In this way, power as a media code regulates contingency by relating to 
a possible, and not merely an actual, discrepancy between the preferred selec-
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tions of the power holder and power receiver, and removing that discrepancy. 
Power secures possible chains of effects independently of the will of the power 
receiver; not against the receiver’s will, but indifferently/independently of that 
will. Because, from this point of view, power is not a cause but rather a catalyst: 
It accelerates events, and thereby increases the probability of the ratio of ef-
fective connections between the system and the environment. In other words, 
“power is an opportunity to increase the probability of realizing improbable 
selection combinations (Luhmann, 1979, pp. 113-114).
To recapitulate, power within an organizational (action) system exhibits 
the capacity to influence individual choices among available selections sim-
ply by translating preferred selections into expectations. In this way, power 
helps articulate and integrate the organization’s “doing” environment with-
out constraining individuals.
By defining power as a communication medium, it becomes possible to 
avoid the concept of power that regards it as either a possession or as an attrib-
ute of individuals. Rather, in order to employ power successfully within any 
organization, the individual must learn to access the power code. It is true that 
such theories of power abound in sociological literature, and are imported by 
a number of disciplines, including communication. One characteristic shared 
by most, if not all, of these theories is the view that power is somehow com-
municated and not something that communicates. This is a significant and 
theoretically useful distinction, for it follows from this distinction that power, 
as a communication medium—something that “communicates”—is an exten-
sion of the organization system much in the same way that any technology 
generally represents an articulated extension of its environment.
Luhmann (1979) points out that “in organizations, power creates coun-
tervailing power” (p. 179). This is to say that, speaking from a structural view-
point, the power of subordinates resides in their position as subordinates. To 
deny in some respect the subordinate condition can become, then, a means 
for management to recognize purposively the power of subordinates. This 
final illustration offers a vivid example of code functions.
“Employee involvement” and “worker participation” are phrases that, in 
retrospect, heralded the arrival of quality circles onto the scene of contempo-
rary corporate management strategies. Although quality circles represented 
attempts to increase employee input into the decision-making process, and 
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sought to engender greater employee identification with the organization, 
Weick sees such innovations as direct threats to the survival of an organiza-
tion. Luhmann (1979) also criticizes these attempts by management to sys-
tematize, domesticate, and legislate the power of subordinates by means of 
“participation.”
Thus “emancipation” becomes management’s last trick: denying the difference 
between superior and subordinate and thus taking away the subordinate’s 
power base. Under the pretense of equalizing power, this simply reorganizes 
the power which subordinates already possess. (p. 180)
We could say that through the institution of quality circles, manage-
ment has further elevated its own position with respect to subordinates by 
asserting control of the definition of the relation between management and 
subordinates—in this case, as one of peers. Such an assertion on the part of 
management in effect extends its control over the behaviors of subordinates.
Conclusion
It is important to recognize that the word communication is among the 
most often bandied-about pseudotechnical terms; created as a by-product of 
a genre of popular literature that flourished particularly in the late 1960s and 
well into the 1970s devoted to self-help that consisted largely of popularized 
psychological concepts. In many cases, “communication” became a catchall 
panacea through its regular employment as a social psychological Band-Aid.
The eagerness with which popular writers took up “communication” 
in a wide variety of contexts is matched perhaps by the efforts of scholars 
and researchers to dissect and more perfectly understand communication 
as a uniquely human process. However, the perspective of communication 
scholars differs dramatically from that of popular practitioners, and it is at 
least in part this dramatic difference that accounts for the complaints from 
those employed in nonacademic professional organizations that the prom-
ises implicit in communication as a slogan do not match up with the actual 
accomplishments of communication as a science of human behavior. Each 
side begins from different assumption and employs discernibly unique vo-
cabularies, so that even should they arrive at the same conclusion, it is likely 
that neither party would be able to recognize the scene the other describes.
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As obvious and simplistic as this point may appear, it still bears men-
tioning and requires a moment of elaboration. Far more than agreeing upon 
definitions and sharing a common set of concern is needed to bridge this 
difference. For theory, research, and analysis cannot be restricted to the plane 
of everyday experience, as though it might somehow be of greater scientific 
value to limit oneself to the view from the inside, in contradistinction to the 
researcher’s customary “outside” perspective. Instead, the lesson to be drawn 
here is much more troublesome to put into practice. It is that theory and re-
search need to be informed by the “inside” vantage point while retaining the 
freedom to seek comprehension of a larger and more intricate picture, that 
is, an enlightened view from the “outside.”
It seems difficult, if not impossible, to imagine an organization that is 
not based upon an information economy. Organizations are composites of 
units differentiated according to certain types of information, knowledge, 
and skills. Under this circumstance, there is a clear relationship between in-
formation and mobility, power and control. That it makes conceptual sense 
to equate information, mobility, and power reflects a significant part of daily 
life within the organization. However, what is important for our purposes to 
recognize is that elements such as these are driven by emergent, structura-
tional communication processes.
In The Social Psychology of Organizing Carl Weick (1979) writes, “Peo-
ple in organizations repeatedly impose that which they later claim impose 
on them.” In an important sense, this remark epitomizes what he means by 
the “enacted environment” of organizations (p. 153). For Weick, enactments 
articulate environments, such that it is more representative to say that in the 
case of organizations what takes place is the “invention of rather than dis-
covery of environment” (p. 166). It is at this point where analogies for an 
organization based on the relationship of an organism to its environment 
break down. Not only are human beings capable of altering their environ-
ments, they also are capable of creating that environment. The creation of an 
environment, as distinguished from sheerly inhabiting an environment, is 
precisely the capacity for culture.
These enactments determine the contours and character of an organiza-
tion, defining at the same time external organizational borders. The cultural 
“text” is the totality of the guidelines employed for the interpretation of all 
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organizational action; it grounds the “hows” and “whys” giving meaning to 
the already enacted “what.” It is the stuff of imputed motivations in the or-
ganization setting. Luhmann (1979) describes the relationship between so-
cial action and motive in the following way:
Motives are not necessary for action, but are necessary if actions are to be 
comprehensively experienced. A social order will thus be much more closely 
integrated on the level of the  attribution of motives than on the level of action 
itself. The understanding of motives thus helps retrospectively in recognizing 
whether an action has occurred at all. (p. 120)
From an external perspective, it may not be immediately obvious why 
and how organizing or some dimension thereof can become problematic. 
Nor is it likely that the repercussions of such a situation are easily discernible. 
Organizations, particularly bureaucracies, often appear to be tremendously 
stable, powerfully well-rooted, and blessed by incredible inertia. Weick sug-
gests a very different sort of an image of organizations, one that anyone with 
experience informal organizations would regard as all too familiar: “Organi-
zations enact, adapt to, and survive amidst an environment of puns” (p. 171). 
To be sure, the larger the organization the more clearly this image rings true. 
Elaborating upon this analogy, Weick (1979) contends that organizations 
must find ways to deal collectively, efficiently and internally to the organiza-
tion. There exists, for this reason, tremendous pressure upon the organiza-
tional system constantly to interpret and rationalize, so that there develops a 
great “need for context . . . to reduce the population of puns and the meaning 
of puns” (p. 183). This leaves open the possibility that given a shift or break in 
context, previously unequivocal information would likely become equivocal.
Speaking from an analytic perspective, one typically is restricted to the 
social psychological level; for “failed communications” raise questions such as 
these: “How is it possible to identify more reliably which of the meanings is 
intended by the speakers?” “Do individuals hang consistently onto one defini-
tion, or alternate definitions as circumstances or personal/professional roles 
alter?” “If organizations are such highly structured entities, then how is such 
instability in usage possible?” “Are definitions tied directly to roles/positions or 
to the individuals, and why?” “Why is communication a topic at all?”
It is the last of those questions that is perhaps the most convoluted, 
and for a variety of reasons, the most intriguing: Communication is a social 
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bonding agent, even in the case of disagreement and conflict; participation 
is presupposed. So how is it that communication can become a point of frac-
ture or be blamed as a source for a variety of organizational ills? It is an amaz-
ing feat of human creativity, epitomizing our remarkable capacity as human 
beings to be able to transform a complicated, ambiguous, changeable infor-
mation environment into permitting dependable, even routine, exchanges 
of an entire spectrum of meanings. It is the wonder that lies at the heart 
of human communication as a discipline. It is a process presupposing that 
individuals step beyond their individuality, that is, get beyond immediate 
and idiosyncratic sensory experience. For human beings, it is the actuality of 
communication that undergirds the reality of their social nature.
Each individual is shaped by culture as the enabling condition of par-
ticipating in his or her social milieu. Cultures, like organizations presuppose 
the individual in the very instant that they surpass him or her. Still it is the 
reciprocal articulation that describes cultural life: In anticipating the indi-
vidual, culture is anticipated by the individual. Preservation and transmis-
sion are accomplished only through use and signification. The mere fact that 
the cultural text is written by no one does not change the fact that it must 
be written nonetheless, nor does it make any less valuable the understand-
ing of the means, orientations, and processes through which communication 
processes effect its authorship. From this standpoint, organizations repre-
sent communication systems symbolically interlocking sense and situation, 
meaning and action. 
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GENDER AS A COMMUNICATION CODE:  
VALUING THE DIFFERENCE
The study of gender has taken several directions over the last 15 years, 
led by many feminist scholars from a range of disciplines. This paper lies 
at the intersection of two of those several paths: the search for the location 
of gender, and the critique of the value placed on (each) gender identity/
characteristics. It is the major thesis of this paper that there is a relation-
ship between the locating of gender and the valuing of that gender. Broadly 
speaking, locating gender either physically or meta-physically within or on 
an individual confuses a social prescriptive with that particular individual, 
burdening her with specific valued/valueless characteristics. Further, this 
very act obscures the valuation process.
By modifying Nicklas Luhmann’s theory of communication media to 
adapt to an analysis of gender as a media code, we can accomplish two goals. 
First, we can separate the social prescriptive from the individual(s); and sec-
ond, we can understand the process and function of “gendering” as an opera-
tion of our social system. That is, by separating gender from people (e.g., an 
individual’s personhood), we can more clearly identify the valuing of certain 
gender characteristics as (social) system functions. This clearly distinguishes 
them as not being psycho-emotional extensions of biology, nor products of 
the interaction between personality and environment, nor, in other terms, the 
imperfect products of a kind of genetic/psychogenic/sexual manifest destiny.
Although locating gender is rarely raised as a thematic in feminist and 
other gender-related literature, it is nonetheless an implicit concern among 
feminist scholars. Therefore, why does it matter where gender is located? The 
answer is it matters for several reasons. It matters because the location of 
gender will, in part, determine the research agenda of the immediate future 
by the creation of specific criteria for what constitutes gender. That is, the 
location of gender will prescribe the legitimate, useful, sensible, possible, 
meaningful, interesting and fundable questions to ask. It will influence the 
selection of, or preference for, certain methods of investigation. It will influ-
ence the selection of articles to be published, of conference papers accepted, 
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of job candidates hired. And it will greatly influence the pragmatics and tenor 
of the political agenda of feminists, and thereby code the social, political, and 
economic standing of women as U.S. citizens and as world citizens. Finally, 
it is important because focusing research on the location of gender is often 
used to obscure the issue of valuing (presumed) differences. Sadly, in spite of 
the work of scholars, such as Stephen J. Gould and Anne Fausto-Sterling, the 
locating of gender in the biological/genetic, or psycho-spiritual “nature” of 
women is frequently brandished as a means to rationalize and justify oppres-
sive interpersonal, social, economic, and/or political practices.
While this is not news to feminist communication scholars, it raises an-
other question. Is the search for the biological basis of gender itself a conclu-
sion (albeit disguised) of a patriarchal system, and not actually a question at 
all? The very difficulty of attempting to answer a pseudo-question (conclu-
sion) renders secondary, even tangential the issue of valuing this presumed 
difference. Taking for granted the desirability of shifting this focus from pre-
sumed difference to the process of valuing, the work of Niklas Luhmann of-
fers one possible way to communication scholars of accomplishing this shift.
The remaining part of this paper will be divided into three sections: a 
discussion of locating gender in biology (in our genes) by way of the work 
of women scholars in the biological sciences; an encapsulated description of 
Luhmann’s theory of media codes; and an application of gender as a com-
munication code and the implications for valuing difference.
Gender, Biology, and Social Scientific Process
Understanding the role of expert and authority in Western and Ameri-
can culture as it is manifest in social and natural scientific community is one 
way to begin to understand the issue at hand. In doing so we are able to dem-
onstrate that the agenda of social scientific inquiry is controlled by cultural 
and political forces and does not arise from the object of research. Gender as 
a topic or theme of research provides a clear (and socially relevant) example 
of confounding a cultural perspective with the research subject.
To return to the issue of authority/expert, it can be observed that “facts” 
are whatever scientists say they are, and what have been called “facts” by sci-
entists has varied both by technology available, and to a much greater extent 
by the (historical) socio-political climate of the times. The earth was once flat 
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and the center of the universe, taking baths was dangerous to one’s health, 
and riding trains could lead to contracting venereal diseases. Obviously, 
none of these remain facts today, yet our collective belief in the eternity and 
universality of contemporary facts remains unaffected by this knowledge. 
This is not mere coincidence, nor ignorance nor stupidity. It is a derivative 
of a belief in scientific authority and is a technological vision of progress as 
science pulls us ever closer to complete knowledge and truth. It is an index of 
the explanatory power of this belief system that still only a handful of people 
are so jarred by the incongruity of this vision of (technological) Truth with 
the potential of nuclear disaster to mobilize and take political action.
Because gender appears to be based on biology (sex and the ability to 
bear and suckle children), scholars such as Ruth Bleier have taken on the task 
of critiquing the role of biology in the formation of public policy, as well as 
the research methods and practices employed (Bleier, Gender and Science: A 
Critique of Biological Theories on Women).
Bleier capably traces the interplay between scientific research and main-
tenance of the white male dominant status quo in modern society. She traces 
how scientific “evidence” of racial and sexual inequality was gathered and 
utilized by political leaders to support the racism and sexism in American 
and in European social policy of the nineteenth and twentieth century. This 
included measurement of skull size and shape which “proved” that blacks 
and all women were “naturally” inferior to white males – smaller skull size, 
presumed to mean smaller brain size, presumed to mean lesser IQ. And 
since it could be “demonstrated” that brain size increased as one climbed the 
evolutionary ladder, it was only logical to conclude that blacks and females 
represented less developed stages of evolutionary ascent as compared with 
white males (Bleier, Gender and Science and Women, Biology and Public 
Policy, edited by V. Sappiro.) In reaching their conclusions, scientists both 
found what they were expecting to find and also explained away (usually by 
discounting) conflicting results. In this way, what counted as “facts” were 
not empirical results, but the interpretation of those results. What is also sig-
nificant here is that a biology (hence “natural”) explanation was offered for a 
social and cultural assumption, as well as for certain social conditions ( e.g., 
that black urban poor people are destined to remain poor because of their 
genes). The provision of a biological explanation lends an air of inevitability 
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and universality to such reasoning and allows people to believe, in the words 
of Gould, that their “social prejudices are scientific facts.”
As the feminist critics have pointed out, the sub-cultural assumptions that 
underlie scientific inquiry are drawn from the larger culture of which they are 
a part, and serve to determine what questions are worth asking, how a given 
problem is to be defined and whether the problem is seen as solvable, and if 
so, which alternatives are considered viable. Both the social and natural sci-
ences have been broadly criticized for the presumption of male dominance 
and superiority and for their valuation only of those qualities associated with 
the cultural definition of masculine. In her critique of biological and medical 
research, Anne Fausto-Sterling (Myths of Gender) points out how male physi-
ology and psychology are assumed to be normative; hence, female physiology 
and psychology are regarded as deviant or even pathological in comparison. 
This becomes clear in the medical profession’s talk and treatment of menstrual 
problems and includes even the of menstruation of a healthy female, who is 
treated as though this monthly cycle were a disease, a malfunction of the ideal, 
the normative male body. An example of this can be found in a chapter by 
William Graham from Women, Biolojzy and Public Policy in which materials 
and texts used in sex education classes are evaluated. An example of a text rec-
ommending that girls suffer from severe menstrual cramps often as a result of 
tension and ambiguity surrounding their sexuality is cited. While such tension 
and anxiety may or may not contribute to such pain, at least one physiological 
cause of severe cramps has been well documented. Fausto-Sterling emphati-
cally questions the assumption that significant gender-based differences in 
abilities exist. More specifically, she questions the validity of incorporating the 
assumption of such differences in research proposals and agendas. She points 
to articles whose main body of prose discusses the single indication of a sta-
tistically significant gender-based difference in some performance measure, 
ignoring standard scientific practice to report the majority finding, even if the 
null hypothesis holds. This is also a reflection of the editorial policies of a dis-
cipline’s journals, which in turn reflects the implicit rules about the production 
and process of social scientific investigation held by the scientific community.
After her review of the biological research, Fausto-Sterling concludes 
that in some areas, such as upper body strength, there appears to be an ad-
vantage of males over females. She cautions that not all the data are yet in 
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concerning athletic performance, as women have so recently received com-
parable training and development. As for other differences, such as brain 
hemisphere dominance, mathematical ability and other popularized differ-
ences, Fausto-Sterling concludes that in most cases the evidence indicates 
that there are no significant differences in ability based upon gender and in a 
few other cases, the evidence is inconclusive, often as a result of questionable 
research designs and procedures.
For Fausto-Sterling, Sappiro, Bleier, Leacock, and others, the confound-
ing of gender with the scientific process is significant for reasons beyond 
the heuristic and academic. Such research carries substantial policy impli-
cations at a variety of social levels, including education, training, medical 
care, child care and is an issue vital to the continued survival of humanity. 
Many scholars and others feel that in order to constructively meet and solve 
today’s problems the abilities of all people will be needed. Here there is a divi-
sion among feminist scholars and activists. The division occurs at the point 
Fausto-Sterling begins: Are there genuine gender-based differences? If we 
answer to the affirmative then we also conclude, as does Margaret Mead, that 
“women will see the world differently than men.” This view leads Mead to be 
concerned with understanding each gender in terms of its limitations and its 
potentialities Male and Female).
Many feminists would side with Mead, concurring that women’s experi-
ence in the world is as a consequence of their biological sex distinct from the 
experience of men. These same scholars and activists believe that not only 
has the voice of women been systematically ignored/overlooked by male 
historians, but that that voice can only be adequately represented by other 
women, and that at some level must remain always outside the ken of males, 
including academic and professional colleagues. Other feminists feel that the 
political implications of such a position are dangerous to the socioeconomic 
position of women, for separate is all too easily construed as inferior/subor-
dinate. These same scholars support this latter position even in the face of the 
reported experience of a female scholar who recognizes in herself different 
emotions/cognitions than her training in academe acknowledges.
Yet, as Sappiro points out, even if such gender-based differences as 
mathematical ability are found to exist, even more critical is the interpreta-
tion of these differences. Framing the situation in male terms often presup-
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poses a subordinate and inferior role for women. Examples abound in the 
literature, but one from Sappiro will suffice for present purposes. Among the 
perceptual studies conducted is the one that assesses “field dependence” or 
“field independence”. According to the researcher’s conclusions, females are 
more field-dependent than males. That is, women tend to perceive problems 
as wholes, rather than tending to identify single units within a larger pattern. 
Social scientists, including some communication researchers, have borrowed 
this concept and results to deduce (for example) that women would therefore 
make less competent architects and engineers. Such an “androcentric” (man-
centered) interpretation is not the only possibility. For example, as Sappiro 
points out, instead of defining the context in terms of dependence one might 
instead describe this same finding in terms of “field sensitivity”. Thus, women 
are more “field sensitive” than are males (who would here be considered 
“field insensitive”) and by deduction, women so inclined and trained would 
make superior urban planners – they would be far less likely to build a build-
ing inconsistent with its surroundings.
If this link between the biological and the social sciences still appears 
to be attenuated, sociobiology certainly closes any gap. It is the work of 
E. O. Wilson which is the most predominantly associated with sociobiology, 
a field which links the behavior of animals, including insects, with the be-
havior of humans, drawing freely and loosely upon evolutionary theory. Wil-
son and his colleagues use presumably genetically coded and evolutionarily 
conditioned behavior of animals, prehistoric man and so-called “primitive” 
cultures to explain contemporary behaviors. In an article in the New York 
Times Book Review, Stephen Jay Gould criticizes Wilson and sociobiology 
for, among other things, using circular logic through the use of anthropo-
morphizing the behaviors of animals e.g., using the word “rape” to describe 
the behavior of mallard ducks and then reusing the term in the context of the 
behavior of human males, lending an air of genetically determined “natural-
ness” to their socially aberrant violent behavior. Yet, sociobiologists deny any 
of the political implications of their collective work and writing.
To recap briefly, we have demonstrated two ways in which the social 
scientific investigation of gender and the cultural articulation of gender are 
confounded: the first is in focusing investigation through an “androcentric” 
lens, from the formulation of the research question to the interpretation and 
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suggested implication of the results, and second is the wholesale and often 
erroneous application of a biological/genetic implicitly causal explanation of 
complex, socially defined human behaviors. Women and other concerned 
scholars have sought to create balance of perspective by focusing research 
not only upon women, but also allowing women to speak for themselves, 
revealing their own assessment of their social roles and position.
Unfortunately, tying gender to biology does not aid in clarifying “fact” 
from sociocultural bias, including valuing certain gender traits above others 
and creating a polarity of differences. Perhaps communication scholars have a 
perspective to offer which can redirect the focus of current research on gender.
Luhmann’s Theory of Communication Codes
The potential contribution of Luhmann’s theory to communication and 
the study of gender is primarily an outgrowth of his systems-based assump-
tions, including the view of system characteristics as not structural, but as 
process. Concentrating upon the phenomenon of highly complex (differen-
tiated) systems, Luhmann places a particular conceptualization of commu-
nication at the core of system generation and recreation. It will be useful 
to provide a summary statement of this much of Luhmann’s theory before 
discussing its potential applications to gender research.
Complex social systems require an economic deployment of commu-
nication strategies/media/codes in order for the system to not only operate 
but also to recreate itself. In this context, communication includes all forms 
of meaning creation, co-creation, coordination, and manipulation. Com-
munication enables the creation of a social reality, and in highly complex, 
or in Luhmann’s words, highly differentiated societies. These social systems 
require as a precondition the possibility of a symbolic order that is simulta-
neously a product of, yet abstracted from, the immediate here and now and 
from the historic past and present. Such an abstraction from the actual lived 
and historical circumstances of its ontology releases a symbolic reality from 
the tyranny of experiential time (of an individual or group), as well as, from 
the necessity of accounting for the idiosyncrasies of lived experience. The 
ability to create such an abstracted social order/reality is itself predicated 
upon a form or forms of human communication which are not wholly (or 
even mostly) limited by temporal and physical immediacy.
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While systems theory is readily employed by a host of communication 
scholars in the examination of organizational, interpersonal, intercultural, and 
mass mediated communication, the above synopsis of Nicklas Luhmann’s ap-
plication and modification of systems theory to the problem of social process is 
unique. Its potential appeal to communication scholars resides in the formula-
tion of communication as essential to the formation and maintenance of mod-
ern society and culture. Moreover, Luhmann squarely addresses the atemporal 
quality of much contemporary communication as a key characteristic.
Luhmann’s perspective can be summarized as follows. For a number of 
reasons, including the limitations of human beings for coping with everpre-
sent and increasing complexity in a direct (sensory) way, as well as the tem-
poral and contextual limitations of face to face interactions, it is convenient 
and possible to view the formation of systems as a response to the “problem” 
of environmental complexity. Social action systems, then, take shape in order 
to accomplish the reduction of complexity. That is, they simplify life, make 
it controllable, manageable, comprehensible. In other words, social systems 
represent “islands of lower complexity ... within fields of higher complexity.” 
These social systems are constituted and operate through the communication 
of meaning. For Luhmann, systems involve not only great complexity but also 
respond to a high level of contingency. This saturation of contingency, in turn, 
makes problematic the very survival of social systems because those same so-
cial action systems are based upon the possibility of meaning and, therefore, of 
communication. As will be clarified shortly, communication is problematic for 
a system as communication employs symbols, e.g. language.
For Luhmann, meaning is system contained (system-driven). In this 
respect, his viewpoint can be regarded as the other side of the coin implicit 
in the phenomenological viewpoint. This later viewpoint regards mean-
ing as actor-determined, and addresses the conditions for the possibility of 
meaning. For Luhmann, the object of analysis becomes the state of affairs for 
which meaning is the condition; in other words, what meaning makes pos-
sible. And what meaning makes possible are remarkably effective complexity 
reducing mechanisms.
As part of the requirements for the effective functioning of the social 
action system, there arises a need to communicate meaning that provides for 
the agreement between possible selections, ordering the alternatives (selec-
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tions) available to the individuals within the system. Because communication 
accomplishes this only through the employment of symbols, the situation 
is one of high contingency; this contingency further complicates selection. 
In high contingency situations, it is necessary to develop and employ some 
means for efficiently and effectively guiding the transference of selections 
(guiding choice) from one social member to another.
Contingency is a key concept in Luhmann’s theoretical framework, be-
cause it underpins the relationship of communication and communication 
media to social action systems. It offers a possible explanation for how and 
why the creation of shared meaning enables the formation and functioning of 
social systems. Luhmann sees the regulation of contingency as critical to the 
existence of social systems. Such systems presume two areas of contingency:
1. rules for joining/leaving because there exist members/non-members
2. the role of membership rules determines the behaviors to be enacted 
in the social system.
The level of contingency of each of these two areas is higher than is the 
level of contingency of the relationship between the two areas. For the pur-
pose of communicating meaning, namely, guiding choice, the language code 
is insufficient. Because, by its very nature, language contains both the pos-
sibility of affirmation (compliance) and negation (rejection), what Luhmann 
calls “double selectivity.” The more complex the action system, the greater the 
need for a functional differentiation between the language code in general 
and special, symbolically generalized communication media (like power, 
truth, trust, or money), which serve to condition and regulate the motivation 
for accepting offered selections. These devices greatly increase the efficiency 
of the system by creating generalized motivational reality constructs.
In part, generalized motivational reality constructs account for “the way 
things are done”, for both the typical behavior and the deviations are allowed 
to co-exist. It accounts for the thousand and one day-to-day actions which 
conduct business in a manner unassuming, reliable, and self-perpetuating. 
It is the stuff which is the system, the living matter which like the cells in 
the body renews itself, contains the patterns that are the blueprints for the 
entity’s structure and functioning, is composed of individual units yet su-
persedes mere collectivity, enables growth and adaptation. These constructs 
serve also as the coding scheme for the text of the system, as the gate-keepers 
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of everpresent and constantly growing contingency. This task exhausts the 
utility of language, and therefore specialized communication media develop 
to carry out these functions for the system/organization.
A communication medium is defined as a mechanism communicating 
meaning in addition or as a supplement to language; a code of generalized 
symbols which guides the transmission of selections. Communication media 
also have a motivating function, which is to “urge the acceptance of (the oth-
er’s) selections and make that acceptance the object of expectation.” When the 
manner of one partner’s selection serves simultaneously as a motivating struc-
ture for the other, a communication medium can be said to be formulated. 
Such formulation is self-reinforcing; it makes the following two assumptions:
1. Media-guided communication processes bind partners who complete 
their own selections and know about this from each other.
2. The transference of selections means the reproduction of selections 
in simplified conditions abstracted from initial contexts.
The processes of simplification and abstraction presuppose symbol us-
age and the formulation of symbolically generalized codes. It can be said 
that communication codes secure possible chains of effects independently 
of the will of the receiver. Not against the receiver’s will, but indifferently/
independent of that will; for a communication code is not here a cause but 
rather a catalyst: accelerating events, thereby increasing the probability of the 
ratio of effective connections between the system and the environment. In 
Luhmann’s words, a communication code is an “opportunity to increase the 
probability of realizing improbable selection combinations.”
This makes it possible to make a distinction between the code and the 
communication process, so that gender is not considered to be the posses-
sion either of an individual or a group, that is, not as an inherent attribute 
or as a characteristic. Rather, the rules for gender attribution are themselves 
contained in the media code. The implicit and socially embedded nature of 
communication media makes such a reflexive posture possible. This reflex-
ivity greatly increases the efficiency of the system and serves also to aid in 
guaranteeing its future and continued effectiveness.
Proposing to examine gender as a communication code is also a way of 
suggesting that communication between individuals can also be understood 
and examined by looking at those aspects of communication which transcend 
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the here and now and the individuals involved. While it is generally acknowl-
edged that interaction patterns are basically socially conditioned, relatively 
little research attention in communication has been focused upon the ahis‑
torical and atemporal aspects of that social conditioning. What this suggests 
is that serious consideration be afforded the definition of what is meant by 
“socially conditioned.” If it is not meant to mean only that children repeat the 
interaction patterns of their parents, then consideration of how concrete, idio-
syncratic events are translated/abstracted into a portable “pattern” is required. 
Luhmann labels what results from this abstracting process “communication 
media” or “communication codes.” For Luhmann, the existence of such codes 
enables the enormous complexity of modem society and is necessitated by the 
limitation of language, which he claims would be quickly overburdened by any 
effort to explain the patterns (of expectation) carried by the codes.
This seemingly sweeping dismissal of language requires further elabo-
ration. It is easy to misread Luhmann’s intent, and to therefore regard all 
conversation as irrelevant in any attempt to uncover these communication 
media/codes which so efficiently condense and impart interpretation as well 
as motivational patterns of action. Communication media differ from con-
versation in the information-exchanging sense in that communication me-
dia or codes are not neutral in regard to action selection, nor are they sensory 
in an ordinary sense. Codes do not carry any explicit sense of alternatives or 
choice, rather they carry a motivation force of an expected/anticipated ac-
tion or behavior. Codes are akin operationally to the motivational force that 
causes American drivers to stop at stop signs and red lights, regardless of 
time of day or traffic conditions (or rather, the absence of other traffic) and 
to the presumed influence that both detergent packaging has on consumer 
purchasing or the public announcement to vote for a certain candidate has 
upon voting behavior.
Luhmann suggests that the motivational power of the communication 
codes is partly a result of its embedding in the web of social conventions 
which constitute a society. What Luhmann is observing as regards language 
is that it would take at least one and possible several lifetimes to explain all of 
the social conventions and expectations that underlie both the daily activi-
ties and the pivotal life decisions faced by each member of a social system. 
This difficulty is magnified geometrically in the case of a highly complex and 
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differentiated social system, within which individuals are often members of 
more than one subsystem, each in a variety of ways and differing to various 
degrees. If individuals were bound by linguistic explication, such crossovers 
of multiple sub-system memberships would be impossible. Likewise, if lan-
guage (e.g., natural language) were the only communication medium avail-
able, the development of social complexity would be restricted by its natural 
limitations. Luhmann does not preclude the possibility that language might 
function in an adjunctive capacity or even an elemental capacity to other 
communication codes. In looking to language as a code adjunct, it is neces-
sary to bear in mind the salient qualities of communication codes: because 
they are condensed and motivational, these codes must be atemporal and 
ahistorical. In order to relieve the need for explication, the content of com-
munication codes must be in a highly abstracted form, comprehensible in-
stantly, as well as independently of the context of its origin.
Talk, or verbal exchange, can in some regard be said to function as a 
model for all communication research. Often in communication, research 
language is largely taken for granted as a code. Communication researchers 
are frequently concerned with the content of that code, and occasionally with 
its surface structure (e.g., syntactic characterization by sentence type such as 
interrogative, command, etc.) and thereby focus on language as a noun.
In seeking to examine language not only as a noun but also as a process, 
communication must recognize and distinguish its approach from that of 
other interested disciplines currently cooperating under the rubric of cogni-
tive science to examine language as a psychological or cognitive process, as 
a neurophysical, neurochemical and neuroelectrical process, and as a me-
chanical process. Luhmann’s communication codes provide one means of 
examining linguistic phenomena as a social process or social code.
The examination of language as a social code would require a shift in 
focus from the now predominant psychological and cognitive emphasis to 
those aspects of communication which transcend (yet encompass) individ-
ual use and divergent episodes/acts. I am not here referring to the schema of 
communication act with which all communication scholars and students are 
familiar; a sender/encoder, a medium, a message, a receiver/decoder, an en-
vironment potentially disruptive. While this scenario clearly depicts a great 
many communicative acts and enables a kind of post hoc analysis of a given 
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event, it possesses little capacity to explain those aspects of human com-
munication which create and recreate the necessary social knowledge to in 
turn facilitate social process. Put another way, inasmuch as individuals both 
feel themselves and can refer to membership in a collective, non-material 
entity labeled as “society”, what role or roles does communication play in 
the maintenance of such a dynamic entity? Luhmann might suggest that the 
(communicative) mechanisms by which individuals accomplish social inter-
action are the product of the history of the social system. In this regard, these 
mechanisms are also in process, so that they are comprised of the past epi-
sodes and all contingencies to these episodes. Yet these mechanisms/codes 
are abstracted from that history and time.
What makes the codes (or mechanisms) ahistorical is that they com-
press and abstract elements or features of their original social interaction in a 
manner that does not require knowledge of that original context and episode 
as a precondition for use of that code. These codes are atemporal in their 
abstraction of information and motivation, so that through the employment 
of these communication codes, the action choice of individuals is structured 
to produce a selected outcome moments, months, even generations removed 
from the original “context”.
In some sense, all language employs, or can employ, atemporal and ahis-
torical qualities. It is this potentiality upon which the poet draws in creating 
meaning. The use of these qualities in the form of metaphors and metonomy 
appears to be a common linguistic phenomenon (see Pragmatics by Levin-
son and Language by Clark, et al). While communication has turned some 
attention to metaphor, additional investigatory possibilities exist. An exam-
ple of one such possibility is the work of George Lakoff and his recently pub-
lished Women” Fire and Danizerous Things: What Cateizories Reveal About 
the Mind. As the title suggests, Lakoff uses linguistic data to uncover cultural 
models that are assumed to inform our reasoning.
In the chapter of Cultural Models in Language and Thought (editors Hol-
land and Quinn) Lakoff et al. examine the possibility of a cognitive model 
of anger resident in American English. Lakoff discusses a model of anger in 
cognitive and not affective terms because one of his goals is to tap into a larger 
model, one operative at a cultural level. Anger, or at least its expression, be-
comes an aspect of a larger social system. An extension and application of 
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Luhmann’s systems theory conceptualization would focus at this point: the 
code that transmits the conditioned expression of anger. However, the justi-
ficatory structure connecting some version of Luhmann influenced theory to 
any specific (in this case linguistic-based) methodology does not exist.
Because communication media are system elements, they potential-
ly provide an explanatory structure for a large range of actions within the 
system which appear to otherwise be irrational. While Luhmann’s theories 
require an abstraction from lived experience (most people don’t consider 
which code must be employed to achieve a goal), they concurrently require a 
system-participant view and knowledge.
Gender As a Communication Code: De‑Coding Value
If we are not to locate gender in biology, and instead locate it in a social 
practice-labeled “communication code”, then perhaps we can begin to delin-
eate the valuing that is inherent in the coding process. Following Luhmann, 
we can say that gender as a code carries with it a motivational force for select-
ing specific behaviors over others in a range of behaviors. Put another way, 
the individual at the receiving end of a gender code transaction is limited by 
the expectations embedded in that code. To select a behavior inconsistent 
with the code’s expectations carries the real threat of sanction, which eventu-
ally means exclusion from the group. To elect not to participate in the code 
is ultimately to risk exclusion (in principle) from the largest social system: 
from humanity.
This sanction (exclusion from humanity) is devastating to individuals. 
Unlike electing to not participate in the social communication code known 
as money surely places one at the fringe of this wealthy society. But exclusion 
from humanity places one beyond even a hint of fringe. Gender is one of the 
most basic of social codes. And it appears to be fundamental to all other identi-
ties or memberships in sociocultural groups and sub-groups. Witness the awk-
wardness with which one addresses a newborn infant who’s sex is unknown at 
first. In fact, adults seem to be uncertain how to interact at all with a child of 
indeterminate sex. There is some evidence that the tone of voice, the manner in 
which one handles the infant, the content of one’s speech, and even the attrib-
utes one accords to the infant are all coded in large part by one’s knowledge of 
the infant’s sex/gender. What this suggests is that without gender identity, one 
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can have virtually no social identity whatsoever. Not engaging in the gender 
code renders one all but unable to participate in the system at all.
Perhaps things have changed a bit in the last fifty years, and a gender 
identity is less vital than it may have been historically. After all, women are 
no longer confined to secondary job positions, no longer automatically cease 
working in order to raise children, they may participate in physical activities 
once reserved solely for males, and they may choose to remain single. On 
the other hand, marriage is experiencing an upsurgence, Christian funda-
mentalism appears to be politically strong, and abortion may soon no longer 
be protected by the federal court. If the gender code has been altered in the 
recent past, it has not yet been broken.
It is possible to find evidence in many places for the gender code in opera-
tion, serving to pre-select specific behaviors over others, and thereby ordering 
the potential chaos in freedom of choice. Perhaps this is the reason that much 
of our popular media carry messages which all too clearly delimit human be-
havior to a narrow and highly predictable range of behaviors: the system itself 
responds to the “stress” of new variation in acceptable actions by displaying 
highly encoded messages as morality lessons and as a means of ensuring the 
incredible efficiency of code deployment – stability of the status quo.
In order to provide an illustration of the gender code in a particular set-
ting, I am drawing upon some preliminary research findings from a project 
funded by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority from July 1988 
to June 1989. The research initially entailed two goals: the first was to assess 
the collective state of affairs among the residents of a specific federal housing 
community. The second was to develop a plan for engendering leadership 
among the residents. The discussion that follows draws upon the findings 
described in a preliminary report filed with CMHA in early April 1989.
Residents of the CMHA facility are primarily young, single, head of 
household females with multiple dependents. It appears many of them are 
second or even third generation residents of public housing. How does that 
come to pass? Our interviews and observations yielded the following version 
of how this comes to be. Beginning with a child (female) of grade school age, 
there are only two sources of role models: their mothers and grandmothers, 
and women in the mass media. It is the case that teachers do not fill this func-
tion for children of public housing. What seems to happen instead is that 
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these children are tagged very early on as “low achievers” by the school per-
sonnel and so treated accordingly. This serves in part to disenfranchise the 
children who seem to feel as though they are merely visitors in their schools, 
and not a part of the system. This reduces their exposure to alternative life 
choices by reducing their active participation as well as their engagement in 
extra-curricular activities. The system so miserably fails them as a group that 
most drop out by age sixteen and never graduate. The young women often 
leave because of pregnancy. Because they cannot apply for their own ADC 
and housing until they are 18, their mother’s assume responsibility for the 
child and claim it as a dependent until such time as the girls reach 18. Bear-
ing multiple children is seen as a large part of the ordinary definition of being 
a young woman in this community. At the same time, it serves as the only 
viable economic alternative to illegal drug-related activities.
This scenario can be easily contrasted with the same gender code modi-
fied by white, middle to upper class culture. At the risk of oversimplification, 
young girls from this particular socio-economic background are early and 
thoroughly initiated into the educational system, including extra-curricular 
activities. As the consequence, they are exposed to a variety of alternative 
role models. This translates into a greater variety of choices for these girls, 
although the gender code is also well-established with them, lest they forget 
their primary responsibility to family and caretaking. For example, as the 
girls approach adulthood, they may well be exposed to notions about balanc-
ing a career and a family, or at least a husband. For the most part, they are 
encouraged to seek a husband, especially in the case that their future plans 
entail children. And even though it has become increasingly popular for sin-
gle and independent women to talk about bearing and raising a child without 
the interpersonal involvement of a male, no woman is encouraged to bear a 
child who does not also have sufficient fiscal resources to cope with this plan 
easily. By expanding their social horizons through advanced education and 
career-tracked employment, these young women must come to terms with 
balancing their gender identities with their career role expectations.
For this certain segment of the population, economic independence is 
touted as mandatory. For the young women in public housing, economic 
independence is the major lesson taught during their tenure as children and 
adolescents. Yet, in a convoluted, almost paradoxical way, the young women 
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raised in public housing and on public monies are also encouraged to be 
economically independent in the sense that they are not socialized to depend 
upon (even partially) the earning potential of a male. The irony here deserves 
further attention.
Remember that communication codes serve to condense information 
and to carry motivation for certain action selections. The need for these 
communication media arises from the incredible complexity of the social 
environment which overwhelms human capacity to cope. In particular, this 
is true for modern societies that are comprised of highly differentiated social 
systems. Communication codes serve the system’s need to manage this chaos 
which they do by reducing complexity, by pre-selecting actions. In allowing 
the definition of economic independence to be largely tied up with rhetoric 
associated with feminism or the women’s movement, the system (in this case 
the articulation of it through the federal government) defines female gender 
in a way which suits the particular needs of two different sub-systems: the 
upwardly mobile segment, and the permanently economically marginal or 
dependent segment, or rather the subsystem that subsists on supplying this 
societally suppressed population.
How do we know (or at least what makes us suspect) that this is evi-
dence for the existence and operation of a communication code? There are 
two factors that substantiate this analysis. First, we know that communica-
tion codes serve to pre-select actions, and carry a motivational component 
with that action pre-selection. To return to a point made earlier in this paper, 
it is one of the contentions of this writing that no operational definition of 
what is meant by “socially conditioned” exists in the relevant communication 
literature. It is herein suggested that communication codes might be adapted 
to meet this need. Thus, to employ the explanation of “socialization” to this 
phenomena is unsatisfactory. To put it another way, our young women are 
socialized by the deployment and participation in a communication code 
labeled “gender”. It is not language alone which can account for their pat-
terned behavior. None of the women we interviewed spoke of encouraging 
the daughters to become pregnant as teenagers and drop out of school. In 
fact, they counseled against such behavior.
Second, codes serve to bind partners as they operate extrinsically to the 
will of the individuals involved. Perhaps nowhere else in American society 
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is there a more clear illustration of a social sub- system and group of people 
bound by a code in a pattern of behavior neither party appears to find desir-
able than the case of welfare mothers in public housing and the entire social 
service delivery system. In this case, gender as a code is interacting with at 
least two other of the codes identified by Luhmann: power and money. The 
intersection of gender here is especially dramatic in the case of female gen-
der. Mothers on welfare are allocated benefits on the basis of their number of 
dependents. In order to increase their economic benefits, they must increase 
the number of dependents. While this is now a cliche of the critique of the 
welfare system, it places blame upon the women who are seen as draining 
the service delivery system by thoughtlessly bearing multiple children. If we 
restate the premise in this way, that the welfare system rewards only a very 
few select behaviors, such as lack of initiative in regards to employment and 
bearing children, the burden of responsibility suddenly shifts. It also serves 
to delineate the reciprocity of the (coded) relationship.
If we assume that a highly condensed code that carries pre-selected action 
choices is at work in this situation, we can make some sense of the fact that the 
system has remained largely unchanged (until very recently) in spite of much 
public rhetoric against its operation, as well as the obvious fact that the major-
ity of welfare recipients would prefer that viable and genuine employment op-
portunities were available to them and that they were better prepared to take 
advantage of such opportunities. The sense here is at the system level: the iner-
tial force of the codes involved is what works to keep in place the relationships. 
In other words, the system has produced a code which is itself differentiated, 
and which orders and reduces complexity in such a way that its participants are 
bound together in a pattern established in another historical time and place. 
The code (gender) pre-selects actions that ensure the continuity of the relation-
ship between the system and the sub-system. In doing so, the contingencies of 
the economic realities which are altered from those of the original context are 
nonetheless dealt with in way that maintains this predictable pattern.
Gender as a social/communication code serves the larger system by re-
ducing the complexity of human variation and differences to a highly simpli-
fied and therefore predictable set of possibilities within the sphere of social 
action. It does so by dealing with the complexities of contingencies (such as 
the variation inherent in humans) in such a way as to make salient only those 
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features the code pre-selects and which it further motivates social actors to 
enact. In this way, value is placed on specific types of actions. But these ac-
tions are not necessitated --- only limited in range --- by our biology.
Specialized communication codes enact culture. They make possible the 
density of meaning resident in and transmitted through human interaction. 
As such, they may be considered the focal point for one kind of examination 
of collective human action. This examination places communication at the 
center of the analysis and opens for analysis the social process of valuing.
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CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICS OF “SOCIAL DIFFERENCE”:  
CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIALLY CONDITIONED  
INACTIVISM
It is the politics of “social difference” that can provide the analytic ori-
entation sufficiently comprehensive to make sense of this pervasive theme in 
the central urban setting, we need to examine the unique aspects of “social 
distinction”, “social difference”, and “minority” (racial, ethnic, and therefore 
social) in order to fully elaborate and finally explicate the socio-political and 
theoretical significance of the politics of social difference forming the basis 
of critical politics. The meanings of difference and minority first need to be 
contextualized within the framework of social organization. That is, we must 
understand difference/minority within the principles of modem social or-
ganization. Traditionally, social organizing is understood as a set of elements 
whose interrelationships are best characterized as hierarchical. The notion of 
hierarchy implies a particular pattern of interrelating: that these relationships 
can be placed on an abstract continuum (like complexity or power) and thus 
each element stands on this scale and can be understood and identified by its 
position on the scale in relation to the position of other elements of the scale 
and to each other. Consequently, each element must be identifiable in at least 
two ways: by its distinctiveness and by its connectedness/interrelatedness. 
Therefore, we can say that the individual element must be marked by both 
distinction and connection. Social distinction becomes essential to having a 
social place or position. However, if distinctiveness is essential to position 
or place, the connectivity is essential to social mobility, for motion or move-
ment within the framework of social organization requires the coordination 
(cooperation) of or with other elements. Mobility without such coordination 
places individuals at risk of exclusion from the system. Social distinction and 
connection, then, form opposite faces of the same coin: The former providing 
the means to anchor in a kind of (social) harbor, and the latter providing the 
sail of social and economic mobility. Social difference, taken to the extreme 
of minority, however, marks a place in the social order without contempora-
neously providing genuine connectivity. Without social connectivity there is 
117
Chapter VII. The Politics of „Social Difference“: Consequences of Socially Conditioned Inactivism
no real possibility of social mobility. To (socially) institutionalize difference 
as minority is to have created an intranscendant social category. Acceptance 
into this category is tantamount to entering a room with no exits. In the case 
of a central city community’s self-identification as a social and racial minor-
ity the perception of this kind of intranscendant difference (self-identifying 
as a minority community) is often combined with an acceptance of broad 
cultural goals, and a rejection of the traditional methods of achieving such 
goals. It is a particular and contemporary form of social and economic dis-
enfranchisement, an attitude, if you will, unfortunately reinforced by both 
popular culture forms and by the socio-economic realities of most minority 
neighborhoods. There is a difference between, for example, wanting attain-
ment or acquisition and wanting achievement; in the first case one wants to 
be famous, win the lottery, and so on, and in the second, one hopes for a level 
of skill warranting reward and recognition. For a large part of the central city 
community, socio-economic disenfranchisement means having no access, 
understanding, or acceptance of the socially approved means (mechanisms, 
channels, vehicles) of goal achievement. This mixture of wanting materially 
but not apprehending a means of attainment leads to a displaced sense of 
agency. The means of social success are tied up in the rules of a game biased 
against minority participants – only the rule-makers have power or agency. In 
this case, the rule-makers are White Members of the social system. And be-
cause cultural values and goals are common currency, and because American 
mythology still contains the empty promise of equal and ample opportunity 
for all, a curious sense of entitlement has evolved among minority members. 
However, it is entitlement to what others already have, and not to the means 
of that attainment. If one believes that agency lies external to oneself (because 
the system treats one as without agency), then one is unlikely to value access 
to the means of attainment, for only agents can transform means into ends. 
Indeed, even minority members who gain access to an attainment means such 
as higher education will frequently manage the opportunity as a chance to 
manipulate the system and not as a chance to develop and hone new skills. 
This is to suggest neither that scamming the system is tied in any way to racial 
or ethnic membership, nor that this is an unreasonable or ineffective strategy. 
Rather this is to point out a difference in manner participation between what 
is socially prescribed and what IS (sometimes) enacted. 
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To continue, the sense of agency seems to be displaced into a sense of 
identification as a minority, as though enacting an identity as a minority 
were both a means and an end. Although most socio-cultural acts of identi-
fication are certainly ends by themselves, the particular nature of central city 
community identification as a minority has at least two qualities that render 
it significantly different as a subcultural identity from many other minority 
(subcultural) identities. The first of these is the displaced and abbreviated 
sense of agency previously described and the second is a cultural (systemic) 
characteristic described in the anthropological literature as liminality. 
In socio-cultural terms that which is liminal is the element or group 
whose identity is sufficiently ambiguous as to contain at least one set of para-
doxical conditions, such that Its members are disenabled from participating 
in the larger social system in a meaningful, productive adult way. Thus what 
are the paradoxes comprising the label minority in application to central city 
communities? To begin at the most general (and pervasive) level, to be black 
is to be not White (or some other color binary). If to be White is to be suc-
cessful by working inside of the system then to be Black is to be successful by 
working against or at least outside of the system. The problem this appears to 
create is that for a Black to succeed in a WASP society by following conven-
tional (white) means is to simultaneously reject one’s minority membership 
or identity: a crippling paradox. 
For example, the educational system is viewed as oppressive of Black 
historical experience and repressive of Black cultural expression. This is an 
identity based not on some particular cultural articulation, but rather on dif-
ference, if not opposition to mainstream (White) culture. This stands in con-
trast to some other minority groups, who embrace much about mainstream 
culture (goals, values, etc.) and who demarcate difference or subgroup mem-
bership by the use of primarily ritualistic events (i.e. specific marriage cus-
toms, customs and costumes, religious displays, food preparation, rites of 
passage jewelry) emblems and organized community activities or events). 
However, each of these cultural demarcations, although emphasizing unique 
subcultural features and a sense of community and identity, occurs while 
individual members participate in general and on a daily basis within the 
structure of the (White) socio-cultural hegemony. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to comment on or evaluate the gains and losses of such accultur-
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ations, except to note that both parties are affected by the process. The exact 
nature, extent, significance, value, and meaning of these changes is a difficult 
and elusive topic. Rather than seek to assess such a process, our intent here 
is simply to observe and partially characterize it, as it relates to the issues at 
hand, and in doing so assist in illuminating system characteristics and pro-
cesses relevant here. The point is to make note of the fact that ethnicity need 
not be equivalent to social and economic marginality. 
Clearly, this conclusion flies in the face of the partially articulated per-
spective underlying many of the comments and explanations offered by “mi-
norities”, many of whom have voiced the sentiment that they are denied suc-
cess as well as access by virtue of their race. At this point, the question seems 
to be: is their lack of access and success the result of self-imposed minority 
identification or the result of socio-cultural racism? In fact, both perspec-
tives are partially valid because the social system and the subgroup each par-
ticipate in the articulation of minority membership as agentless and liminal. 
Each participates in the communication code that articulates “Blackness, 
Brownness or Yellowness”, as specifically evident in central urban areas (Co-
lumbus, Ohio) and this code binds its participants in a kind of reciprocity 
that perpetuates the code and the social system. 
One of the key consequences of this code is the lack of consistent eco-
nomic cohesiveness. What does not occur is the sort of economic solidarity 
that would take the form of central city Blacks purchasing primarily from 
other Black business owners, which would generally mean patronizing 
neighborhood businesses. For instance, as one respondent noted, Jews living 
in the far northwest comer of the city commonly travel to the east side, a 20 to 
30 minute trip, to patronize Jewish-owned businesses, whereas Blacks living 
only several blocks away make no effort to patronize Black-owned business-
es. In short, as a group, they seem not to display economic solidarity, and yet, 
this is not to suggest that as a minority group central city Blacks lack a sense 
of community, but rather to make note of the manner in which “community” 
is articulated: it is an interpersonal-phenomenon and not a socioeconomic 
one with one obvious exception – the ease of neighborhood-organized drug 
dealing. In public housing, the money generated by such endeavors was not 
funneled back into the area and local businesses, and most certainly it was 
not the neighborhood that gained in any respect from drug trafficking. 
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Adapting how we can understand this theoretical and practical theory 
of communication codes has an intellectual and political benefit in that such 
codes are posited to operate throughout a system (e.g., society) without dis-
tinguishing among cultural variations. These codes reduce contingencies 
that might overwhelm an individual, and thereby enable great amounts of 
social differentiation along economic lines, while enabling the now differ-
entiated segments to interact predictably. Thus, the codes provide the means 
to relatively stable system ends by providing or perhaps “enlisting” a kind of 
compliance on the part of all individuals. Because the codes remain out of 
conscious consideration of most system participants, compliance does not 
require consenting cooperation on the part of these same individuals. Be-
cause their behavior is compliant only in terms of the system’s needs, and not 
in terms of the needs of an individual’s psyche, it is not necessary to resort 
to either personality characteristics nor to hypothetical genetic or cultural 
predispositions to explain, and understand the behavior of individuals and 
groups. In short, in applying this theoretical construct, it is not necessary to 
blame individuals in order to explain social phenomena. 
Communication codes are characterized by both reducing the field of 
alternatives, and reciprocity. Communication codes are complexity-reducing 
mechanisms that are accomplished through the management of fields of con-
tingency. In a social system, the fields of contingency are the alternatives (ac-
tion and meaning) available to individuals. One way to define meaning is as 
a reduction of these alternatives through the mutual acknowledgment of the 
participants. In this way, meaning is created by the increase in the probability 
of the selection of some very limited actions on the part of the participants. 
The net result is that each participant can be said to understand the situation 
in the sense that it is predicable to a large degree for the participant. This is, 
of course, a limited and specific way of defining meaning, and is not meant 
to deny or invalidate other ways of defining the term. It is also not to suggest 
that alternative or additional kinds of meaning both actually occur and are 
possible to discern given the same parameters as are utilized here. The point, 
instead, is to sharpen the focus of this theoretic discussion in a way that will 
enable us to more clearly understand the detail and application of commu-
nication codes to minoritization. The first step is to determine whether any 
set of transactions can be said to be constitutive of, or at least indicative of 
121
Chapter VII. The Politics of „Social Difference“: Consequences of Socially Conditioned Inactivism
a communication code. We can judge communication processes for clues to 
the existence and enactment of codes by looking for the following pattern 
in the exchange: participants who complete their own action selections and 
know this from each other. Immediately, the participants are linked because 
both the selection choices and their completion require confirmation by the 
other. Once this takes place, the participants become bound as their future 
exchanges and action selections are predicated upon confirmation on the 
part of the other. It is, in part, this particular kind of interdependence that 
earmarks the formulation of a communication code. 
Communication codes seen as mechanisms, as catalysts that guide 
transactions, the specifics of the selections, are not as important as is the 
motivating quality of the selecting process. It is motivating in terms of the 
selections made by the other. That is to say that, when the manner of one 
partner’s selections serves simultaneously as a motivating structure for the 
other, a communication code can be said to be formulated. Clearly, if it is the 
manner and not the content of the selections that is the compelling or condi-
tioning aspect of the transactions, then a code is formulated, as it can be said 
to be both abstract and ahistorical in nature. By encoding the manner of the 
selecting, a code is freed from the boundaries of the here and now and can 
operate out of consciousness, because, in fact, it is the code that now orders 
the situation and not the situation that determines the encoding. 
One of the benefits of employing the concept of communication codes 
is that it provides a way of specifying how that which communication schol-
ars call context affects human interaction. Thus, we can operationalize the 
variable context as the presence of a specific code or set of codes that co-
condition the selections of the actors, so that the interpretation or meaning 
created is wholly a product of a highly reduced field of contingencies per-
ceived by the participants. Contingencies are further ordered by a code so 
that some specific combinations of selections are rendered highly probable. 
Because probability (determined by codes) greatly enhances predictability 
and predictability constitutes one basis of/for meaning, context operational-
ized as communication coders directly affects the range of possible and likely 
meanings available to the participants. 
Because codes manage complexity by reducing contingency, they not 
only reduce the number of action alternatives available to the participants, 
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but they simultaneously order those contingencies, the remaining preferred 
alternatives, and in so doing, significantly increase the probability of a few of 
those remaining selections. This sequence of contingency reduces motiva-
tion because of the net effect: the high probability of selections of the selec-
tion of some few alternatives by the participants for a selection of options ap-
pears to be intrinsically limited, that is, limited due to the nature of the world 
or of the situation, not as the consequence of the operation of codes. Two 
results follow from this apprehension: limited and narrow changes seem pos-
sible, if any do, and the actors do not see themselves as participating in the 
mechanism responsible for the curtailment of their options. This net effect 
is further reinforced by the fact that codes are ahistorical and atemporal in 
nature, and these qualities render them invisible to social participants. When 
a mechanism is invisible and only the effects of it are manifest, it is easy to 
conclude that either some completely different mechanism is at work, or that 
nothing in particular is at work; that the effects merely constitute “reality”. In 
this respect, codes gain potency and efficacy by being ahistorical and atem-
poral, in contrast to the more typical assumptions communication research-
ers make about the nature of context: that it is very much a product of the 
specific histories of both the parties involved and their joint history (their 
relational history) in addition to immediate situational variables.   
Reciprocity, the second key characteristic of codes, is crucial to both 
the success of the social system and to the ability of the individual to par-
ticipate in the system. It is a marker of inclusion. It is also, in principle, the 
characteristic responsible for exclusion from system processes, without the 
reciprocation of the other during interaction, the field of selection remains 
relatively unpredictable, which is to say that compliance of any kind is not a 
likely result. The other is not responsive to the individual’s manner of select-
ing alternatives, so that the individual cannot seem to influence the selection 
of alternatives (the behavior of the other, a situation of relatively high con-
tingency and low predictabi1ity). Given the potency and efficacy of codes 
when enacted, being unable to enact a code would cause an individual to 
feel excluded and ineffective, and over time, possibly impotent and/or help-
less. It is the reciprocity that serves as boundary marker for the system par-
ticipants. Not that it demarcates members from nonmembers, but rather, it 
indicates points of differentiation within the system. That is, the failure to 
123
Chapter VII. The Politics of „Social Difference“: Consequences of Socially Conditioned Inactivism
engage reciprocity of the code (any code) occurs as a means of distinguishing 
subsystems within the larger social system. In fact, it is exactly because codes 
as atemporal and ahistorical phenomena possess the potential for guiding 
communication processes throughout the entire system: that the points at 
which there is a failure of reciprocity are functionally equivalent to actual 
physical borders. From a system perspective, it is highly efficacious to utilize 
a mechanism that simultaneously serves to cohere the system elements and 
to differentiate among subsystems.
Responses need to be carefully examined in the light of both their origi-
nal context and from the perspective of the actors, thu highlighting the dif-
ference between the sensibility of the system and that of the actor: what is 
functional for one is not necessarily optimal for the other. 
From a system perspective, the need for self-replication may consist-
ently override the option of optimization for/of system elements. At strate-
gic points, the deployment of a code (maybe “socio- economic mobility”) or 
codes minus the component of reciprocity creates the economic marginaliza-
tion of the inner-city regions of urban areas through the replication of subsys-
tem divisions that, in turn, maintain a particular simplification or balancing 
of a host of symbolic and material contingencies. This, in turn, enables the 
continuation of a particular pattern of resource allocation while minimizing 
both the likelihood of and potential success of any challenge to that pattern. 
By encoding specific behavioral expectations into variations of communica-
tion media across the spectrum of social differentiation, and by the selective 
engagement of code reciprocity, the system induces replication of itself, in-
cluding a segment characterized by economic and social marginalization.
From the perspective of the social actor, such marginalization is cer-
tainly not experienced as anything nearing optimal. Nonetheless, from a sys-
tem perspective, such a component serves various functions, and because 
system elements are interdependent, altering this component is difficult and 
implicitly threatening to the future of the system which is biased in favor of 
actualizing any future: state as a replication, if not near duplication, of its pre-
sent state. In other words, the system itself, although potentially adaptable, is 
inherently conservative, favoring preservation of the status quo. Replication 
more commonly wins out over optimization. In offering up greatly reduced 
alternatives and in favoring the selection of one or several of those alterna-
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tives over others, codes provide the sort of information on which individuals 
predicate their understanding of self, of the world, and of the relationship 
between the self and the world. In so orienting the individual to the world, 
codes influence the ability of individuals to generate new or different per-
spectives. Because one can only ask questions about what one understands 
(or believes oneself to understand: I must be able to articulate what it is I 
know that I don’t know in order to formulate a question), one can limit the 
extent and range of, questions an individual might raise. Put differently, that 
people often don’t know that they don’t know is, to some extent, a byproduct 
of the nature of communication codes. The net result is that they don’t know 
what questions to ask because they don’t understand the relationships that 
constitute the encryption scheme for locating the information they need but 
don’t know they need.
These are two of the problems that emerged as thematic in the interview 
data: asking the right questions to get at relevant information and determin-
ing that one does in fact know what one believes one knows. The way a social 
actor knows factually anything is from engagement with the social system 
(e.g. with other actors and/or institutions). Here again, reciprocity is a key to 
the communication process and its social consequences, if successful engage-
ment is characterized by the articulation of code reciprocity, then disconfir-
mation would be characterized by a lack of reciprocity. If a communication 
encounter does not activate reciprocity as anticipated by a social actor, then 
there is only disconfirmation of the assumptions and understanding that 
predicated the interaction. The result is that the actor must conclude that he 
or she does not know what he or she thought he or she knew or understood, 
and without the engagement of the reciprocity, there is a sudden and steep rise 
in contingencies and therefore a complexity accompanied by a parallel drop 
in predictability. The interaction is now characterized by uncertainty, and 
the actors experience discomfort and possible dissatisfaction. Furthermore, 
without the engagement of reciprocity of the code, the linking and binding 
functions of communicative transactions are not accomplished or at least not 
in the ordinary sense in which connectivity is recognized and understood 
as a positive force in the sense that it is the presence of some relationship. In 
a back-handed sort of way, the failure of reciprocity links individuals in the 
sense that it firmly establishes the absence of connectivity, but the context of 
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a social system, demarcation of relational boundaries (exclusion as well as 
inclusion) is still acknowledging a relationship in terms of the larger system. 
That this negative linking is still a form of social relating reflects on the need 
of the system to replicate itself and on the idea of socio-economic competency 
and mobility. In terms of the system, it may be necessary, or at least desirable, 
for certain elements to remain, in socio-economic terms, immobile, in which 
case it is inaccurate to label those elements as socio-economically incompe-
tent. For, from a system perspective, such immobility is really a form of com-
petency, of accurately enacting the expectations of the system.
It is clear that codes must, in fact, order the social situation and consti-
tute the context of an interaction, what Luhmann (1995) so elliptically refers 
to as “code-guided communication processes”. Minorities attempting to deal 
with bank loan officers clearly illustrate an example of the effect of code-
limited alternatives restricting the possibility or probability of a social actor 
asking the appropriate and relevant questions in order to secure the neces-
sary information and understanding to accomplish his or her goal (i.e., to 
secure a loan). 
This difficulty is further exacerbated by the fact that much (legal. etc.) 
information is encrypted in a way that renders it incomprehensible to the 
very people who might most benefit from access to it (in this case, inner-
city small business owners). At one level, untangling this kind of encryp-
tion problem can be managed if dealt with in a conscientious and systematic 
way. That it remains a problem in light of the attention afforded it at local, 
state, and federal levels is an indication that something more pervasive is at 
work in the situation. One explanation is that changing that situation will 
result in a direct challenge to the governmental and financial networks that 
enmesh such programs as those designed to offer support and technical as-
sistance to small businesses, especially ones located in inner cities. However, 
it is beyond the scope of any single case study to provide sufficient evidence 
to determine whether a specific code or set of codes is directly implicated 
here. What can be noted is that such a significant reallocation of resources 
raises contingencies within several social system domains, and so constitutes 
an implicit threat to replication. 
To shift perspective from communication codes to more general system 
characteristics, the need for a system to ensure its continuation by means of 
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replication is closely related to a system’s tendency toward homeostasis, that 
is, its tendency to maintain equilibrium. There are two primary means for a 
system to maintain equilibrium in the face of newly introduced forces. It can 
either adapt itself to the new condition or it can reconfigure the new force 
into a shape which the system can assimilate and/or manipulate. In the first 
case, the system must make some significant self-adjustment, whereas in the 
second, it conversely causes a change in the new contingency or force. One 
can argue that a sufficiently robust system would tend toward the second 
alternative, which is more conservative, requires fewer changes or manipula-
tions, and does not require the nearly always risky application of the princi-
ple of equifinality. 
An example of this kind of homeostatic response is the taking over of 
specific symbols, images, and issues by the dominant culture and the tel-
ecommunication media of “minority” efforts to shift some aspect of the so-
cial value system. This is otherwise recognized by scholars as cooptation. 
Although social movements arise from within a social system, partly as a 
result of high levels of differentiation, the mechanisms that cohere the system 
(those that cut across the differentiation) operate to co-opt such movements 
in order to manipulate or reconfigure them into forms the system can better 
direct and control. Trivialization of a social movement effectively co-opts 
that movement and reduces its potency in two ways. It presents the issues 
around which efforts to create change are focused as insignificant and frivo-
lous. It also reconfigures those symbols into forms, already dominant and 
meaning-laden, and so the new meaning is overwhelmed by the old, domi-
nant, easily recognized, and commonly embraced meanings. The new mes-
sage comes to merely reiterate the old. 
In the case of the articulation of a minority identity, and the articulation 
of an identity as a minority, this kind of cooptation appears to character-
ize the efforts of generations of central city minorities. Although it is true 
that there is no necessary (e.g., genetic or biological) connection between an 
underclass status and race-indeed, there are Blacks at virtually all socio-eco-
nomic levels, there appears to be an institutionalized form of racism which 
serves to facilitate social and economic differentiation in broad terms across 
the system. 
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It may be the case that racism is one of the key triggers of the suspension 
of code reciprocity, a means of activating differentiation while deploying a 
mechanism that otherwise coheres system elements by reducing contingen-
cies to ordered alternatives. In this respect, racism serves to assist in the at-
tainment and maintenance of homeostasis of the system. To the extent that 
this is the case, cooptation of the efforts by minorities to initiate substan-
tive change in their social status and valuation in the system clearly reflects 
the conservative and robust nature of the system. The capacity to enact the 
transformation of new forces to fit standard formats means that replication 
of existing codes will be favored as a means of ensuring the continuation of 
the system. In this way, the potential for significant and substantive (social) 
change is subsumed by the system while being made possible in part by the 
potency of communication codes and their ability to reduce complexity and 
order alternatives into mutual expectation.
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